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SUMMARY
In this study an attempt has been made to examine
the behaviour of pre-school children in reasoning tasks.
The tasks have been made as simple as possible on the
assumption that many reasoning experiments with young
children fail to elicit evidence of reasoning behaviour,
not because the child is incapable of reasoning but,
because the complexities of the task and the variables
extraneous to reasoning involved inhibit its appearance.
Adult subjects have also been tested on the same tasks
as the children in order to gain a * standard1 against
which the children's performance might be measured.
Of particular interest in this study has been whether
pre-school children can act strictly in accordance with
verbally presented information fully accepting its con¬
straints and whether they can make inferences defined as
the drawing of a conclusion which follows necessarily
from, but is not explicitly contained within, information
given to the children.
Seven experiments were conducted (six of which
afforded the opportunity to demonstrate inferential be¬
haviour). Prom the results it was found that insofar as
the verbally presented information conveyed the nature of
the task, then all the pre-school children acted strictly
within its limits. For example when the verbally presented
information stated that a particular type of verbal res¬
ponse was required (e.g. a judgement of 'all right* or
'wrong') this type of verbal response was given. Where
the verbally presented information was that presented
within a premiss then some of the children in some of
the tasks acted strictly in accordance with it and it
is argued that these children demonstrated the ability
to make inferences. These children produced responses
which appeared equivalent to adult responses.
The children who did not make inferences, however,
did not behave randomly. They acted strictly in accor¬
dance with the nature of the task and produced task
appropriate behaviour, i.e. they did not produce be¬
haviour which conflicted with the type of verbal and
nonverbal activity which the task required. They res¬
ponded consistently either with systematic search or
systematic repetitive strategies which were independent
of the information within the premiss, or with consistent
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A. Area and Alma of Study
The reasoning processes of pre-school children (three
to five year olds) have received only limited attention
from psychologists. Inadequate testing techniques, the
restricted availability of subjects of this age and our
comparative ignorance of relevant related issues, such ae
linguistic, social and emotional development, have probably
contributed to the scarcity of information. In addition
those studies which have been carried out conclude, in
the main, that the pre-school child does not possess
reasoning ability.* Thus, on available evidence, the area
would appear to have little to offer to the experimental
psychologist interested in reasoning processes.
The present writer, however, argues that this Is not
the case and that non-experimental observations of pre¬
school children indicate that this area, far from being
infertile, is one of rapid and frequently dramatic reasoning
development. In support of this view, Donaldson (1970)
sayss 'observations of the "spontaneous" behaviour of
children considerably younger than this (seven years) can
yield instances of what appear to be complicated inferen¬
tial acts'. She goes on to describe a recorded example of
such an instance, which took place between a research
worker and a child just over five soon after the death of
1. A review of relevant literature is given in Section B
of this chapter.
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Donald Campbell. Another research worker named Sr. Campbell
had tested the child or earlier occasions. The child asked :
'Is that Mr. Campbell who came here ... dead?' When she
was assured that Mr. Campbell was not dead, she responded
with: 'Well, there must be two Mr. Campbells then, because
Mr. Campbell's dead, under the water.' It is difficult to
describe this as anything other than a demonstration of
reasoning.
It is evidence such as this which suggests that we
may be making gross undcrestimations of the pre-school
child's reasoning ability and that this ability is worthy
of study, not only in its own right but also, as part of
the development of reasoning in human beings generally.
Moreover the task for psychologists is not to deny the
existence of reasoning in young children because it is non-
testable by conventional means, but to concentrate on ways
and means of making such behaviour more accessible to
systematic study.
This ia a task of no small magnitude. Our current
knowledge of child testing techniques is largely unformulated.
To a great extent testing children is carried out on a trial
and error basis backed by only limited theory. The fact
that a child falls to demonstrate a particular type of
response in a test can by no means be taken to imply that
he is not capable of such a response. It is Just as reason¬
able to assume that the test was not capable of eliciting
the response.
One of the aims of this study is to design techniques
which are capable of drawing out reasoning behaviour in
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young ohildren. Non-experimental observations suggest that
reasoning in some situations is available to these children,
but the majority of earlier experimental observations have
concluded that such ability ia lacking. In some ways the
task of finding adequate techniques is rather like looking
for the proverbial needle in the haystack.
Nevertheless, there is an assumption from which one
can start. This is the assumption that much of the earlier
experimental work on children's reasoning has been con¬
founded by variables extraneous to reasoning per se and
that the complexities of the test situations, in many
experiments, have themselves been sufficient to result in
a failure to elicit, or have inhibited, reasoning behaviour.
What are these confounding variables which are assumed
to influence experimental findings? Some we are aware of,
others we cannot identify; some we can specify and isolate,
others we cannot; some apply to experimentation with
adults and children, others are peculiar to the child
testing situation; some we can reduce or control and others
are not amenable to such procedures. Further some variables
are extraneous to reasoning whereas others are part of
reasoning itself.
Amongst those variables w ich influence experimenta¬
tion are culture differences. For example, Slgel and
Mermelstein (1965) found that Negro children from Virginia
who did not attend school were unable to solve class-
inclusion problems normally solved by Western children
attending school. Greenfield (1966) found that African
Bush children and French-educated children gave different
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conservation explanations.
Personality is another variable which plays a part.
Kagan, Moss and Sigel (1963) have identified three per¬
sonality-related cognitive styles used over a variety of
tasks. Wallach and Kagan (1965) have demonstrated that
modes of classification are related to personality
characteristlos and Kagan, Pearson and Welch (1966)
suggest that the impulse-control dimension will result in
different performances between children who are impulsive
and respond quickly without reflection and those who are
controlled and respond more slowly and carefully.
Much of the variation in experimental results can
also be attributed to the subject's pre-experimental
experience. With children the amount and nature of play
activities can be important. Charlesworth (1964) says
that the child may experience cognitive conflict when he
meets unexpected situations in his play and this conflict
will encourage a reordering of cognitive structure. Mani¬
pulation of various materials such as clay and water
provides feedback which could facilitate the acquisition
of conservation. (Metcalf, 1965? Sigel and Mermelstein,
1965; bigel and McB&ne, 1967).
Other variables are related quite closely to the task
the subject is required to perform. Lac.; of intrinsic
interest may account for young children failing to perform
some conservation tasks (In*elder, 1962). Task complexity
may lead to similar failures. This complexity can take
a variety of forms ranging from a simple increase in the
number of objects the child has to manipulate or make
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judgements on to the number of different transformations
and operations within a task, Peigenbauro (1963) found in
a conservation of quantity task that using twenty-eight
beads and using fourteen beads produced no difference in
children's ability to conserve, but when he rearranged the
beads into seven pairs of two beads and fourteen pairs of
two beads the latter arrangement resulted in failure of
conservation in some children. The number of transforma¬
tions which material in continuous quantity studies under¬
goes be ore the child makes a response also affects the
failure rate (Smedslund, 1966a).
The language used in experimental situations is
pointed to as a source of considerable variation in experi¬
mental results, particularly with children and particularly
in relation to traditional Piagetian studies. It is argued
that the language used by the experimenter and that used
by the child do not always have e common 'meaning' with
the result that a child fails to perform a task, not because
he lacxs the ability to do so, but because he never appre¬
ciates what he is being asked to do and moreover, when the
child has to give a verbal response, tie experimenter does
not necessarily understand the 'meaning' behind the response.
Plavell (1963) aaye of Piaget: '...much of the criticism
of Piaget, especially the early Piaget, comes down to a
dissatisfaction with his lan uage-thought translations ' .
As a consequence of such criticism studies have evolved
which attempt to reduce or change the linguistic component
of cognitive tasks. Brain© (1959) utilised a nonverbal
technique and claims that such a technique elicits tran-
sitivity of length two years earlier than the age at which
flagetian procedures elicit length transitivity. Cohen
(1967) had similar findings with conservation when she
eliminated such ambiguous terms as 'saiae* from her instruc
tions, replacing them with words such as •share* and
•fair* .-1
Many expressions used in instructions to the child
and which are crucial to the tea* have been criticised on
the grounds of ambiguity and inconsistency in 'meaning*
between child and adult. Such words as 'same', 'different
'bigger', 'longer*, 'more* and 'less' iall into this
category. Such expressions are open to both a phenomenal
interpretation, i.e. 'looks the same', 'looks different',
etc. or a reality interpretation, i.e. 'is really the
same', 'is really different', etc. Zimiles (1963) soys
that the child may respond in terms of whichever of these
dimensions is stressed by the experimenter's manipulations
Braine and Shanks (1965a) say that until at least seven
or eight children spontaneously Interpret questions about
size as questions about phenomenal size, but they found
that the ability to respond on a 'reality* basis began
around the age of three and was generally available to
all children by the age of five provided feedback informa¬
tion encouraged a 'reality' interpretation. A later study
Braine and Shanks (1965b), indicated that this was also
true of e ape and suggested it was generullzesble to other
attributes;
1. Further discussion of Braine (1959) and Cohen (1967)
will be found in bection B of this chapter.
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However, ambiguity to riot the only problem which
these crucial expressions raise. It has been found that
words such as 'leas' and 'different* are handled by pre¬
school children in a way which indicates that they convey
directly opposed 'meanings* for children and adults.
Instructions containing these 'negative-pole' words are
responded to in exactly the same way as their 'positive-
pole' counterparts, i.e. 'more* and 'same* (Donaldson
and Balfour, 1968; Donaldson and Wales, 1969?).
Failure tc remember initial instructions or premisses
when making a response has also been pxxt forward as an
explanation for failure in some tasks (Fralsee and
Vautrey, 1952: Cowan, 1964). Bryant (1971) and Bryant and
Trabaso (1971) claim to have demonstrated that children of
four can produce correct transitivity of length responses
'provided they can remeiaber the items of information which
they are required to combine'."**
Finally the scoring criteria used by experimenters
are a further source of variation. Piaget, for example,
typically requires that a child should verbally justify
his response. Others, for example Bruner (1964), do not
require anything of the child beyond his response. Oruen
(1966) in discussing scoring criteria in conservation says
the choice of criteria ia not arbitrary, but reflects the
'psychological processes that one assumes underlie
conservation*. Consequently 'investigators should be
careful to specify what they mean by "conservation"'.
1. A more detailed account of memory as a confounding
variable is given in Section B of this chapter.
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It can be seen from the above examples that there
are numerous confounding variables which can influence
experimentation with children. In the present study an
attempt has been made to control and reduce these variables
wherever possible in the hope that this will ?acilitate
the emergence of reasoning behaviour in pre-school children.
In designing tasks the aim has been to keep the questions
asked and problems raised ae free as possible from con¬
founding variables of the type mentioned above. This has
been done within the limitations of existing test tech¬
niques and knowledge and when possible by adapting and
introducing techniques which may be conducive to eliei$l*ng
reasoning behaviour in children of this age.
In part then the tasks have been designed with an
awareness of some possible pitfalls, but in part there is
also a trial and error element. Because of the gaps in
our knowledge of testing children much of the experimental
design has to be based on the experimenter's unformulated
knowledge and experience of working with children of this
age. Therefore the presence or absence of reasoning
ability by the children in these experiments has to be
judged with this in mind.
The objective in thin study has always been to
present tasks in the simplest form possible by eliminating
all but the essential aspects of the task. But straight¬
forward as some of the issues involved may appear at
first, it will soon become apparent that, even at a level
as basic aa that proposed here, the complexities of the
tanks are considerable, hot only are the child's thinking
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processes intricate and involved, but the test techniques,
material used and language in which instructions are
couched, all of which appear simple and straightforward to
adults and which are necessary if testing of any form is
to take place, are the source of additional complex!ties
with children of this age and can make interpretation of
results difficult.
It has often, therefore, been necessary to look at
issues which may appear only indirectly relevant to the
main theme of the study, but when one considers that
testing takes place within a context of test methods,
language and physically present material and cannot pro¬
ceed in the absence of such a context then the context
becomes an integral part of the thinking proce ses under
study and has to be considered and assessed as such.
The Nature of inference
We come now to one of the central themes around which
this study is based. This is the rueetion of inferen ial
behaviour and the ability or otherwise of pre-school
children to make inferences. The use of the word 'inference*
calls for some comment and definition since its meaning
appears to vary widely from the making of an approximate
estimation based on partial knowledge of a situation (Hecox
and Kagan, 1971), to ."'The independent assertion of a new
proposition which is implied by previously asserted ones '
(hanger, 1953), to '...art inference is a procedure and not
a statement. This procedure can be described only in a
rule, formulated in the metalanguage, and symbol!cally
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expressed by a schema' (Relehenbach, 194").
For the purposes of this study a child is considered
to have made an inference when he draws a conclusion
which follows necessarily from, but ia not explicitly
contained within, Information given to hlra.
In this study the Information is presented in a
verbal/visual combination or verbally a,lone. In the
cases where the information is presented in a verbal/
visual combination the child is required to act upon
concretely present material and/or make a verbal response.
In the cases of the verbally presented information no
concrete material ia present and the child is required
to give a verbal response.
uleron (1969) distinguishes three forms of inference
or reasoning which he says to a certain extent correspond
to three levels. The first form he describes as 'actually
experienced inferences'. These occur when 'the subject
simply puts into operation response schemata which have
already been constituted and which establish a connection
between a given category of stimuli and gestures or actions
which the stimuli could not spontaneously have produced ' •
The second for® is 'material reasonings'. 'These draw on
a symbolism which ia usually verbal but which may be made
up of representations of an even more concrete nature.
The way in which they unfold is determined by content,
that is> by the objects to which the symbols refer and
by the connections between the®, as revealed by experience. '
Oleron says that almost every inference which a man uses
is 0f this type, that it is found in pre-scientlfic thought
and! that it often reveals faulty chains of thought. The
third fore he names 'formal reasonings'. He says: 'These
also have a symbolic basis, which may be verbal or
specialized (symbols used by mathematicians and logicians).
Chains and combinations of proposition proceed vi formae,
i.e. they are not a mere reproduction of empirical connec¬
tions. They obey rules defined within the system concerned.
It is Oleron's third form of inference with which
this study is primarily concerned although the second
form does play a part both directly and indirectly.
A useful way of looking at the issues involved in
this study is through Yon bright's (1951) discussion of
modal logic. The necessity which links the conclusion
with the information given to the subject is a concept
falling within his alethic domain of modal logic. Von
Wright distinguishes between a number of modal categories,
two of which, the alethic and the epletemic, are relevant
to the present study. The alethlc and epistemic domains
respectively correspond quite closely with Oleron's
'formal reasonings* and 'material reasonings'.
For Von Wright the alethic modes (or modes of truth)
are concerned with what is true, what is not true and
what may be true whilst the epistemic modes (or raode3 of
knowing) cover what is known to be true, w at is known
to be not true and what is neither known to be true nor
known to be false. Schematically they can be displayed
as in Figure 1.
In the alethic modes possibility is given by Von
Wright as the 'only undefined modality we need'. From
Figure 1









thia he goes on to define necessity, contingency and im¬
possibility as follows: 'If a proposition is not possible,
it is called impossible. If the negation of a proposition
is impossible, the proposition is called necessary. If
a proposition and its negation are both possible, the
proposition is called contingent.' It will be seen from
this that the concepts of necessity and contingency are
narrower than that of possibility so that all necessary
propositions are possible as are all contingent proposi¬
tions, but not all possible propositions are necessary nor
are all possible propositions contingent.
As an undefined epistemic modality Von Wright rives
the concept 'known to be true' (or 'verified'}. From this
he says: 'If the negation of a proposition is verified, the
proposition is called falsified. If neither a proposition
nor its negation is verified (falsified) the proposition
is called undecided.'
It is interesting to note that there is no epistemic
terra inch corresponds with the alethlc 'possibility',
i.e. t ere is no word to cover both the 'verified' and
the 'undecided'. An Von Wright points out 'possible' is
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sometimes used epidemically to mean 'not known to be
false', but such use is rare, its more common epistemic
use being as a synonym for 'undecided', i.e. 'neither known
to be true nor known to be false 1 •
In this study we are concerned basically with concepts
of the alethic variety but, largely as a function of the
nature of the experimental situations, epistemic concepts
impinge upon the study. For example, a typical kind of
experiment used in this study involves the subject, with
the aid of an alethic proposition, locating an object in
one of a group of boxes. Until he actually locates a
box, opens it and sees whether or not the sought-for object
is contained within he is, strictly speaking, working within
the alethic domain (this by no means implies that this is
in fact what he is doing and, as will be seen, he may well
be utilising rules and strategies external to the given
proposition), but once he has opened the box the situation
changes. He still has available to him the alethic proposi¬
tions but, in addition, he has tie epioteraic concepts of
verification and falsification. He now knows whether the
box contains the object or not.
If one examines further the properties of alethic
propositions and considers t e features which are peculiar
»
to such propositions, then a number of points which are
relevant to inferential behaviour, as defined above, are
worthy of note.
The drawing of a necessarily true conclusion from a
premise without the utilization of any other external
data is analytic. Ayer (1964; holds that: 'a proposition
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la analytic if It la true solely In virtue of the meaning
of its constituent symbols, and cannot therefore be either
confirmed or refuted by any fact of experience*. Kant in
'Critique of Pure Reason' defines analytic propositions in
i similar vein: 'the predicate B belongs to the subject A,
as something which is covertly contained in this concept
A'. He describes analytic propositions further as 'adding
nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject,
but merely breaking it up into those constituent concepts
that have all along been thought in it; although confused¬
ly'. Such a proposition then is demonstrative in the
sense that Its 'premisses necessitate its conclusion',
i.e. it is necessarily truth-preserving, and nonampliative
in the sense that the conclusion says 'nothing that was
not already stated in the premisses' (Salmon, 1967).
Requirements of toe subject
We can now ask what is required of a subject if he is
to demonstrate inferential behaviour. What are the con¬
ditions he must satisfy?
As Donaldson (1971) sayei 'A fundamental requirement
for any system that is capable of inferential activity ie
t at it should be able to operate in terms of relation¬
ships of compatibility and incompatibility. That is, it
has to be capable of making decisions about whether the
co-occurrence of given states of affairs is possible.*
In addition, in making inferences, a subject has to be
capable of extending his decision-making beyond compati¬
bility to necessity so that he can decide that a conclusion
a
.is not only compatible with a premiss, i.e. possible, but
also necessary. Furthermore, he is required to restrict
himself to the bounds of the premiss and draw conclusions
on an analytic basis only.
Other requirements of the subject are perhaps more a
result of the conditions necessary for obtaining systematic
information on the child's reasoning than requirements of
inferential behaviour. For example, the child is required
to submit himself to the confines of a formal experimental
situation. Formal situation here is used in the sense of
a situation which the child himself does not initiate, a
situation which is not spontaneous.
Moreover, he is also required to act in accordance
with verbally presented information. Sheldon White (1969)
raises this when discussing cognitive changes in children
between the ages of five and seven. He says that after
the age of five there is a bidirectional improvement in
the 'ability to sustain a pro oaition to guide successive
behaviour segments" and in the 'ability to integrate
successive behaviour segments to form a proposition,*.
Along with this improvement there is also an increase in
speed of inner reaction, i.e. an increase in the speed of
'locating recognition, meaning and association to an
event'. Prom this he suggests that changes in .reasoning
ability may come about because more 'bits' of information
can be processed by the child in a given length of time.
This suggests that when testing young children, the informa¬
tion presented to them should be neither complex nor
lengthy and in describing the conditions and precautions
for testing children White says: 'One never ives lengthy
verbal Instructions. g^^ter the instructions, the
better. • The present stU(jy eTideavours to adhere to a
policy of brevity and noheoffipiexity in verbal instructions.
The Russian Psi'0holo|?i8^s, particularly Luria and his
associates, are concerned with "the role of language in
the regulation of behaviour 8n<3 with the ability of young
children to voluntarily regulate their behaviour in accor¬
dance with verbal instruction- Their work has its roots
in Pavlov's second signalling system' and the problems
raised by Vygotsky (1962) concerning the functions of
speech as it passes from overt to covert forms. Luria
(1961a) says: 'In Soviet psychology it has been established
that voluntary activity does not originate from any primor¬
dial properties of an internal life, but from the relations
between a child and an adult. The adult at first des¬
cribes certain tasks to t e child, who is later able to
carr^ them out in response to his own verbal instructions.'
Soviet psychologists then are interested 'both in the ways
in which speech of adults can direct the behaviour of
children, and in the ways in which children can influence
their own behaviour by speaking.' (O'Connor, 1966) .
Luria (1959) distinguishes four functions which the
verbal instructions of an experimenter can have. Firstly
there is an orienting function, secondly an initialing
function, thirdly an inhibiting function and fourthly a
regulatory function. The child acquires these functions
in the above order.
During the first si> months of life if a child is
asked to hand an object to the experimenter there is
unlikely to be a response. After six months the child
may look at the experimenter and around twelve months at
tb e object. 'The orientation function of speech, is thus
established• Around eighteen months the initiating func¬
tion begins to appear. A child responds to simple
instructions such as 'Clap hands', but only if the required
behaviour does not conflict with the child's ongoing
activities. Luria (1961b) says: 'Try giving a child of
twenty months to two ears verbal instructions to take its
stockings off while it is pulling them on. ' At this stage
then an adult's speech cannot yet inhibit an action once
started, nor can it switch the child from one action to
another.
The regulatory function of language does not appear
until later, t e age of acquisition depending on task
complexity. One of luria's tasks required the child to
press a. bulb when a light came on. At the age of two-and-
a half the child presses the bulb as soon as he hears the
word 'press' and before the light cornea on. When the
light does appear it acts as an 'external inhibitory
agent' causing the child to discontinue pressing. A year
later the child can carry out t e instruction correctly
demonstrating the appearance of the 'regulatory function
proper'. However, if a child of this age is instructed
to press the bulb twice when the light comes on he presses
it three, four and many times in succession even if he
is aware of the meaning of 'twice'. It is not until the
age of four-and-a-half to five-and-a-half, when the
regulatory function begins to move from the external to
the internal speech of the child, that a wore stable system
of motor reaction© to verbal instructions occurs and even,
then tas complexity can prevent success*
According to Luria's position then, the children in
the present study are at a critical stage in their develop¬
ment where the regulatory function of language is unstable.
Apart from the distinction drawn above (p. 15) between
formal and spontaneous situations, one can perhaps also
talk about degrees of formality or the extefi^ to which
the constraints of the teat situation are removed from
the ordinary experiences of the child's everyday life and
the extent to which other constraints, in addition to
verbal ones and other than those basic to tee task, impinge
upon the test situation. It is by no means improbable
that such test constraints are sufficient to inhibit the
appearance of behaviour of which the c ilu is capable in
a more conducive context.
It may well be that t e child's difficulty in confining
himself to a formal situation, his difficulty in restricting
himself to verbally'presented information and the additional
complexities of teat constraints go at least part of the
way towards explaining why most experimental attempts to
demonstrate inferential behaviour in young children have
met with a marked lack of success. Therefore, if experi¬
mental tasks are made extremely 'simple' and the level of
teat constraint reduced as far as possible, some evidence
of inferential behaviour may appear or at least some
indication may be gained of the types of behaviour young
children produce iri reasoning tasks.
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Summary of aims of study
Briefly then the questions which this study asks
and attempts to answer via simple experimental situations
are;
1. Are pre-school children capable of acting strictly
in accordance with verbally presented information?
2. Are pre-school children capable of drawing necessary
conclusions from premisses in which the conclusion
is implied, but not explicitly stated, i.e. are they
capable of making inferences?
3. If pre-school children cannot make inferences, do
they make any kind of response in the experimental
situation and, if so, on what is it based?
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B. A review of Helevant Ii.teratti.re
The work of Piaget and the Geneva school Is foremost
and best known In its denial of the ability to operate at
even a level approaching inference before the age of seven
or eight. Prior to that sfre the child passes through a
pro-operational stage in which his thinking is egocentric
with respect to representation (Piaget, 1955)* Another
level of egccentricity occurs during the earlier sensori¬
motor stage when the child is unable to distinguish his
actions from their environmental consequences. The ability
to make this distinction begine during the second year of
life, but there still remains 'the problem of mentally
representing what has already been absorbed at the level
of action' (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969)*
The representational egocentricity of the pre-operational
child is revealed in his inability to see hie own view¬
point aa one of many. For example at four or five a child
may be able to distinguish hie own left hand from his
right hand, but it is not until much later that he appre¬
ciates that the hand to the right of a person facing him
is that person's left hand. In a similar voin the pre¬
operational child when talking to a person does not adapt
his speech to the needs of the listener (Piaget, 1926).
Another way in which Piaget talks of egocentris® is
through the concepts of centration and decentration. The
pre-operational child tends to 'center' on one particular
attribute of a situation at the expense of other relevant
attributes. He is unable to 'decenter' from this one
attribute thus failing to notice attributes which compensate
for the distortions of this single centration (Piaget,
1950; Piaget., 1955). for example, in conservation tasks
ne will take account of only one dimension of the array,
such as the height of liquid in a beaker or the length of
a row of discrete objects, ignoring the dimensions of the
width of the glass and the density of the discrete objects
(Piaget, 1952).
The child's pro-operational thought operates with
static images of reality, by isomorphic, step-by-step
replicas of actions and events, rather than by reordering
events as does the older child. Things are what they
appear to be in immediate, egocentric perception. This
characteristic of pre-operational thought Plaget terms
'realism'(Piaget, 1951a; Piaget, 1951b). When the child
considers static situations, he explains them in terms of
the characteristics of their configuration at a given
moment rather than in terms of changes leading from one
situation to another i.e. in terms of transformations
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958). Moreover, there is a relative
absence of staole equilibrium between assimilation and
accomodation such that 'the child is unable to accomodate
to the new by assimilating it to the old in a coherent,
rational way, a way which manages to preserve intact the
fundamental a yects of the previous aasimilatory organiza¬
tion. Thus ... he is the slave rather than the master of
changes in ...eonfiguration; the successive changes pull
him this way and that way, draw him into flagrant contra¬
dictions vith earlier cognitions, and in general destroy
any momentary assimilation-acccmodation equilibrium
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he say have attained just previously.' (Flavell, 1963).
Finally pre-operational thought Is irreversible. It
cannot compose into a single organised system the various
compensating changes resulting from transforraatlons. Two
kinds of reversible transformations, which appear at the
level of concrete operations (seven to eight years), but
are absent at the pre-operational level, are postulated
by the Geneva school. Firstly there is inversion where
+A is reversed by -A. For example the transformation of
dividing a ball of plasticine into two smaller balls can
be reversed so that the two email balls make the original
single ball. Secondly there is reciprocity where A<-B is
reciprocated by B<A. For example the height of water in
a wide glass A is less than that in a narrow glass B, but
this is compensated for by the width of glass B being lees
than that of glass A. (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958? Piaget
and Inhelder, 1969? Piaget, 1970) .
It is these features of pre-operational thought, ego-
centrism, centration, realism, unstable equilibrium between
assimilation and accomodation and irreversibility, which,
according to Piaget, preclude the pre-school child from
raa&ing Inferences. Thus, lacking the necessary thought
.structures, he centers on one dimension of an event and
proceeds irreversibly to draw a conclusion from it based
on some other perceptually compelling happening rather
than appealing to logical necessity. (Flavell, 1963)*
Piaget's theory has provided the impetus for a
substantial proportion of tne studies of children's reasoning,
not only in Geneva, but throughout the world. But whether
they have been validation studies (e.g. Peel, 1959; Dodwell,
I960; Blkind, 1964) or learning studies (e.g. Wohlwill and
lowe, 1962; Smedslund, 1961) they have been, in the main,
supportive of Piaget'a theory.
However, there has always been an undercurrent of
criticism which validation and learning studies, such as
those mentioned above, have not quelled. As early as
1930 Hazlltt said: *Piaget's picture of a striking diffe¬
rence between adult and childish thinking is, I believe,
due to an over-valuation of verbal expression as a measure
of thinking." Much later Berko and Brown (i960) say:
*Piaget is inclined to see through words as though they
were not there and to imagine that he directly studies
the child's mind. In fact, he Is often concerned with the
comprehension of utterances. ' Dienes (1965) describes an
experiment conducted by Greco in which five year old
children put beads, one at a time, into two differently
shaped receptacles. Even after the number of beads in the
receptacles exceeded the numbers for which the children
knew the number names, the children would still insist
that the contents of the two receptacles were equal because
each time they had put a bead in one, they had also put a
bead in the other and there must be the same in each.
Bienes contrasts this result with Piaget's lindings and
like Haslitt and Berko and Brown above, draws similar
conclusions: ' some of the conservation responses in
the experiment? conducted in Geneva might have been due
to a misunderstanding on the part of the children, that is,
t! e vocabulary used by the child might not have had the
24
same semantic significance as the vocabulary used by the
experimenter. When the chili says "+he same", he might
well mean "looking the same" or "having the same height"
... It is possible that children in these experiments
were simply speaking a different language and thinking
different things and yet using the came words'.
Piaget has not been unaware of the difficulties of
communicating with children. He says: ' ...the effort ...
to communicate one's thought objectively does not appear
in children before the age of about 7 or 7&' (Piaget, 1926).
The solution he offers is to observe and use children's
spontaneous questions. 'We may thu3 state the first rule
of our method. When a particular group of explanations
by children is to be investigated, the questions we shall
ask them will be determined in matter and in form, by the
spontaneous questions actually asked by children of the
same are or younger'(Piaget, 1951b). But, as Plavell (1963)
says: 'He has not, however, always followed his own stated
precautions regarding it, and has frequently made cognitive
inferences from verbal protocols as though there were no
translation problem at all.'
Two studies aimed at overcoming the language barrier
in Fiagetian experiments (Braine, 1959; Cohen, 1967) have
already been mentioned briefly (p. 5) but will be considered
now in more detail. Braine designed a largely nonverbal
test in order to assess the presence or absence of length
transitivity in children between the ages of three years
six months and seven years. The first stage of the experi¬
ment consisted of a training procedure in which the child
had to lift the longer (or sVrter) of two uprights,
which differed clearly tr length, to find concealed candy,
f'• e poire of uprights were varied, but for any one child
the critical upright under which the candy was concealed
was always the longer (or shorter) of the pair. To
attain success in this phase of the experiment the subject
was required to select the critical upright on eight
successive comparisons, by which time he was considered
'to have leer-ed whichever af the concepts "longer than"
or "shorter then" he had been taught*. Of the forty-one
subjects, in the experiment only one failed to learn this
initial length discrimination.
The second stage of the experiment was then initiated.
Pairs of uprights, differing only slightly in length,
were employed. A measuring stick slightly shorter than
cr.e upright and slightly longer than the other upright
was placed alongside each upright in turn. The subject
was then asked to find the candy. In order to gain a. measure
cf perceptual 'discriminabllity*, i.e. to assess whether
t e subjects could perceive the difference in length
between the two uprights, e number of trials were run in
whic* no measuring stick was used. The results showed that,
without the measuring stick, in only the top age group
(6 years ? months to 7 years) was the mean number of
'correct' responses above chance level whereas with the
measuring stick the mean number of 'correct' responses of
the second youngest group (4 yearn 2 months to 4 years 9
months) and all older groups were significantly above
chance level. From this Braine concluded that, from their
observations that upright A was longer than the raea uring
stick B (a>B) and the measuring stick B was longer than
upright C (B>0), the children were able to infer that
upright A must be longer than upright C (A>C) end, therefore,
children at least two gears younger than the age porited
Ly liaget had transitivity available to them.
Brain©'e findings, however, have been strongly
criticized by Satedalund (1965) who argues that non-transitive
hypotheses could account for the results. The perception
of upright A longer than measuring stick B leads t e child
to conclude that the candy is under a without reference
to the relationship between measuring stick B and upright
C. This, says Siaedulund, is a direct application cx the
child's training. On the other hand, the child could also
consider B longer than 0, but knowing that B is a measuring
stick with no place to conceal candy underneath, he con¬
cludes that the candy must be under upright A. A lengthy
controversy has ensued between Bralne and Bmcdslund
(brains, 1964; Smedslund, 1965, 1966b), ere main points of
agreement between them being the need for more data and
that the controversy is still open.
The second study mentioned above (Cohen, 196?) looks
at the conservation of continuous and discontinuous
quantity in wo groups of children aged between 4 years
2 months and 5 years 9 months. The control group was given
a standard Piagetian task in which two equal glasses were
filled vith twenty five sweets each. '.Vhen the child had
agreed that they contained equal amounts, the experimenter
transferred t;e contents of one glass to a third class of
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different dimensions and asked: 'Does one glass have more
or are they both the same?* The same procedure was used
with orangeade and with balls of plasticine, giving three
trials per child and a total of thirty control trials.
The experimental group used the same material, but
for the 'sweets' test the experimenter showed the child
one glass containing twenty-five sweets and saidi 'We
are going to pretend that there are two children, Mary and
Tommy, and we have to share out some sweets between theirs.
We have to be absolutely fair or else there'll be a ter¬
rible quarrel. Now these are Mary's sweets and I want
you to put Tommy'3 share in this glass,* The experimenter
then gave the child the glass of different dimensions and,
if the child allowed for the difference in dimensions when
filling it, he was credited with having demonstrated
conservation. Again a similar procedure was carried out
with orangeade and plasticine giving thirty experimental
trials. The results showed that whereas only eight of the
control trials were conservation responses twenty-three of
the experimental trials were considered to show conserva¬
tion.
Cohen accounts for the superior results of the ex¬
perimental group on the basis of:
a. a vocabulary factor involving the removal of ambiguous
words such as 'same* and replacing them with words such
as 'share•.
b. better motivation because the task purports to have
consequences affecting people.
c. participation in the task rather than making verbal*
Judgements.
In addition uhe points out that the control teat
gave the child the opportunity of arriving at a correct
conservation judgement either by an understanding of
compensated relations, or by an understanding of identity
of invariance and that since the latter was not available
to the experimental child he might therefore be expected
to do less well.
It is this last point, however, which raises doubts
as to the nature of Cohen's experimental task.. Conserva¬
tion as it is defined by Pingst and as it is generally
understood involves the notion of the invariance of some
empirical factor (e.g. mass, volume etc.) through
changes of state (Iuheldor and fi&get, 1958)• By not
providing an invariant transformation Cohen can thus be
said not to be studying conservation. However the
present writer (1963) using verbal instructions similar
to Cohen's, but with establishment of initial equality
and the presence of art invariant transformation obtained
resulta comparable with Coh n's.
The whole question of what does and what does not
constitute conservation is debatable, though. The
procedure in a classic conservation task involves pouring
equal amounts of liquid into two identical glass beakers
A and 13. The subject is asked whether the contents of the
two glasses are equivalent not* If acknowledges
that they -ere ecuiv let, then the contents of B are
pcured into a differently shaped glass and the subject
is again robed whether the cen- ents are equivalent or not.
Tzq subject is then asked to justify hia response.
According to Inhelder and Pinget (1969), three types
responses are elicited from const rvers. Firstly idei'^^y
responses, e.g. 'it is the same water', secondly reversi¬
bility by inversion, e.g. 'you an put the v/ater back
into where it was before', or thirdly reversibility by
recipr :cal relationships, e.g. 'the water is higher, but
the glass is narrower, so it's the same amount'.
But what evidence is there that a child who say3
that ti e contents of A and Bj arc equal and. justifies
this or the basis of the re<. iprccal relationship is not
just ignoring the initial equality of A and B, ignoring
the transformation from B to 3^ and simply responding*
in the way that Cohen's subject.3 ray have been res¬
ponding , on the basis of compensation between A and
It would appear that the classic conservation tasks,
therefore, do not necessarily demand an awareness of the
necessity of irvariance.
If a child is to sake an inference, he needs to be
able to remember the premisses he received long enough
for him to draw conclusions. ^raisse and Vautrey (1952)
suggested that errors typical of liaget's youngest
subjects in length experiments reflect not a peculiarity
of their . once ticn of length, but their failure to notice
or recall initial inf rats t ion. necessary for 'correct'
solution. In one oi fiaget'o tasks two wires eq *1 in
length were placed in parallel before the subject so that
their end points were net opposed. A bead was moved a
certain distance along from the end of one wire ond the
jrs
child ?ma required t0 n^ve whether read the same distance
along -nether wire, fhe pre--°!?errtAonal child mover his
head to o point directly opposite the first head, thus
f»l.ll.ng to take into gocount the differing points of
departure of the two heads. This phenomenon Piaget calls
ct
' '"in-5!ism' cni^ia interpreted as a reflection that the
logical operations bgsic to measurement are not yet
available to tHe child. ?t»aisse end Vautrey, however,
found '♦'hat subjects who were told to indicate the starting
position? of the object? responded correctly more often
than subjects whose response was not orefaced by this
instruction. Moreover,- subjects who made errors
usually Indicted the starting position incorrectly, their
response being appropriate to the starting position which
tv,ev had indicated.
<y
Transitive inferences of tie form A>B, B>C,.".A>C are
supposedly not available to pre-opernt1onal children.
However Bryant (1971) and Bryant and Trabaso (1971) claim
to have shown that this is not the case provided that
they can remember the premisses A>B and B>C. The study
used five rods of different colours and lengths. There
was an initial training period in which the four compari¬
sons, A>B, !3>C, C?B, were learned. This was achieved
by placing pairs of rode in a container in such a way
that they projected equally from the top. '"he chili was
asked to indicate which rod was 'longer' or 'shorter'.
Feedback was given @nce the child had responded by with¬
drawing the rods from the containers so that direot com¬
parison could be made. This procedure continued until
the child responded correctly to six successive presen¬
tations of each pair. In the experiment that followed
the procedure was the sotie except that no feedback' wan
given. Toe critical comparison Ilea in the B>D situation
since it contains the only non-adjacent rods which have
teen seen to be both 'longer' and 'shorter' in the training.
The results showed performance well above chance level
even with children as young as four. A further experiment
in which no visual feedback occurred in the training
procedure, tie subjects having to remember the com^»r1eons
on the basis of being told which of two rod? was !longer*
or 'shorter', was carried out. Again the results were
well above chance level.
Uric Aronson (personal communication), however,
suggests that these reaxilto do not necessarily demonstrate
transitivity. His criticism is similar to that made by
uvcdslund in relation to Bralne*a study (p. ?6). He
suggests that when presented "ith the four comparisons
A>3, B>C, C>3 and T3>K( the 'child 1 earns in the A>3
comparison that A is the 'longer' >*od and in the 15>15
comparison 3 is the * shorter* rod. In the other two
comparisons, 3>C, C>D, rod 0 is common to both end so the
child ignores rod 0 and simply I earns that B is the 'longer'
ro1 and 3 the 'shorter' rod in comparisons other than
A>B and X»E. Tvus when faced with the critical comparison
3pD the child base" hi ■ response on previously scruired
'verbal labels' for these two rode, i.e. B is 'longer'
and D is 'shorter* whenever rods A and B are not present.
Bryant and Trabaao themrelves point out the possibility
t o
y
cc 'verbal labels' be in/? attached to rods A and E arid
say that comparisons involving these end points 'may have
teen susceptible to the transfer of absolute responses',
but If Aronson'~ criticism of their study is valid
♦absolute responses' Fay have occurred throughout the
v/hole experitent.
So fsr in this review of relevant literature we
have boen concerned with studies coming either from
Geneva or based directly on the work of Piaget. Be tarn
now to other studies of children's reasoning. These ore
net numerous, but they do represent fairly important
bodies of work.
One attempt to look at inferential behaviour was
made by the Kcndlers in a series of experiments (Kendler
and Kendler, 1956, 1961, 1962: Ker.dler et el, 1958). They
based their studies on an experimental paradigm, derived
from Bull, in which the subject learns three discrete
behaviour segments (A~R, X-Y and B-O). In the test
situation the subject in presented with A and X and is
instructed to 'get 0'. The assumption is that inferential
behaviour is mediated by an anticipatory goal response to
the goal G which moves back to B and then to A via the
already learned behaviour segments B-G and A-B. Problem,
solution, therefore, requires t?e assembly of A-B and B-G.
The notion of combination to characterise inferential
behaviour had earlier been used by Maler (1936) in studies
of young children. Mater concluded from his experiments
that children of less than five or six were unable to
combine- elements from different experiences Into the single
step which leads to the solution of a problem. The
Kendlers (1956) and Xendler et al (1958) on the contrary
initially claimed to have discovered this ability in
children of three and four. The material they used in
the 1956 study was a covered maze-like structure with
three points of access which corresponded to the beginnings
of the three behaviour segments. The child pulled out
a ribbon at access A revealing a toy lady bug (B). This
was replaced and a chain at access X was pulled revealing
a toy chicken (Y). After this had been replaced a door
was removed at access B revealing the toy ladybug again.
The child pulled the ladybug thus revealing a toy car (0).
The apparatus was then arranged so that only the ribbon(A)
and the chain (X) were exposed and the child was instructed
to pull the one that would get him the car. The results
varied with the 653er in which the segments (A-B, X-Y and
B-G) were presented to the subjects, but over all 71.9 per
cent of the subjects raade the correct initial choice
(i.e. the ribbon at A). This rose to 87.5 per cent in
children who learned the behaviour segments in the order
X-Y, A-B, B-G. In the 1958 experiment 65 per cent of the
subjects made a correct initial choice, but they noted
in this experiment that after making the correct initial
choice A and thus obtaining the sub-goal B, only one-third
of the subjects spontaneously utilized B to obtain the
goal G. It became evident at this point in the Xendter s'
experiments that correct initial selection of A was not
an adequate indication of success in attaining goal G.
Two further experiments were carried out (Keniler and
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Kendler, 1961, 1962) In which the subject had to press a
button to obtain a marble and then place the marble in a
hole before the goal was achieved. In these experiments
correct initial selection was at chance level only and
very few subjects succeeded in attaining the goal. From
their studies the Kendlere concluded that 'when the
RulUan paradigm is applied to youne- children, there is
little or no evidence that reasoning or inference occurs'
(Kendler and Kendler, 1967)*
fhe type of behaviour which ti © Kendlere are con¬
cerned with is the form of inference which Oleron (1969)
describes as 'actually experienced inference', this being
the lowest level of the three types of reasoning he
mentions (p. 10)• Donaldson and Wales (1969b) also
refer to the limited nature of the behaviour the Kendlers
are studying. They say? 'if one thinks of the organization
of eomolex behaviour as deriving essentially from a
process of laying behaviour units end to end, then ...
emphasis on temporal sequence is almost inescapable'. They
argue further that reasoning need not be art order-preser¬
ving reolica of the outside world and that theories such
as Hull's (on which the Kendler studies are based), which
utilize notions such a© 'foresight' and 'anticipatory goal
reaction*, have the 'effect of excluding many of the acts
which would by common agreement be classed as inferential'♦
Peel (196?) looked at t e understanding of Implication,
Incompatibility and disjunction in children between the
ages of five and eleven using a 'games technloue'. This
technique, he says, obviates the need to use 'naturally'
connected propositions and their meaningful associations
and at the same time prevents the rejection of the
propositions on account of their arbitrariness. The
essence of the 'games technique* is that arbitrary rules
and relations are accepted as in the rule ace takes the
queen.
The procedure of Feel's 'games technique' is that
the experimenter has a container of coloured beads and
the child a container of coloured counters. An empty box,
into which they make their play, is placed between the
experimenter and child. The game consists essentially
of the experimenter drawing a certain bead, and then the
subject drawing a counter depending upon the rule of the
particular game.
For implication the instruction was: 'We may each
pick any colour we like, but in this game, if and
whenever I draw a red bead, you also draw a red counter.*
For incompatibility it was: 'Vile may each draw any colour
we like, but in this game, if and whenever I draw a red
bead, you are not to draw a red counter.' For disjunction
it was: 'We both draw so that there is at least one red
in the box between us. I shall draw first, and put my
bead in, and then you draw a counter and put that in.'
Aften the instruction had been given the experimenter put
either a red bead or a non-red bead into the box between
them and the child was required to respond with a counter.
& reverse form of the 'game' was also played with the
child making the first move, the experimenter responding
and the child saying whether the experimenter's response
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was right or wrong.
The children were divided into three groups, 5*» 8*
end 11* and for our purposes it ie the responses of the
youngest group which are of most interest.
With the implication task the subjects responded on
the basis of equivalence giving a red counter in response
to a red bead and a non-red counter in response to a non-
red bead. In the reverse form of the game when they gave
a red counter they accepted a red bead from the experimenter
(R.R), but rejected a non-red bead (R.ft). When they gave
a non-red counter they rejected a red bead (R.R) and
accepted a non-red bead OUT) from the experimenter. The
older children responded in exactly the same way with one
exception. This was the R.R case where the children were
judging the experimenter's response. Whereas 76 per cent
of the 5+ age group rejected it, 82 per cent of the 11+
age group accepted it. This is interesting In the light
of the work of Wason and his colleagues. According to
Wason's theory jj.q i3 considered 'irrelevant' by intelli¬
gent adults to the truth or falsity of a conditional. This
theory has been confirmed in some test situations (e.g.
Johnson-Laird and Ta gart, 1969), but in Wason (1968)
the "p.q contingency was evaluated as making a sentence
false. Wason's subjects are thus producing the same res¬
ponses the five-year-olds, whilst the eleven year olds
are producing results which accordvith material implica¬
tion."^ One must, however, guard against reading too much
1. ote discussion of 'growtn errors' in Chapter V.
b x tiut/3 i on.
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into such a situation. The differences between the
experimental tasks and the subjects* response patterns as
a whole (i.e. responses to other contingencies) need to be
accounted for.
The incompatibility situation was handled correctly
by the majority of Peel's five-year-olds although 34 per
cent of the responses Judged the R.R contingency acceptable.
The situation is more confused with disjunction. Peel
says the best approximation to the responses of the five-
year-olds is disjunction of red bead and non-red counter.
In practice what appears to have happened is matching of
non-red to non-red when non-red is selected first and a
combination of matching red to red and random responding
when red is selected first.
Pour points are worth noting in Peel*s study. Firstly
the wording of the Instructions is far from simple. The
use of the expression 'at least one red' is particularly
worrying and the confusion in the disjunction results of
the five-year-olds may reflect their difficulty in hand¬
ling this expression rather than a difficulty in handling
disjunction. However in view of Peel's experimental
design it is difficult to suggest more adequate alternative
terminology.
Secondly, Peel notes that young children match for
colour when the experimenter selects a non-red bead, e.g.
if the experimenter chooses a blue bead, the subject
responds with a blue counter rather than a yellow or
green one. He explains this as a •spread of the implica¬
tion rule from reds to other colours'. Tn. saying this,
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however, he la missing the heart of the matter by not
die inguiehing between simple colour matching and
implication. In fact bis Implication test encourages
colour matching (i.e. redored rather than red^green or
blue^yellow) and fails to produce a situation which
discriminates between those subjects who respond on the
basis of the necessity of implication and those who
simply match colours.
Thirdly Peel's subjects are making their responses
from a collection of counters which is 25 per cent red
and 75 per cent non-red. It is difficult to say whether
this influenced results, but it could have Infla ted non-
red responses at the expense of red responses.
Fourthly, the non-red counters are yellow, blue and
green i.e. there are three groups of non-red material as
opposed to one group of red material. Peel is studying
'binary propositional thinking', logically this is the
case, but psychologically it may not be ao. Wales and
Grieve (1969) in discussing the difficulties of negation
refer to the distinction between antonym pairs which are
*contradictory* i.e. they are 'mutually exclusive and
exhaustive* and antonym pairs which are 'contrary' and
are infinitely gradable. For example with the 'contradic¬
tory ' antonym pair 'odd-even', 'not odd' implies'even'and
similarly 'not even' implies 'odd', but with the 'contrary'
antonym pair 'hot-cold', 'not hot' lies on a continuum
containing 'lukewarm* and 'cold' and 'not lukewarm' does
1. The distinction between 'matching' ana implication will
be reierred to in Chapter III. Implication.
not imply 'hot*. The 'odd-even* pair, therefore, is
symmetrical whereas the 'hot-cold' pair is asymmetrical.
However, Wales and Grieve point out that not all 'contra¬
dictories' are syre etrical. For example in the 'contra¬
dictory' pair 'closed-open' one can have decrees of
'openness', but the same does not apply to 'closed'.
Lack of symmetry of this type is akin to the asymmetry
in Peel's task where the red and non-red material differ
both in quantity arid in variety (i.e. red as opposed to
blue, preen and yellow).
As mentioned above the larger number of non-red
counters could serve to encourage non-red responses, but
it could also serve to inhibit responses. By this it is
meant that a child who is operating on a random selection
basis or is using a primitive response rule may select a
non-red counter simply because there are more of them
whereas a child who is reasoning out the situation may
be confounded by the greater complexity of the non-red
situation (in terms of type and quantity of non-red
material) and may produce a lower level of performance in
the non-red selection than in the less com lex red selec¬
tion. This may account for the non-red colour matching
responses that Peel found.
The final study to be reported is that of le Bonnlec
(1970) who Is concerned with the modal aspects of reasoning.
The study covers a wide area including the modalities of
ore-operational, concrete operational and formal operational
thinking. Her subjects ranged from three years to thirteen
years. In one experiment she used a boy doll and a girl
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doll. Each doll had a box containing plastic segments
which could be fitted together. In the boy doll's box
there were only straight segments, in the girl doll's box
there were curved segments. The subjects were shown a
bracelet and a stick made of these segments and asked to
say whetv er the boy doll or the girl doll had made them.
After they had responded they were asked if the 'incorrect'
doll (i.e. the boy doll for the bracelet, the girl doll for
the stick) could have made the bracelet (or stick). If the
child responded incorrectly he was asked whether there were
the same segments in the boy doll's box and the bracelet
(or the girl doll's box and the stick).
Between the age of 3 years 6 months and 5 years 1 month
there were thirty-six subjects. Five of these failed
completely at every stage of the task, eleven failed all
except acknowledging that the contents of the girl's box
and the stick and the boy's box and the bracelet are not
the same and twelve were completely correct. However, as
le Bonniec points out the responses these children make
are not sufficient in themselves to indicate the kind of
'reasoning' the subjects employed. During the experiment
she had, therefore, asked the subjects to justify their
responses. Many of the children did not produce justifica¬
tions, but those who did, justified in terras of factors
external to the task rather than in terms of the necessity
of the task. The girl doll made the bracelet 'because
mothers have bracelets', 'because she didn't know how to
make the stick', the girl doll did not make the bracelet
'because she didn't want to', 'because it isn't a live girl'.
It would have been interesting to see how the children
responded had the boy doll had the curved segments and
the girl doll the straight segments.
In another experiement le Bonniec looked at 'necessity'
'possibility' and 'impossibility'. Her subjects were aged
between 4 years 4 months and 8 years 10 months. The
youngest group (4 years 4 months to b years 1 month) are
of interest to us. The material she used consisted of a
ball, a stick and a box with a large circular hole and a
slit on top. Only the stick could pass through the slit,
but both the ball and atickcould pass through the hole.
Beneath each opening there was a drawer into which the
ball or stick fell* These drawers could be withdrawn. To
pass into the box the ball must of necessity go though
the hole, it was Impossible for it to pass through the
slit. It was possible, however, for the stick to peas
through both the hole and the slit.
Before the test oroper the subjects were shown the
material and acquainted with the properties of it by
questions such ass 'Can the ball get in the box by oasaing
through the slit?' 'Do you have to put the bell in through
the large hole?• 'There 1e a ball in the box, did it have
to go throng1 the large hole?'
Jn the second pretest stage the subject was acquainted
with the need to open the drawers on some occasions and
not on others in order to know what was inside the box.
The experimenter told the subject that she whs going to
put the ball and stick into the box and the game was to
say whether It was necessary to open the box to find out
which object she had put in. Question ouch as: 'I
have put a stick in, do you know, without opening the
door, which hole it went through?* Were o.sfeed „
The test itself consisted oi' a series of four
questions asked twice. They were: 1. 'I have put some¬
thing through the slit; to know what it is do you need
to open the drawer or not?' 2. 'I have put something in
the large hole; to know what it is do you need to open
the drawer or not?' 3. 'I have put a stick in; to know
which hole it went through, do you need to open the
drawer or not?' 4. 'I have put a ball in; to know which
hole it went through do you need to open the drawer or
not?' Justifications were required and the results were
analysed on the basis of response and justification. An
•adequate' justification for question 1. required reference
to the ball not being able to go through the hole, for
question 2. reference to both the ball and stick being
able to pass through the large hole, question 3. reference
to the stick being able to pass through both the hole and
slit and question 4. reference to ti e ball not being able
to pass through the slit.
Of the twenty-two subjects in the youngest group
one responded correctly with adequate justifications on
all items. One subject responded correctly and produced
'adequate' justifications for questions 1. and 4., but
failed to respond to questions 3?. and 3. 3"e* responded
and justified his response to the 'necessary'/'impossible'
situations, but could not handle the 'possible' situations.
Eleven sub je> to always responded that it was not necessary
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to open the drawer and the remaining nine subjects showed
a complete lack of comprehension of the task. For all
groups other than this group, the most usual response
pattern was correct response and 'adequate' justification
to the 'necessary'/'impossible' situations and complete
failure to handle the 'possible' situations although even
in the oldest group (median age 7 years 6 months) six
subjects out of thirty-four were still denying the neces¬
sity of opening the door at all and one was showing com¬
plete lack of comprehension of the task.
The bulk of the studies referred to in this review
do not paint a very bright picture o, the pro-school
child's inferentiaiability. Moat studies deny the exis-
I
tenc of such an ability and those which attempt to
demonstrate it using new techniques are often or en to
criticism on methodological grounds.
Plaget. has, it could be argued, dominated this
review. There is good reason for this. It is not just
the sheer quantity of his work which makes him so important,
but the fact that like Chomsky in linguistics he has
become a reference point in studies of children's
reasoning such that the majority of researcher's into
reasoning ability define their position with reference to
1
Piaget's theory.
1. This review o.f literature is an outline of the main
studies in the area. A number of other studies have some
tearing on the present enquiry but, in the interests of
clarity, these will be referred to at relevant points
in the following sections.
Joae Methodolo^ical Issues
White (1969) provides a useful outline of conditions
which it is •usually wise to establish' in experimental
procedures with children. He says that one must have
'rapport' with the pre-sohool child and that one must by¬
pass a noticeable component of 'stranger anxiety' for
many children. The child is praised throughout the task.
This praise serves ae a kind of feedback to the child
informing him that v e experimenter finds hir behaviour
acceptable. It also makes the child feel successful and
conveys the experimenter's 'friendly feelings' towards
the child. Apart from praise of thi^ nature the experi¬
menter attempts to keep his face expressionless, so that
the child will be led to attend to what satisfies the
test and not the experimenter. In addition a 'simpli¬
fied visual environment' is used. The apparatus dominates
the child's field of view and possible distractions and
other interesting visual material are removed from view.
Verbal instructions are short and mixed with actual motor
rehearsal of the moves the child will make during the
course of the procedure. Finally, at intervals through¬
out the test the child's goals are recalled to him.
White based these precautions on his experience in
conducting a 'discrimination» learning experiment, but
suggests that most experimenters who work with pre¬
school children use similar techniques. Certainly the
'precautions' mentioned above are relevant to the ureaent
study.
An attempt to establish 'raroort* and eliminate
'stranger anxiety* was made by the experimenter visiting
the nursery school, class or playgroup prior to an experi¬
ment. Time was spent mixing and talking with the children
when other children and familiar nursery teachers and
nursery assistants were close at hand. Perhaps as a
result of this procedure only two children refused to
accompany the experimenter away from the re3t of the
children, as -soon as they were asked. In one case a boy
of three years nine months refused to enter the staffroom
where the experiment was to be carried out, but quite
happily took part in the experiment in the corridor out-
aide the staffroom. The second case was a girl of three
years two months who refused to accompany the exp eriraenter
alone, but later agreed when a nursery teacher also came
along. The nursery* teacher left as soon as the experi¬
mental procedure began.
The tasks were designed to be 'intrinsically attrac¬
tive* for the child. Ho rewards were given, but it was
hoped that the tasks were rewarding in themselves. For
example, finding a sought-for object in a box or building
a row of houses* from pictures of houses which were found
when the child responded to a task, can presumably be
considered 'rewarding' si nations. Verbal encouragement
was given by using expressions such as 'good' after the
r; ild had made a response. Also the test was always
referred to as a ~ame and the child was asked to accompany
the exnerimenter 'to play a game'.
'To avoid distraction, testing always took place
away from other children. The locations of the testing
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ranged from staffrooms, a headteacher's study to a church
vestry and in one case a screened-off section of a cloak¬
room. The testing irae conducted with the child a d
experimenter seated on opposite rides of a low table. Only
tre experimental material wee on the table > nd possible
sources of distraction were removed from the immediate
vicinity.
The test material res simple and mostly of a kind
which lb© child might handle in hie everyday life? o.g.
a rutbor all, a toy train, a matchhox. To ensure that
the child knew the names of these objects and that
failure was not the result of nn unfamiliar name, -n
identification procedure was carried out at the beginning
of experiments in which the child had to point out the
objects wfcer the experimenter named them end nnrac the
objects when tre experimenter p -inted to them.
Two types of verbal instructions appeared in the
experiments, those which conveyed the nature of the
procedures, e.xr. selecting op object in response to
something said by the experimenter, and those which
conveyed the verbal premies by which, the subject could
make n eneci fic sol ectior.. The former type ol instruction
was re-pa ted appropriate Intervals throughout the
experiment to avoid feilure to remember the procedure.
Althou'* memory limitations try have played « part in
responses to toe second type of verbal *nstructlor in
moot cases ep imrredlate response tt recuired ■■ r.d "^epeti—
ticn of t'-e premiss would have beep i.nappropri «*te. In
one py'V'fTTp'nt, though, fkxrerjment ' . 'Houses - -"i boxes')
in some trials two responses were required following a
verbal premiss and a comparison was mad© between half
these trials where t.h*> premies was repeated before the
second response and half these trials where the premiss
was not repeated.
The attention spans of children are another source
of difficulty. The pre-achool child's ability to sustain
his attention on one particular task is extremely fragile
and tends to disappear with only relatively minor distrac¬
tion. (lollin (1961) has found that distraction which
interferes with the ability of a five-year-old to solve
a discrimination problem does not interfere with the
performance of a seven-year-old and Birch (1966) found
that the simple instruction to hold down a lever was
adhered to for time lengths which related to the are ofthe
pre-school child, line older the child the longer he held
down the lever.
A reduction of the distraction element of attention
span was attempted in this study by making the task
♦attractive' and therefore hopefully attention arousing
and by eliminating as many sources of distraction as
possible (p. 45). Reduction of the effects of t?e
limited 'irse of the child's attention scan "-as attempted
by restricting 4 he length -.f the experiments to en
average o* ten or fifteen minutes. In addition, :-""ior
to conducting en experiment, % pilot study using ""ildren
from -''e Edinburgh Cognition Project nursery was carried
out. This pilot s' ■ dv afforded the experimenter an
opportunity of ascertaining approximately If t- ere was a
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point in c © experiment where the child's attention
began to wander. A considerable improvement in the
usefulness of these pilot studies came about after the
first group of experiments had been carried out (Chapter II.
Disjunction, Experiments 2 sod 3). At this point video¬
tape equipment became available and subsequent pilot
studies were recorded and analysed later when the experi¬
menter was less involved in the ongoing procedure of the
experiment. This type of analysis of pilot tests enabled
toe experimenter to modify and refine experiments on a
more thorough basis than is available in non-recorded
pilot tests.
Typical kinds of raodificationa made as n result of
these analyses were the reduction of trials in an
experiment because analysis of the receding revealed lack
of attention, reducing the length of an Instruction
because the c ill appeared confused and uncertain towards
the end of the instruction, eliminating repetitions of
instructions concerning the nature of the task because
they appeared to be unnecessary and rather than ailing
the child to keep the objectives of the task in mind
appeared to be inducing a loss of interest a id finally
repositioning experimental material when it was seen
not to fall easily within the child's visual field.
For example, in Experiment 4. it was proposed to run
one session of" eight trials, but this was changed to two
sessions of ;our trials each because the pilot children's
attention appeared to wander after the sixth trial. In
Experiment 5 the initial instrucxions contained a large
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repetitive element because it was thought that this would
help the child to understand the instructions, but the
pilot children showed uncertainty and. confusion towards
the end of the instructions and so the length of the
instructions was considerably reduced resulting in no
such evidence of confusion in further pilot tests. Again
in Experiment 5 repetition of part of the instruction
afxer each trial was seen to be unnecessary and a source
of loss of interest indicated by the child's ga~e moving
beyond the experimental set-up. Therefore this repetition
wa s el itnina ted.
One of the difficulties of an adult testing a child
is trat the child, desiring to please the experimenter,
is inclined to produce responses which he thinks the
experimenter wants at the expense of adhering to the
needs of the task. This has to be borne in mind when
assessing studies such as the present one for which no
other adequate technique exists at the moment. This
difficulty is most extreme in Experiments 5 and 6 where
the child is required to make judgements on the 'Tightness'
or 'wrongness' of responses made by the experimenter, i.e.
the child has to judge an adult' b haviour as non-
acccptnble when his everyday experiences tend to be in the
reverse direction and his inclinations are to please and
conform with the adult rather thai deny the correctness
of the adult's behaviour.
Donaldson (1)7 } has tac led this problem by using a
'talking panda' which the children in her study accept
as 'younger than themselves' and 'not very clever* * By
means of a speaker concealed in the head of the panda a
voice was projected so that the panda appeared to speak to
the children. On the assumption that the children would
be more willing to criticize this lees intelligent, younger
creature than adults, an experiment was conducted in which
the child was required to judge winether statements made
by the panda were true or false. It was found that they
were capable of making such judgements in this type of
situation.
A pilot study for Experiment b attempted to use a
similar technique with a hand-puppet, The nand-puppet,
which was a cat, was described to the children as being
•very young* and 'not very clever1 and the cat was going
to play a game, but sometimes he made mistakes and they
were to tell him when he was wrong. Experiment b was
then carried out with the experimenter manipulating the
hand-puppet so that it appeared to make the selection
responses required by the tasx.
The results of this venture, however, were rather
disconcerting. Rather than eliciting a critical attitude
in tr.e children it produced a state of high excitement
with the children paying far more attention to the cat
than the task. Further it produced a 'protective'
attitude towards the cat so that when an 'incorrect'
response was made the children denied that it was wrong
even though they gave evidence that they were aware of
the 'incorrectness'. ror example one child actually
corrected the cat's response by changing the item
selected by tne cat for another item yet still denied
that the cat was 'wrong*. Another child s~iled and
giggled when saying one of the cat's responses was 'correct*.
■ The Donaldson study involved lengthy pre-experiment
familiarisation with the 'talking panda'. This would
also appear necessary for the hand-puppet technique to
stand any chance of success. However, this wen not
feasible in the present study largely because it would
have meant imposing considerable inconvenience on the
nursery schools, classes and play groups where space is
at a premium and provision of a roots or area, for testing
frequently involves extensive organisation as well as
loss of valuable space.
Therefore, it war- decided to abandon this procedure
and for the experimenter to make the responses, stressing
in the instructions that both correct and incorrect
responses would be made. Possibly because of this
precaution arid also the game-like nature of the task
this procedure appears, in this study at least, to have
been effective in eliciting judgements of 'incorrectness'
to the experimenter's responses in Experiments 5 and 6.
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I). General Design of study
A number of -*ays of presenting this study suggest
themselves. For example a progression from simple to less
simple in terms of experimental design or from less to
more successful or consistent in termft of the subject's
level of performance. However, v?ith one exception, an
historical presentation bss been chosen as more expedient.
The one exception is the first experiment reported ('And/or'}
which wee performed later in the study, but because of
its direct bearing on the initial group of experiments,
has been inserted out of chronological secuer.ee.
Historical, presentation, in this study, affords not
only * breakdown into three me lor croups of experiments
(disjunction, implication and verbs! 1nferenoes' >, tut
also demonstrates the development of test methods which
is «»» Important constituent of the study. In addition it
«how« more clearly how solutions to problems «nd questions
relaed in experiments are attempted in subsequent
cxperimente.
The study has been designed to examine the child's
inferential or non-inferential behaviour in s variety
of frameworks. The tests cover situations in which the
subject has to make:
a. a physical response to a verbal proposition concerning
concrete material displayed before him.
1. term 'verbal inferences* la used to describe
inferential behaviour wnero t«.e chilo ha» to ta>ike n
veroal response i o veroal premies in til* absence of
concrete material. 'ferial inferences' are examined
in Chapter J. V .
b. a verbal response to a verbal proposition concerning
concrete material displayed before him.
c. h verbal response to a verbal proposition when no
concrete material is present.
In addition to tests where the subject is required
to draw conclusions himself, he haS also been placed in
situations where he is required to make judgements of
•correctness' and •inftrrectneas' on conclusions drawn
by another person (i.e. the experimenter), the reason for
this procedure being to give a more definitive picture of
what a subject considers compatible and incompatible with
a given premiss by presenting him with a wider variety of
conclusions than he would normally produce himself.
Negatives as well as positives have also been used
in verbal premisses, sometimes as constraints differing
from the positive ones and sometimes also as logical
equivalents to the positives.
Response patterns have been considered in the light
of the test situation as a whole. Therefore strategies
of search and object or position preferences have been
recorded. In the implication tests a direct comparison
has been made between materials differing in their degree
of 'relatedness'. At one extreme are objects which, as
far as the experimenter ca ascertain, are sufficiently
'abstract* and exclusive not to have an experiential
relationship for the child, whilst at the other extreme
are objects which have a 'relatedness* based on the child'
everyday experiences. The question here is whether the
chili can accept a verbal premise aa dominant over his
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experience of such objects.
Two forms of control, against which the experimental
results can be checked, have been used. Firstly in tests
which require the child to locate a hidden object in a
row of boxes on the basis of a verbal premiss, a control
group has been asked to perform the same task in the
absence of the verbal premiss. This control offers some
measure of whether perceptual features of the task or
some other process, rather than the verbal premiss may
be regulating behaviour.
Secondly some kind of 'standard' of inference
against which the children's inferential or non-inferential
behaviour can be compared ia needed. Formal logic could
provide this 'standard', but there is evidence that even
highly intelligent adults are not always loyal to formal
logic. For example the conditional, 'if p then q', has
been found not to be tree ted in a truth-functional manner
(Wason, 1966, 1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1971; Wason and -Johnson-
Laird, 1970; Johnson-Laird and Tagart, 1969)
The observed 'illogicality' of adult reasoning
throws some considerable doubt on Piaget's theory of
formal operational thinking which requires a truth-
functional treatment of implication (Beth arid Piaget, 1966).
Wohlwill (1962) says; 'Piaget has ...been repeatedly
taken to task for hi* inclination to see nothing but
perfect logic and rationality in adult intelligence. His
1. Further reference will be made to these studies in
Chapter III. Implication.
reliance on the principles of abstract logic as a model
for human thinking has blinded him to the question of the
breadth and stability of logic as used by the individual'.
aiehler and Bever (1968) draw a distinction between
what a person can learn to do and what he is disposed to
do naturally within a particular cognitive domain, a
distinction analogous with competence and performance in
linguistics. They argue that natural predispositions must
be included 'as a fact relevant for a theory of the
natural patterns of the psychology of inferences'.
For this experiment the argument of Mehler and Bever
is a useful line of approach. The 'standard' against
which the children's responses are compared is the per¬
formance of a control group of adults carrying out the
same tasks. The same tasks, rather than comparable tasks
specifically designed for adults, were used because there
is evidence (e.g. in the Wason studies mentioned above)
that logically equivalent situations can elicit different
responses if the task conditions are varied. Using tasks,
designed for children, with adults raises the problem of
the appropriateness of such tasks for eliciting adult
reasoning. The nature of the study, however, is such that
the problem of different results as a function of varying
task conditions and the problem of using tests, designed
for children, with adults cannot both be eliminated. Con¬
sequently the former problem was removed on the assumption
that, with the tasks in this study, the latter problemws
the lesser of the two evils. fcorehVer by making minor
modifications in procedure (these modifications were con-
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sidered not to detract from the nature of the task) the
second problem was reduced somewhat.
The adult subjects used were restricted to the
twenty to thirty age range, this range being widely
accepted as intellectually stable. They had backgrounds
and hopefully intelligence levels comparable with the
children. The occupations of these subjects ranged across
primary school teacher, accountant, nurse, joiner,
electrician, printer, shop assistant, clerk, typist,
machine operator, petrol pump attendant and miner.
Because of limited availability of such subjects their
use as control subjects was restricted to those situa¬
tions where the nature and type of adult response was
most in doubt.
To avoid inter-task practice and learning effects,
no subject was used in more than one experiment. This
applied to adults aa well as children.
The children used in the tasks came from six
Edinburgh nursery schools, nursery classes and playgroups.
They were selected from the scnool or playgroup register
on the basis of age and sex so that as nearly as possible,
for each experimental group, e mean and median age
coincided (thus affording a representative sample of the
whole age range) and boys and girls were equally
represented.
The age range and mean and median ages were also
controlled between groups. Two of the tests on
disjunction have comparable age range.: between 3 years
1 month and 4 years 7 months with near equivalent means
and medians. For the remaining disjunction test and all
other tests the age range was extended upwards to 4 years
11 months giving these tests comparable age ranges from
3 years 1 month to 4 years 11 months again with near
equivalent inter-test means and medians.
CHAPTER II
DldJU&CTIOfl
A. Introduction to Disjunction
Disjunction affords an opportunity of looking at
children's ability to act in accordance with verbally
presented information. In addition, disjunction can
also be used to yield situations where a 'correct* res¬
ponse requires the subject to demonstrate inferential
behaviour as defined in the introductory chapter of this
study (p. 10). However, before proceeding further with
the different types >£ disjunctive tasks studied in the
investigation, it is perhaps desirable to consider what
we already know about children's ability to handle die-
junction.
About pre-school children very Utile is known, but
one study involving pre-school children has been carried
out at the Edinburgh Cognition Project Nursery (Mnrgeret
Donaldson and Roger Wales have kindly made the data
available). The study forms part of a large-scale
investigation of children's cognitive development and
is reported here in some detail because it is not available
in published form.
Thirty-one children (aged four years six months to
five years) were presented with a card matching task in
which a standard card of two dimensions (colour aad shape;
was displayed in front of the subjects. A sequence of
comparison cards varying along the same two dimensions
w-5 revealed to the subject who whs required to press a
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button whenever a. comparison card, consistent with a
given disjunctive instruction, appeared.
In one trial a red circle standard card was displayed
with the instructions 'Every time you see either a red
one or one that's a circle, I want you to press the
button. You only press the button when you see one that's
red or one that's a circle.' Of the thirty-one subjects,
only one did not respond to the 'red circle' comparison
card. He responded 'exclusively♦ by selecting some, but
not all, 'red non-circles' and sorae, but not all, 'non-red
circles'. Of the thirty subjects who did respond to the
•red circle' comparison card, seven made no other response.
These seven subjects were responding to disjunction
neither 'inclusively' nor 'exclusively', but 'conjunctively'
(i.e. neither 'red or circle or both' nor 'red or circle,
but not both', but 'red and circle'5• Because of the
nature of the task it is impossible to say whether they
were failing to differentiate between disjunction and
conjunction (i.e. treating 'or' as 'and') or whether they
were performing a simple matching task of comparison to
standard (i.e. responding only to a comparison identical
to the standard).* Twenty-three subjects responded
•inclusively' (i.e. 'red or circle or both*), but of
these twenty-three subjects only lour responded to all
possible 'inclusive' comparisons, ten subjects responded
to the 'red circle', some'red non-circles' and some
•non-red circles' and nine subjects responded to the 'red
1. 'Matching' is discussed in Chapter III. Implication.
circle* plus comparisons consistent with one dimension of
the standard only (i.e. they responded to 'red non-circles'
or 'non-red circles', but not both). Although the
responses of this latter group of nine subjects are
'inclusive' insofar as they Included the 'red circle',
it may be that the reasoning involved has 'exclusive'
qualities. If the subject works on the oasis of only
one dimension of the standard and ignores the other
dimension of the standard, he will produce what appears
to be an 'inclusive* interpretation. For example, if he
takes red as his basis, he will respond to red shapes
(this will include the red circle), not because he Is
reasoning 'red or circle or both', but simply because he
is seeking out 'red' in the comparisons and selecting on
thin dimension done. The other dimension, 'circle', clays
no part in the operation. It could also be argued that
subjects who respond 'inclusively* along two dimensions,
but f&il to notice all possible 'correct' comparison
cards may be utilizing a similar 'exclusive' strategy
in which they are seeking out only one dimension at a
given time, but switch their attention from one
dimension to the other dimension and back again as the
experiment progresses. This would be a feasible explana¬
tion for t e omi sion of some 'correct* comparisons
although other explanations are equally probable.
The results of this experiment indicate that pre¬
school children can handle disjunction irt what appears
to be an 'inclusive' manner, but by its very nature and
particularly because >i the physical presence of the two
dimensions (i.e. the standard card) throughout the experi¬
ment, this task may be abnormally conducive to the
eliciting of apparently •inclusive* responses.
ether studies of disjunction have involved older
children. They are of tw ■ main types. Firstly there
have been concept attainment studies in which conjunctive
and disjunctive concepts have been compared and the
former found easier to learn than the latter (Xing, 1966:
Snow and Rabinovitch, 1969). Similar findings have also
been reported for adults (Bruner, Ooodnow and Austin,
1956).
The second type of study involves the subject
responding to a disjunctive instruction either by selec¬
ting a single exemplar which he considers consistent
with the disjunction (p.g. Peel, 1967 referred to on
page 34) or by selecting all consistent exemplars from
a comparison group. This latter procedure was used in
the Edinburgh Cognition Project study reported above and
was also used by Neimark and Slotnick (1970). They
presented subjects aged from nine to fifteen and college
students with 'inclusive' (A v 8 or both) and 'unspecified'
(a v 3) disjunctive statements. For each statement the
subject had to select, from a group of pictures or names
of common objects, those items which were consistent with
the civ. n disjunction. A typical statement was: 'All
things which are birds or are black, or both.' Negatives
occurred in six of the eight disjunctions used.
The results showed an increase in 'correct' responses
with age (a 'correct' response was an 'in lusive' inter-
pretation In which all possible exemplars had been
selected). At nine only 4 per cent of responses were
•correct', at fifteen 26 per cent and with college
students 70 per cent. The use of negatives in the
disjunctions undoubtedly lowered the success rate.
Apart from errors attributed to 'probable carelessness *
two main error types were identified. Firstly, there were
those In which the subject treated disjunction as con¬
junction. This error accounted for 42 per cent of res¬
ponses at age nine, 37 per cent of responses at age
fifteen and 16 per cent of responses with college students.
With increasing age, it was more common in the 'inclusive'
disjunctions than in the 'unspecified' diajunctions.
The second type of er-or was where the subject gave 'a
single class in place of the required combination'. This
accounted for 24 per cent of responses at nine, 79 per
cent of responses at fifteen and 6 per cent of responses
with college students. Again this error was slight iy
more common in the 'inclusive' than the *unspecified'
disjunctions.
Further Meimark and Slotnick report that an 'exclusive'
interpretation of disjunction occurred very infrequently.
They say: 'practically no 3 at any a&e gives A.B + a.B
for A v B'. Here, however, Weimark and Blotnick reveal
an ambiguity in their interpretation of what comprises
an 'exclusive' response in their task. They take an
'exclusive' response to be one in which the subject bases
his responses on s. truth-functional analysis in which
A.B is false, A .If is true, A.B is true and A.If is false.
He selects items corresponding to A.If and A.B and rejects
those corresponding to A.B and T.lf. However, one has to
distinguish between a truth-functional analysis of
'exclusive' disjunction and the way in which an
individual will respond to an 'exclusive' disjunction
instruction. For instance, if someone is told to take
'an a = pie or an orange, but not both', he will choose
only one of the offered items. For example he will
select the apple and reject t e orange (A.1T). He will
not also reject the apple and select the orange (A.B)
since, in practice, this is tantamount to selecting both
the apple and the orange (A.B). He is probably aware
that A.If and A.B are both 'acceptable selections, but
his response does not generally reveal such awareness.
Perhaps we can talk of 'exclusive' disjunction
responses* (i.e. truth-functional responses) and
'exclusive' disjunction responses (i.e. responses to
'exclusive' disjunction instructions). In the Neimark
and Slotnick experiment the former type of response
hardly ever occurs, but the latter may well have occurred,
unfortunately, they do not state the exact nature of the
errors they described as 'giving a single class in place
of the required combination'. They do not say whether
such responses included A.B items or not. If they did
not, then these errors are the second type of 'exclusive*
disjunction response put forward here.
At this point we can perhaps also talk about the
nature of 'Inclusive' disjunction. A truth-functional
analysis of 'Inclusive' disjunction gives A.B as true,
A.B as true, A.If as true and TuTf as false. An 'inclusive'
disjunction response based on a truth- uActional analysis
requires selection of items corresponding to A.B, A.IT and
A.B with rejection of iteme corresponding to A.7. However,
as with * exclusive • -disjunction one can distinguish
between a truth-functional analysis of 'inclusive' dis¬
junction ard responses to 'inclusive' disjunction instruc¬
tions. If this time someone la told he can take 'an
apple or an orange or both' and he responds by taking
both the apple and orange we do not atsums that he is
responding conjunctively without aw .reneas of the truth-
functional values of 'inclusive' disjunction. Similarly
if be takes only the apple, hie response is not taken to
indicate that he is responding * exclusively' without
awareness of the nature of 'inclusive' disjunction. Here
may be the key to understanding some of the 'conjunctive*
and 'one class' responrses in Neinnrk and Slotnick's
experiment. These responses nee 3 not necessarily reflect
a 'tenuous comprehension of disjunction* as Neicark and
Slotnick suggest, but rather the nature and constraints
of the task the subject w-<a asked to perform.
Clearly there? is a distinction between a truth-
functional analysis of disjunction and the way in which
one acts in response to a disjunctive instruction. It
is ar--ued here that to present a subject with a disjunc¬
tive statement a d ask him to select exemplars consistent
with it, from a comparison group, places the subject in an
ambiguous situation where it is unclear whether he is
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expected to wake a truth-iunctional analysis or whether
he is expected to respond as he would normally to a
disjunctive instruction. The selection he makes from
the comparison group is, therefore, dependent not only
on whether he handles disjunction 'exclusively', •inclusively',
•conjunctively' or in some other way, but also upon the
way he resolves the ambiguity of the task.
a further point about 'inclusive' disjunction is
that one can hypothesize psychological processes which
will result in apparently 'inclusive' responses (according
to a truth-functional analysis) and yet require no
awareness of the truth-functional nature of 'inclusive'
disjunction. For example if a subject is given the
disjunction A v ii and required to select items consistent
with this diejunction, he may simply select those items
with attributes consistent with A (this would give him
K.b and A.B) ana those items with attributes consistent
with B (this would give him a.B and again A.B). ouch a
process involves a simple matching of disjunct*? with
item attributes and requires no awareness that some
items contain an attribute consistent with one disj net,
but not with the other disjunct, and that acme items
contain attributes consistent with both disjuncte. In
fact, once an item has been selected as having one
attribute consistent with one disjunct, t e other
attribute of the item which is relevant for a truth-
functional treatment of 'inclusive' disjunction, is
immaterial in the 'matching' process proposed here.
Nevertheless, this process can result in what appear to
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be 'inclusive* responses and may account for * inclusive'
responses found in young children (for example in the
Edinburgh Cognition Project study, p. 58).
In everyday language adults generally interpret *or'
in its 'exclusive' sense. Mehler and Bever (1968) says
'...the natural or "primary" interpretation of disjunction
is exclusive'. 'Inclusive* interpretation is rare, but
can occur when the subject's experience of the context
of the disjunction impinges upon the interpretation.
Naess (1962) presented seventeen-year-olds with a series
of disjunctions and found that they interpreted 'inclusively*
disjunctions such as: * Scholarships in this faculty are
awarded to those who are competent in Greek or in
latin'.
The way in which adults as well as children handle
disjunction is obviously complex. The nature of the
task in which disjunction is presented would appear to
contribute to the type of disjunctive response a subject
produces. College students sometimes produce responses
which appear to be conjunctive, but we know that in their
everyday language they generally handle disjunction
'exclusively'. With pre-school children, however, the
situation is less clear. We do not know whether their
everyday handling of disjunction is 'exclusive', whether
it is 'conjunctive' or whether they place some other
interpretation upon the word 'or'.
It was, therefore, considered worthwhile to perform
a simple test in which 'and' and 'or' were the only
variables and in which task constraints, such as those in
the experiments discussed above, were removed as far as
possible in order to determines
a. whether pre-school children would respond differently
to statements mediated by tie word 'and* and those
mediated by the word 'or' and
b. if they respond in different ways to 'and* and 'or'
what form does it take, how widespread is it and how
consistent within and between subjects.
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B. Experiment 1. And ,/fr
• ^et^od
The task required S, on the b*sis of 'a verbally
presented conjunction (t.B) or disjunction (A v B\ to
select en object cr objects from en array of three objects
displayed in front o'* him.
i) Subjects
1? nursery school children (6 boys, 6 girls) aged
between 3 years 1 month end 4 years 11 months; mean age
4 years 0 months, rre-'ian age four years 1 months.
ii) Material
A matchbox, a red rubber ball (diameter ?f") *5nd
a red cylindrical stick (length 3", diameter ?/5"}
i 1 i) Procedure
The three objects (matchbox, ball and stick) were
placed in line in front of 3 who was rented at a low
table. K saids 'I've srot a matchbox, a ball and n.
stick here.' (indicating each object as it was mentioned).
E then requested 3 to 'show me the ball* (matchbox, stick).
3 was required to point out each object as it was named.
The Identification of the objects was then repeated with
E pointing to each object in turn and asking 'What's
this?* cvd S giving the name of the object in response.
All Ss were completely successful in identifying the
objects in both the above manners.
The test itself then followed. This consisted of E
presorting. 3 with instructions of the following two forms:
a. Give me the matchbox and the stick.
b. Give me the matchbox or the stick."
When 8 handed the object/a to E, he was told 'Good'.
The distribution of objects was then changed and the
procedure repeated,
iv) 'Design
Bach combination of two from the three objects was
used in the instruction containing 'and' (conjunction)
and in the instruction containing 'or* (disjunction) for
each S. This gave six trials per 8. The conjunction
and disjunction instructions were alternated in the
six trials. Six subjects commenced with a conjunction
and six with a disjunction.
Each 8 ws presented with one of twelve orders.
In the twelve order;each combination of two objects
occurred with equal frequency in all six trial positions.
In addition the objects in each combination were presented
equally in both directions (e.g. matchbox *nd/or ball;
ball and/or matchbox) with half of each direction
mediated by the conjunction and half by the disjunction.
For individual 3e each combination of objects
occurred twice (once in each direction), on one occasion
with the conjunction and on one occasion with the
diejunction. Each S was also presented with all six
possible ways of displaying the material in front of him.
1. Matchbox, -tic and ball were used equally.
b. Results
In response to the conjunction situation (a.B) all
twelve subjects, on ©11 trials, selected the two objects
mentioned in the instruction. There was complete
consistency in the disjunctive situation also, with all
subjects, on all trials, selecting one of the two objects
mentioned in the instruction. There was no evidence of
either position preference (i.e. preference for the right,
centre or left object in the array) or object preference.
In the disjunctive situation, where such preferences
might have manifested themselves, the three positions
were selected with almost equal frequency as were the
objects, with the matchbox chosen on 13 occasions, the
ball on 1? occasions and the stick on 11 occasions.
c. Discussion
It is clear, therefore, that three to five year old
children do respond differently to the words •and' and
•or' aid that they do so with a very high degree of
consistency. The conjunction is handled •correctly',
not only in formal logical terms, but also in the same
Banner as adults. Disjunction is handled in its
•exclusive• sense (A v B, but not both). This is the
response one would expect from adults in this situation.
It would appear that a 'simple' task such as the
one in this experiment, produces not the varied results,
aa In the experiments referred to in the introduction
to this chapter (p. 58), but 'exclusive' responses of a
highly consistent nature, even from a child as young as
three years one month.
It could perhaps be argued that presenting disjunctions
alongside conjunctions will force subjects to differentiate
between the two thus forcing an 'exclusive' interpretation
on disjunction. However, the fact that half the subjects
commenced the test with h disjunctive trial and that these
subjects all responded 'exclusively' be lore conjunction
appeared on the scene, disproved this.
Finally, if one considers the way in which adults
use disjunction when talking to children, it would appear
that an 'exclusive' rather than an 'inclusive' interpreta¬
tion is more frequently intended. For example, 'We'll
go to the zoo on Wednesday or Thursday' is more likely
to be intended as and accepted as an 'exclusive* disjunc-
TV)ar>
tion and not as an 'inclusive' disjunction. If it ia the
case that in their everyday lives children encounter
•exclusive* disjunction more frequently than. 'Inclusive',
it is not surprising if this in the interpretation they
put upon the word 'or' in s situation where the pressures
t.o respond in one direction or the other, if not removed,
ore considerably reduced when compared with the more
usual experimental situations.
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0. Experiment 2. Houses and Boxes
a. Introduction
In this experiment the subject is presented with an
array of three boxes (p, q and r). Bach box contains a
card. Two of the cards are blank and one has a picture
of a house on It. The BUbject has to select the box
containing the picture of a house. Before each selection,
the experimenter makes a statement providing information
relevant to the choice and the subject's task is to
select a box or boxes strictly in accordance with this
information.
One prerequisite for success in such a task is the
ability to accept a verbal statement, given by the
experimenter, as a basis for judgement and action which
is consistent with the statement. It has already been
shown in the previously reported experiment (And/or, p. 68)
that, in one task at least, pre-school children can
consistently constrain their behaviour in accordance with
verbally given statements. Here it ie proposed to take
the issue further, in a different task, and in addition,
in some of the statements presented to the subject, to
look at the ability to draw necessary conclusions, i.e.
to make inferences (aa defined in Chapter I, p. 10), in
a disjunctive context.
Four types of statement occur. These are used in
conjunction with the instruction to 'find the house'.
The first; type of statement refers directly to the box
which contains a picture of a house. For example 'The
house is in the red box', Statements of this kind will
be referred to as 'simple positive* or 'p'.^ This statement
calls for no inference on the part of the child.
The second type of statement specifies one box which
does not contain a picture of a house. For example 'The
house is not in the white box'. This will be referred to
as 'simple negative* or Vp' and is used as the negative
counterpart of 'simple positive' or 'p'. For success
with this statement, the subject has to constrain his
selection to one of the two boxes not mentioned in the
statement (i.e. box q or box r). To do so he must draw
the necessary conclusion that since the house is not in
box p, it must, therefore, be in either box q or in
2
box r. It will be noted that, since only one of these
boxes contains a picture of a house, theore/zftically only
half of the 'correct* selections will obtain the sought-
for picture. This means that if the subject 'correctly'
concludes that the house is in box q or box r and on
selecting box q finds that the picture is not there, he
must then draw another necessary conclusion i.e. that
the picture must be in box r. This statement, therefore,
can require the subject to make two inferences before he
attains his goal. The first inference requires him to
combine the verbally given information that a picture of
a house is in one of the three boxes (p v q v r) with the
1. 'p' is used to represent a statement which refers to
a single box rather than as a symbol for 'positive*.
2. The drawing of this conclusion (i.e. p v q v r,^ p,
q v r) cannot be taken to indicate that the subject
is aware of the alethic modality of 'possibility' as
described by Von Wright, p 11)
verbally driven information that it is not in box p in
order to draw the necessary conclusion that the picture
must be in box q or box r (i.e. p v q v r, ~p> q v r).
The second inference again requires the subject to combine
two pieces of information, one being the conclusion of
the first inference (q v r)» the other being his percep¬
tually ob ained information that box q does not contain
a picture of a house, in order to draw the conclusion
that the picture must be in box r (i.e. q v r, ^ q, r).
The third type -of statement contains direct reference
to two boxes either of which may contain the picture of a
house. For example 'The house is in the red box or in
the white box'. Statements of this kind will be referred
to as 'positive disjunctive* or *p v q'. As with the
'simple negative' statements, two selections may be needed
before the goal is attained, the second selection being
based on an inference of the type made for a 'correct'
second select ion in a 'simple negative' situation.
The fourth type of statement refers to two boxes
which do not contain a picture of a house. For example
'The house ie not in the red box. The house is rot in
the w>ite box'. A successful response to this statement
requires the subject to combine the information that a
picture of a house is in one of the three boxes (p v q v r)
with the information that the house is not in box p and
the house 1 s not in box q (^p.^-q) in order to draw the
conclusion that the house must, of necessity, be in box r
(i.e. p v o v r, p.-q, r). As with 'simple positive'
situations only one selection is 'correct'. This type of
statement will be referred to as 'negative disjunctive'
or « a.q ' •
The wording of the fourth type of statement and
reference to it as 'negative disjunctive' calls for
some comment. The conjunction of two negated propositions
(~p.~q) was chosen as the negative counterpart of statements
of the third type because, linguistically, it affords a
simpler means of conveying a negated disjunction. The
more obvious 'The house is neither in the white box nor
in the red box ( v q)) would have presented
difficulties extraneous to the actual task since it has
been shown (Donaldson, 1970) that children older than
those in the present study have considerable difficulties
with the word 'neither' and the double negative 'neither
...nor*. In her experiment, children aged from five
years to seven years one month completed statements
describing attributes of cards. Positive rather than
negative attributes of the cards were more freouently
given in completing statements commencing with 'neither'
and, in those cases where negative attributes were referred
to in the responses, only one subject out of a hundred and
fifty five used the word 'nor*, and she on only one
occasion. There were thirteen instances of completion
with negative attributes using the word 'or'. It was,
therefore, considered wieer in this study to avoid the
word 'neither'. The Donaldson study only provides evidence
that 'nor' is not used successfully when following 'neither',
but «inc» there is no other available evidence to suggest
that it is used or understood in other situations ^nd no
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evidence to indicate whether it is confused or differen¬
tiated from * or', the word 'nor' has also been av oided.
Logically the conjunction of two negated propositions
is equivalent to the negation of their disjunction
(<^(p v a)) (de Morgan's rules) and, in this study, In
view of the reasons given above, statements of the form
^p.~q ore used as negative counterparts of 'positive
disjunction' (p v q) and will be referred to as 'negative
disjunctive'.
A two-dimensional summary of the four types of state¬
ment is given in Figure 2 below. A third dimension exists,
but is not drawn out in Figure 2. This dimension reflects
the relationship between diagonally opposed statements
where the first and fourth statements (i.e. 'p' andWp.-~q^
have one, and only one, 'correct' response and the second
and third statements (i.e.Vp' and 'p v q') have two
'correct' responses and may recuire a second selection,
based on an inference, before the goal, i.e. the picture
of a house, is attained. Two of the four statements used
Figure 2
The negative/positive and siraple/dinjunctive dimensions
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negatives explicitly, a third statement (simple disjunction)
has an implicit negative which plays a part in a second
selection, if the first selection has revealed the goal
not to be present. It should be noted that, even if they are
equivalent in the information they convey, negative and
positive statements are not psychologically equivalent.
Children begin to use 'no' and 'not' to negative
propositions quite early in life. Klima and Bellugi (1966)
report examples, from children between the ages of two
and three, such as 'He not little, he big' and in response
to an adult stating 'That's your valentine', 'No, Becky
valentine'. However, the use of negatives in 'formal'
experimental tasks with older children and adults has
produced an area of considerable complexity. In some
tasks negatives have been found more difficult to process
than positives (Donaldson, 1959j Wason, 1959» 1961). In
one task connotations of 'not' were found to affect
response latencies more than the function of 'not' as a
logical constant (Wason and Jones, 1963)* With children
Donaldson (1970) found situations with two negatives no
more difficult than those with one negative and one
positive and, with adults, Wason (1965) found the
difficulties of negation were reduced in contexts where
a negative statement denied that an 'exceptional' item
had a property of a larger residual class.
From studies such as these, one concludes that the
nature of a particular experimental situation plays a
part in determining the way in which a subject processes
negatives and that, even if informationally equivalent,
negative and positive statements, are not necessarily
'psychologically' equivalent.
In the present study we have informationally equivalent
negative and positive statements. For example the 'simple
positive* is Informationally equivalent to the 'negative dis¬
junctive', hut the uae of one calls for an inference while
the use of the other does not. Also we have negative
counterparts for each positive statement. For example the
•simple positive' has as its negative counterpart the
•simple negative', but clearly here the 'psychological*
processing required for attainment of goal is different for
the two statements. One can hypothesize that, with informa¬
tionally equivalent negatives and positives and with
positive and negative counterparts, in this taslc, pre¬
school children will find negatives more difficult to
process than positives.
The word 'in' was used in the statements with some
confidence that it was a preposition with which pre-school
children are familiar. Utterances of 'in' have been
reoorded in the spontaneous speech of two year old
children (Brown, Fraser and Bellugi, 1964? Miller and
Ervin, 1964) and the present experimenter found, in
informal situations, pre-school children, aged three to
four, could follow instructions and answer correctly
questions such ass 'Put the brick in the box*, 'What is
in the box?* 'Is the doll in the box?' in situations where
a box was empty or had an object in it.
b. Method
For half of the Ss in this experiment, the relevant
boxes were indicated by reference to their colour only,
whereas for the other half of the 3s, E indicated the
relevant boxes by pointing to them. In the latter con¬
dition a typical statement used was: 'The house is in this
box' (p). When the word 'this* was spoken, E pointed to
the relevant box. These two conditions afforded a com¬
parison between a purely verbal presentation of informa¬
tion and a more usual (for young children) pointing to or
touching relevant aspects of the material in conjunction
with verbally presented information.
However, there were problems in selecting Ss for
the 'colour only' reference condition, since not all
pre-achool children know colour names. To overcome this,
children were tested for their ability to identify the
three colours necessary for the experiment (red, white
and bfeck) before final selection of 3b took place. Each
child was presented with three cards (a red card, white
card and black card) and asked of each card in turn:
'What colour is this?' If a child was unable to identify
all three colours correctly, he was omitted from the
experimental sample and replaced by a child, of as near
equivalent age aspossihle, who did possess colour names.
In selecting the 48 3b for tie 'colour only' reference
condition, 7 other children were rejected on the above
grounds. To have retailed these children in the sample
would have involved introducing a confounding variable,
extraneous* to the task> into the results. Nevertheless,
this procedure may have produced a biased 'colour only*
reference sample, but there are some grounds for sugges¬
ting that this bias may not be in the direction of a
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higher intelligence level. It was found, by the present
experimenter, with pilot test children whose intelligence
quotients were known (7eriaan-Merri.il), that two ore-
school children well above average intelligence did not
possess these colour names whilst two younger children of
average intelligence did. .Nevertheless the selection
procedure of this experimental group has to be borne in
rind when assessing the results.
For half the 3s, if a situation arose where a 'correct'
first selection did not reveal the goal (i.e. with state¬
ments Vvc* a d *p v q'), B repeated the statement before
S made his second selection. For the other half of the
3s the statement was not repeated. This provided some
aensure of whether failure to make a 'correct' second
selection was caused by an inability to remember the
essential information or an inability to draw the approp¬
riate necessary conclusion (see reference to memory
limitation as a confounding variable, p. 7}
A control group of subjects also performed the task.
They had to locate t) e picture of a house y/ithout the
aid of the statements and provided a 'standard' against
which the experimental subjects' performances could be
compared. Any difference between the two groups could
thus be attributed to regulation of beh«viour by the
statements.
In addition a group of adults also Performed the
task (see reference t adult subjects. r>. co*J J J / •
i; ^ub joc ks
nxperitaental subjects: children
9b nursery school children (50 boys, 46 girls) aged
between 3 years 1 month and 4 years 7 months.
Control subjects: children
16 nursery school children (8 boys, 8 girls) aged between
3 years 2 months and 4 years J raontris.
Experimental subjects; adults
12 adults aged between 2o and 36 years (6 men, 6 women).
Control subjectsi adults
6 adults aged between 20 and 36 years (3 sen, 3 women).
ii) Material
38 cards, 3" by 2I". Twenty-four of the cards were
blank and fourteen had on them brightly coloured pictures
of houses.
3 unpeinted wooden boxes and 3 coloured wooden boxes
(one red, one white and one black) measuring 4" in length,
2s" in breadth and 2<t" in height. Bach box had a 3i"
slit on its upper surface. The boxes were designed so
that cards inserted into the slits in the top protruded
by half an inch. The pictures of houses were positioned
sufficiently low on the cards for blank and picture cards
to appear identical when they were in the boxes.
iii) Vrocednre
experimental subjects : children
Bach 8 was tested individually, seated at a low
table facing E. B showed 8 a card with a, picture of a
house on it and asked: 'Do you know whet this is?' All
Ss responded that it was a house or a picture of a house.
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E» after telainr S that his answer was correct, held an
identical card in front of 8 and said: 'and this is
another house/picture of a house isn't it?* (using
whichever label S had himself offered). After 8 had
agreed that it was another house/picture of a house, E
said: 'I'm going to put this house on the table here.
Now, you put the other house there next to it.' When
8 had done this E said: *1 have some more houses here and
we're going to play a game to see whether we can find
them and make a row of houses across the table. I have
some boxes here and I'm going to put a house in one of
the boxes and in the other boxes, I'm going to put
cards with nothing on, like this.' (at this point 8 was
shown one of the blank cards).
The information was then summarized for S as
follows: 'One of the cards has a house on it. The
other cards haven't got a house on them.'
The cards were placed in the appropriate boxes out
of view of the child. E laid the boxes in a row in front
of S and said: 'I'm going to tell you something and then
I want you to try to find the house. Listen carefully.'
For the 8s whose attention was drawn to t e boxes by
E referring to the colours of the relevant boxes, E made
one of the following statements:
1. The house is in the red1 box. (p)
2. The house is not in the red box. (<^p)
1. Red, white and black were used equally for all
subjects and statements.
3. The house is in the red box or in the white box. (p v
4. The house is not in the red box. The house is not
in toe white box. (^-p.^)
For the Sa whose attention was drawn to the relevant
boxes by E pointing to the boxes, K made one of the
following correspondtng statements § pointing as she did
30 to the appropriate box(es):
1. The house is in this box. (p)
2. The house is not in this box. (^p)
3. The house is in this box or in this box. (p v q)
4. The house is not in this box. The house is not
in this box. (^p.~-q)
In statements where the word not occured, It was
stressed.
If 3 failed to select a box immediately, E said;
'Where's the house? Try to find it.* This additional
instruction was required on relatively few occasions and
never more than once by any 3.
Whenever 3 had made a 'correct' choice (i.e. had act¬
ed within the limits of the statement), after he had made
his choice, but before he had removed the card from the
box, he was asked; 'How do you know the house is in that
box?' The aim was to see whether 3 would express any
awareness of" the 'necessity* of some selections and the
uncertainty of other (i.e. with statements *.~p' and
•p v q' where two possibilities are open)#
3 was then asked to take the card out of the box.
If 3 had selected the 'critical' card (i.e. the card with
a house on it), he was told: 'That's good, put the house
there next to the other houses*1 If the child had chosen
a blank card, he was told: 'No, that's not the house, is
it?' With statements *~p' and 'p v q', if this blank
card was 'correct' (in the sense that it was consistent
with the statement), for half the subjects, the statement
was repeated at this point with E saying: 'Listen carefully,
followed by the statement. All Ss were then asked: 'Can
you find the house now?' If S made a 'correct' second
selection with statements hv-p' and 'p v q' he was again
asked: 'How do you know the house is in that box?"* before
removing the card from the box. The procedure was repea¬
ted until the child eventually found the 'critical' card.
Once the 'critical' card had been located and positioned
in the row of houses the child was building up E said:
•We'll see if we can find another house now'. K then
rearranged the cards in the appropriate boxes, said:
'Listen carefully' and then made the statement for the
following trial.
The Ss were never told that they had to select only
one box at a time, although, in practice, this is what
they did. Since they knew that only one box contained a
picture of a house, this knowledge may have been sufficient
to restrict their behaviour to single-box selections.
After the last trial S was shown the array of three
boxes and was asked, without any preceding statement, to
'take out one of the cards'. The purpose of this was to
note any general position and, in the case of the Ss who




Because of the simplicity of the task, it seemed
advisable to begin by explaining to the Ss that no trick¬
ery was involved and by asking for their serious co-opera¬
tion in return for an explanation of the purpose of the
experiment at the end of the trials. The adult version
was modified by omission of a) the introductory familiari¬
zation with the picture cards, and b) the references to
'playing a game* and 'building a row of houses'. Otherwise
the same procedure was followed as for Experimental group
A with E pointing to the relevant boxes and no repetition
of the statement between selections.
Control subjects: children and adults.
The procedure was the same aa for the experimental Ss
except that in each trial the statement was* 'The house is
in one of the boxes', the statement wa» not repeated bet¬
ween selections and no justifications were asked for (i.e.
S was not asked* 'How do you know the house is in that
box*^ ). Half the control children performed the task with
unpainted boxes and half with the coloured boxes. All
adult Ss were presented with unpainted boxes.
iv) Design.
The 96 experimental children were divided into four equal
groups, one for each of four experimental conditions. For
two of the groups (groups A and B) the relevant boxes were
indicated by E pointing to them. For the other two groups
(groups C and D) the relevant boxes were indicated by refe¬
rence to their colour only.
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Groups A and G received all four statements ('p'»
*P v Q' a»d ♦^.p.^q') without any repetitions of the
statement before a second response. Groups B and D recei¬
ved two statements only (Vp' and 'p v q') and if a 'cor¬
rect* first response did not reveal the picture of a house,
the statement was repeated, by E, before a second response
was attempted. Sinee groups B and D were included for the
purpose of studying the extent to which memory limitations
affected second responses following 'correct' first respo¬
nses, only the two statements in which a second response
was possible, after a 'correct' first response, were inc¬
luded (i.e. '^p' and 'p v q').
Details of the four experimental groups and the con¬
trol group are given in Table 1.
Table 1
Composition, age details and experimental conditions













24 13 boys11 girls
3.1-
4.7 3.10 3.9*
















Each of the 24 3s in group A and each of the 24 3s in
group G was assigned to one of the 24 orders produced by
permutation of the four statements.
For each of the four statements there were three con¬
ditions (i.e. spatial positions of the box(es) indicated
in the statements). Box p was always to the left of the
array, box q in the centre and box r to the right (from 3s
viewpoint). For 'simple positive' and 'simple negative'
the three conditions were 'p'f 'q* and 'r'. For 'positive
disjunctive' and 'negative disjunctive* the three condit¬
ions were 'pq', 'pr* and 'qr'. By repeating an individual
S'8 'order' of statements three times, all three conditions
of each statement were given to each S. 'Phis gave a series
of 12 trials per 3.
For each S, each two-box condition (i.e. 'pq', 'qr'
and 'pr') was presented once in a left-right direction and
once in a right-left direction (e.g. 'pq', 'qp'). Three
left-right and three right-left presentations occurred for
each S, with at least one left-right and one right-left
presentation occurring with both 'positive disjunctive'
and 'negative 'disjunctive'.
With 'positive disjunctive' the 'critical* box (i.e.
the box containing a picture of a house) was the first
box indicated, on at least one occasion, and the second
box indicated, on at least one occasion, for each
With the 'simple negative* statements *^p' and '/v.r', on
one occasion the 'critical' box was the one adjacent to
the indicated box and on one occasion the box furthest
from the indicated box. Each box contained the picture
of a house on four occasions for each S.
For group A and group C (i.e. for 24 Ss as a group),
eaoh statement occurred 72 time©, on 6 occasions in each
series position (i.e. 6 times as the first statement
presented to S, 6 times as the second statement presented
to S, etc.). Each condition occurred 8 times in each
series position and each statement/condition combination
occurred twice In each series position.
For groups fl and D who received 'simple negative'
and 'positive disjunctive' statements only, the two state
ments were alternated for each S, with half the Ss in
each group commencing with a 'simple negative* and half
with a 'positive disjunctive*. Each statement was
presented with all its three conditions to each S, giving
6 trials per S. Direction of presentation with 'positive
disjunctive' (i.e. left-right, right-left) and position
of 'critical* box with both statements were controlled
as for groups A and G. Each statement occurred 72 times,
on 12 occasions in each series position. Each condition
occurred 8 times in each series position and each atnte-
ment/^ondi tion combination occurred twice in each series
position.
The twelve adult experimental subjects were assigned
to 12 of the 24 series used for groups A and C, so that
for them, as a group, each statement occurred 36 times,
on 3 occasions in each series position. Each condition
occurred 4 times and each statement/condition combination
occurred once in each series position. Direction of
presentation and position of 'critical' box precautions
were observed for them in the same manner as with the
children.
The positions of the 'critical* boxes for control
subjects were the some as for experimental subjects with
the 22 control subjects (16 children and 6 adults) assigned
to 22 of the 24 sequences of 'critical' positions used in
the trials of group A and C. This gave 12 trials per
control 3 with the picture of a house occurring in each
box on four occasions.
When coloured boxes were used, the six orders
resulting from the permutation of these colours were
used for boxes p, q and r. 3s were allocated equally
to these orders.
c. Results
i) Experimental subjects; children
first responses
Table 2 gives the number of correct and incorrect
first responses for each of the four statements used
(i.e. the nutnber of first responses which are compatible
and the number of first responses which are incompatible
with the statement). In addition it gives the number of
subjects whose first responses are always correct on
all three occasions on which they respond to any particular
statement and the number of subjects making at least one
incorrect first response to a particular statement.
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Table 2
Number of correct and Incorrect first responses and
number of subjects making correct and incorrect
first responses
P P V q /-v p «~q








No.of incorrect responses 3 41 16 32











No.of Ss with at least
one incorrect response
3 24 15 19
Total no.of 8s 48 96 96 48
For statements 'p* and '~p.~q' the probability of a
correct response by charnee is one in three since one box
out of the three is compatible with the statement. For
statements t^p' and 'p v q* the probability of a correct
response by chance is two in three since two out of the
three boxes are compatible with the statement. For each
of the four statements correct first responses are signifi-
1
cantly above chance level (p<.G01). ^
1. Percentages of correct responses and So making
consistently correct responses.
2
2. The X test has been employed throughout thi3 study and
level of significance have been obtained from Table C
of Sigel, 3. Nonparametrlc statistics for the behavioral
sciences
If one takes the percentage of correct first res¬
ponses as an indicator of the degree of difficulty of
each statement, then statement 'p' is the least difficult
with statements *p v q*, Vp' and '^p.^q' becoming
increasingly more difficult.
The major source of difficulty appears to lie in
negation. Since the writer has been unable to find a
statistical test which handles data of this type adequately,
levels of significance have not been computed. Neverthe¬
less the number of inoorrect first responses for the
negative statements (i.e. and *^p./\q') is higher than
for the positive statements (i.e. *p' and *p v q')« A
closer analysis of negatives and positives shows that for
each negative statement there are more errors than for its
positive informational equivalent (i.e. there are more
errors for '^p' than for 'p v q* and more errors for Vp.~q'
than for 'p')» Also for each negative statement there are
more errors than for its positive counterpart (i.e. there
are more errors for ' than 'p' and more errors for
Vp.'vq' than for *p v q')«
Although it is possible to ascertain an order of
difficulty for the statements from the results as a
whole, the situation is less clear when one examines the
results of individual subjects. Here seven subjects
produce incorrect responses for statement 'p v q', but
are consistently correct with negative statements and
none subjects are incorrect with statement '^p*, but are
always correct with all other statements.
Age differences
An analysis of the frequency of incorrect first
responses accord in/? to age reveals that subjects aged 3
years 9 months and younger (this represents exactly half
of the subjects In the experiment as a whole and exactly
half the subjects presented with each statement) produced
significantly more incorrect first responses than the
subjects older than 3 yeans 9 months (p<.001). Only 17
of the 48 subjects in the younger group were consistently
correct with each statement whereas 40 of the 48 subjects
in the older group were consistently correct with each
statement. Nevertheless, the number of correct first
responses, for each statement, was still well above chance
level for the younger half of the subjects (p<.001 for
'p'» *P v Q'» Ov-p./^q'? p<.01 for fable 3 gives the
number of incorrect responses occurring according to age.
fable 3
Number of incorrect first responses according to age
P XV p p v q a p • <^q
All
statements
IR R IR R IR R IR R IR R
3.9 end younger 3 72 30 144 11 14 4 24 72 68 432
Older than 3.9 0 72 11 144 5 144 8 72 24 432
All Ss 3 144 41 288 16 288 32 144 92 864
IR » no. of incorrect responses
R is no. of responses
Colour names vs. pointing
For half the subjects in this experiment the relevant
boxes were indicated by reference to tneir colour only,
whereas for the other half of the subjects the relevant
boxes were indicated by the experimenter pointing to
them. Although there were slight variations for each
statement, identical totals of correct first responses
were produced in the 'pointing* and 'colour naming'
conditions. Table 4 gives the number of correct responses
in these two conditions.
Table 4
Kuraber of correct first responses In 'pointing* and
'colour naming' conditions
. P rv p p V q
All
statements





123 136 57 386
Second responses
The main interest in second responses lies in cases
where the statement leaves two correct alternatives open
(i.e. Vp* and 'p v q'). With statements 'p* and Vp.^c'
a second response indicates that the first response was
incorrect. With statements Vp* and 'p v q* a second
response can follow an incorrect first response. In this
case the second response has to be correct since only
one box is incompatible with the statement. In addition
though, second responses for these two statements (Vp1
and *p v q*5 can follow correct first responses which
are compatible with the statement, but do not produce the
picture of a house. It is second responses of the latter
type which are particularly relevant here, since they
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require the subject to make an inference based on the
information he gains from the statement plus the informa¬
tion he gains from not finding the picture of a house in
hie first response.
In order to gain some measure of memory effects in
this experiment, for half the subjects, second responses
to statements '^p* and *p v q* were preceded by a
repetition of the statement. For the other half of the
subjects no repetition of the statement was made. Table
5 indicates, for statements '~p' end 'p v q*, the number
of correct second responses following correct first res¬
ponses in the 'statement repeated' and 'statement not
repeated' conditions.
Table 5
Correct second responses following correct first responses




















No. No. $» No. «s<ft,
Statement
repeated 71 1 64
i
90.1 63 59 93.7 134 123 91.8
Statement
not repeated 60 47 78.3 69 59 85.5 129 106 82.2
Total 131 111 84.7 132 118 89.4 263 229 87.1
1. These are second responses following correct first
responses and similarly the correct second responses
are only those which follow correct first responses.
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The number of correct second responses is signifi¬
cantly above chance level (pd.001) for each statement in
the 'statement repeated' and in the 'statement not re¬
peated' conditions. However a comparison of the two
conditions reveals that there are significantly more
correct responses (p<.05) in the 'statement repeated'
condition than in the 'statement not repeated' condition.
ii) Experimental subjectsi adults
Only three incorrect responses occurred with the
adult subjects, one in each of the three statements 'p'f
'~p' and 'p v q'. In two of these cases (•p* and 'p v q')
the incorrect response was the first response in the
trial and perhaps reflects a distrust of the information.
iii) Search patterns: control and experimental subjects
For the control children there was a significant
tendency (p<.001) to select t} e left-most box as the first
response. This occurs with both the coloured and un-
coloured boxes, though it is less marked with the
coloured boxes where a preference for the red box, as
opposed to the black and white boxes, appears to play a
part. With adults no such preference for the left-most
box occurs. With adults there is a slight, though non¬
significant, tendency to select the right-most box.
Table 6 gives the frequency of selection of the left,
centre and right boxes by both children and adults for
first responses.
Table 6
First restonee selections for control groups
left box centre box
.
right box
Uncoloured boxes 50 23 23
Coloured boxea 45 25 28
All control children 93 48 51
Adults 20 21 31
The tendency to select the left-most box la also
evident with the experimental children. With staterent
'p v q* where two alternatives are open and one of these
la the left box, then the left box ia selected in 62 per
cent of the children's responses. This is significantly
above chance level (pk.oul)• For adults the percentage
of ouch selections is near chance level at 48 per cent.
Statement Vp' which also afforded two choices was subject
to this strategy only when hp' referred to the centre
box. When '~p • referred to the right-most box another
strategy operated. This will be discussed below.
At the end of the experiment, when both experimental
and control subjects were asked, without any preceding
statement, to 'take out one of the cards* again the
preference for the left-most box occurs with the children,
but not the adults. Selection of the left-most box ie
significantly above chance (p<«001). fable 7 gives the
selections made by children and adults.
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Table 7
Selections made In response to 'take out one of the cards1
at the end of the experiment
! left box
I
centre box right box
Children | 56 34 22
Adults 4 8 6
Whenever the control children selected either the
left-moat box or the right-moat box and did not find the
picture of a house there was a significant tendency (p<.001)
for the second response tobethe the adjacent centre box.
The children appeared to be employing a search strategy
in which they worked along the array fro® left to right
or from right to left until they located the picture of a
house. Adult subjects did not utilize such a strategy.
'fable 8 show® the position of second responses after a
left-most or right-most response.
fable 8
Position of second response after a left or right
box response

















Children 58 2 27 4 85 6
Adults 6 5 8 11 14 16
A further example of the tendency to select the
centre box when the left or right box does not contain
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the picture of a house is found with statement '~p'. When¬
ever refers to either the left hex or the right box,
the adjacent centre cox is the first response on signifi¬
cantly more occasions (p<.001) than the equally correct
non-adjacent box. Table 9 gives the frequency of selec¬
tion of the adjacent centre box and the non-adjacent box
when hvp« refers to either the left or the right box.
Table 9
frequency of adjacent and non-adjacent responses to abate¬
ment f^p* w en Vp' is either the right box or the left box
Adjacent responses Non-adjacent responses
134 32
Colour preferences
For the subjects who were presented with coloured
boxes a further selection preference was noted. This
was the tendency to select the red box in preference to
either the white box or the black box. For the control
subjects there was a tendency to choose the red box as
the first response, although this was not above chance
level. Table 10 gives the frequency of selection of the
red, white and black boxes as first responses by the
control children.
Table 10
First response selections for control group
Red White Black
39 27 30
Selection of the red box when it was one of two
correct alternatives open for statements *~p* and *p v q'
was not above chance level. In response to the final
instruction to 'take out one of the cards', however, for
experimental and control subjects preference for the red
box was significantly above chance level (p<.01). Table
11 gives the frequency for each colour in response to
this Instruction.
Table 11
Selections made in response to 'take out one of the cards'
at the end of the experiment
Red White Black
29 14 13
Other possible search pattern© were followed up, but
were shown not to have influenced the children's responses
For example it was thought that children might select as
their first responses the box which contained the picture
of a house on the preceding trial. This was found not to
be the case. With the control children repetition of the
immediately preceding 'reward' box was almost at chance
level with 62 such selections out of 192 responses (32.3?')
With adults the picture was different. There was a signi¬
ficant tendency not to choose this box (p<.05). Out of
72 responses only 16 (22.2/0 were selections of the
immediately preceding 'reward' box. This adult response
pattern was not unexpected since it conforms with a
tendency to switch a prediction away from a previously
occuring outcome (Cohen, I960)
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It was further thought with statement 'p v q' that
there might be a bias towards selecting either the first
or aecona mentioned box, out this was not the case and
first and second mentioned boxes were selected with
almost equal frequency by both children and adults,
Juatifications
Attempts to obtain justifications from the experi¬
mental children in response to the question 'How do you
know the house is in tha- box?' were almost completely
unsuccessful. On many occasions the children did not res¬
pond at all or they simply pointed to the box they had
chosen, of the answers that wore given, typical examples
were, 'It's in here', 'It pops up', 'I knowed', 'I just
know', ''Cos I know you put it in there', ''Cos it'3 got
a house in it'. Some of the children responded quite rea¬
sonably that the experimenter had told them, for example,
'You told me', 'You said it', 'Somebody told me'. This
type of answer was not unlike some of the replies obtained
from the adult subjects, for example, 'You said it was in
there', 'You said it's not in that box'. Generally, how¬
ever, the adult replies were a modified repetition of the
information given to the subject and/or some indication of
the necessity of the conclusion, for example, 'Well if it's
not in there and it's not in there, it must be in here',
'It has to be here', 'If what you say is right, it should
be in here'. Only one child produced a justification of
this type and this was not a response to the question, but
a spontaneous comment. He said, 'It's not in that box 'cos
I've looked in there, it's got to be in this box'.
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d. Discussion
There is clear evidence in this experiment that even
the younger half of the subjects are capable of behaving
in accordance with verbally presented information and in
addition that they are capable of drawing conclusions from
information in which the conclusion is not explicit, but
only implied. According to the definition of Inferential
behaviour used in this study (p. 10) these children have
shown themselves to be capable of making inferences.
However, for children of three years nine months and
younger these capabilities are not consistent (31 of the
48 subjects made at least one incorrect response). Over
three years nine months, though, there is a high level
of consistency with all except 8 of the 48 subjects
consistently correct.
As was predicted in the Introduction to this experi¬
ment (p. 78) negative statements proved more difficult
than positive statements, but even so negative statements
were still handled well above chance level.
Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the findings
is the almost complete absence of verbal justifications.
It could be argued that this indicates that the children,
although capable of making a correct response, are
operating at a level which involves no awareness of the
necessity of the conclusions they draw. Certainly one
has to accept this as a possibility, but other explana¬
tions for the absence of justifications are feasible. For
example, it does not follow that being aware of the
necessity of a conclusion occurs along with the ability
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to Ascribe this necessity verbally. Also it is possible
that the children did not understand the question they
were asked either because the experimental task appeared
so self-evident as not to be amenable to explanation or
because the language used was not within their compre¬
hension.1
Some of the findings of this experiment have relevance
for testing children in a wide variety of experimental
situations. The finding that conveying information by
pointing at relevant attributes of the situation is no
more conducive to successful responses than using only
verbal colour names suggests that children of this age
are capable of operating at a level which does not re¬
quire physical emphasis of critical aspects of an array.
The desirability of conveying or emphaalKing Information
by physical rather than verbal means is widely accepted
in much experimentation with young children. Certainly
it would appear to be a useful attention directing
technique In certain situations, but in other situations
it may well be either superfluous or an unnecessary
complication of testing method. It has to be remembered
though, that in this experiment the children subjected
to the 'colour naming' condition were slightly biased
as a. sample, since seven original subjects were rejected
on th*- grounds that they did not possess the relevant
1. The language used in questioning children will be
considered further in the following chapter on
implication.
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colour names (p. 79)• Nevertheless this is only a small
proportion of toe total sample of 48 cnildren and the
hig success rate of this .group indicates that verbal
conveying of information is a viaole procedure with pre¬
school cnildren.
The significantly better performance which occurred
when the statement was repeated before a second response
than when the statement was not repeated lends some
support to the argument that memory limitations are a
cause of failure amongst young children performing cog¬
nitive tasks (p. 7). Nevertheless the results from the
subjects who did not have the statement repeated indicate
a high level of retention of information.
A number of search patterns and preferences operated
throughout this experiment. On the whole they appeared
not to have influenced the responses of the experimental
subjects to the extent of taking precedence over the
information conveyed to the subjects in the four statements.
For the experimental subjects they appear to have played
a secondary role to the statements in directing responses.
Where no ouch statement was giveil, as with the control
subjects, and where the search strategies and preferences
do not conflict with the statements, then there is con¬
siderable evidence that subjects do not respond randomly.
In contrast, the adult suojects appear considerably less
influenced by search strategies and preferences (or at
least by the search strategies and preferences employed
by the children).
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The kinds of search patterns found here have
relevance for other experimental situations, since it is
not unreasonable to suppose that in other choice situa¬
tions similar, if not the sane, strategies will be em¬
ployed by young children. In this experiment these
strategies appeared secondary to the task, but in other
situations they could play a more dominant part.
The preference shown for the red box as opposed to
the white or black box is perhaps easy to understand on
the basis of the relative attractiveness of the three
boxes. The tendency to select tie left-most box, however,
defies explanation at the moment. The 'end-to-end' (i.e.
left to right or right to left) search strategy employed
by the control children is interesting and somewhat
impressive since it reflects a highly systematic and
economical search strategy when compared with the apparen¬
tly largely random procedures employed by the adults.
The tendency with statement , to select the
centre box when '^p' refers to either of the end boxes
may be another example of the 'end-to-end' search strategy.
Alternatively, however, it could reflect a preference for
the centre box in this situation or a preference for an
adjacent response. An adjacent response need not be
part of an over all 'end-to-end1 strategy, but in this
three box situation is indistinguishable from such. Indeed
the 'end-to-end1 strategy of the control subjects could
also be explained on the basis of a preference for the
left or the right box followed by selection of each ad¬
jacent box.
Search strategies oi' the type found in the experiment
have been noted by other experimenters working with young
children. Olson (1966) carried out an experiment with
three, five, seven and nine year-old children in which
several matrix patterns were displayed in front of the
subject. These patterns had some features in common and
some features which were peculiar to each pattern. For
example two of the patterns were a horizontal line and a
'T' shape. Here the horizontal line was common to both
patterns whilst the vertical line occurred only in the
•T' pattern. The subject's task was to determine which
pattern was 'correct*. In order to do this he was prese¬
nted with a 'bulb-board' on which the bulbs, corresponding
only to the 'correct' pattern, would light up when pressed
Three types of response were possible. Firstly, bulbs
corresponding to neither pattern could be pressed. In
this case the bulbs did not light up and the child gained
no information to help him distinguish between the correct
nesa of the two patterns. Secondly, bulbs corresponding
to the features common to both patterns could be pressed.
Here the bulbs did light up, but again no information,
enabling the'correct' pattern to be distinguished, was
obtained. Thirdly, bulbs corresponding to one pattern
and not the other could be pressed. These bulbs were
crucial to distinguishing between the two patterns since
they lit up if one pattern was 'correct' and not if the
other pattern was 'correct'. It was responses of this
third type which had to be made before the subject could
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with certainty select the 'correct' picture. Olson refers
to these three response types as 'off-pattern redundant
positions', *on-pattern redundant positions* and 'on-
pattern informative positions.'
Olson found a highly significant tendency for his
three year-old subjects to respond with what he calls a
'search strategy'. This he describes as a 'quasi-
systematic search characterised by 'a high predominance
of corner bulb presses followed by the pressing of an
adjacent bulb* and by 'the occurrence of runs of from four
to over fifteen neighbouring bulbs in a sequence that could
hardly be random'. In a two pattern discrimination 90
per cent and in a three pattern discrimination 100 per
cent of Olson's three year-old subjects responded in
this way. By age five children making this type of res¬
ponse had fallen to 24 per cent in a two pattern discrimina¬
tion and 60 per cent in a three pattern discrimination.
At seven years only 8 per cent responded in this way in
a two pattern discrimination and 12 per cent in a three
pattern discrimination and by nine .years none of the
children produced this response. There were twenty sub¬
jects in the three-year-old group and twenty-five subjects
in each of the three older groups.1
The tendency for young children to make 'adjacent*
responses has been reported by Wales and Campbell (1970).
The experiment they describe was designed to study pre-
1. Other types of response found by Olson will be dis¬
cussed In Chapter III. Implication.
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school children's understanding of superlatives and com¬
paratives. Pour objects of decreasing dimensions were
placed before the child who was asked to give the experi¬
menter firstly the biggest object and then the wee-est
object, lost children correctly selected the biggest
object, but at three-and-a-half well over half the sub¬
jects and at four-and-a-half almost half the subjects
failed to selected the wee-eat object. Instead there
was a significant tendency to select the object adjacent
to the first response. In another part of the same
experiment, the experimenter pointed to the second
largest object and asked the child to give him an object
which was wee-er. Again at three-and-a-half the majority
of the children selected the adjacent as opposed to the
equally acceptable non-adjacent object.
If one considers the available evidence on the
search strategies of these young children it appears
that when presented with an array of objects in which
one object is singled out for attention (as in the '^p*
situation and in the Wales and Campbell experiment where
an object was pointed to by the experimenter) the child
selects an object adjacent to the singled out object.
When no object is singled out for attention an extreme
object is selected by the child and this is followed by
selection of successive adjacent objects. It is unclear
whether selection of an adjacent object is normally
followed by selection of successive adjacent objects
since Wales and Campbell noted a marked tendency for their
subjects not to make a second selection when asked if
there was another object 'wee-er' than the one indicated
by the experimenter and although second selections of
successive adjacent objects were made in the V.p* situa¬
tion in the 'Houses and boxes' experiment, the task
constraints were such that a 'correct' second selection
had to be adjacent to the first selection. Further
experimentation would be required to clarify this and
to determine whether the search strategies noted so far
are based on some common strategy or whether a number of
strategies are operating.
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D. .Experiment 5 • Disjunctive Syllorior?
r . Introduction
The fin*'l experiment in this section on die,junction
used the same procedure and material as the 'Houses
boxes' experiment, tut presents the child with information
in the form of the disjunctive syllogism (p v q).
To be successful the child has to combine the information
from the statement *p v c1 with that from the statement
•a-p* and then draw the necessary conclusion ' q'.
The situation in which the child is placed when
presented with the disjunctive syllogism is very similar
to that of a child making a second response, following
a first 'correct' response which has not revealed the
picture of a house, to statement 'p v o' in the 'Houses
and boxes' experiment. In both cases the child receives
the verbally presented information *p v q' and in both
cases the child receives the information Vp'. In the
'Houses and boxes' situation 'a-o' is conveyed by the
child seeing that the picture of a house is not in box
p and thus box p once emptied of its card is no longer
available for selection. With the disjunctive syllogism,
however, '~-p' is conveyed verbally and a card is present
in box p when the child makes his selection.
h• Method
for half the iss the relevant boxes were indicated by
pointing to them and for the other half of the ijs the
relevant boxes were indicated by reference to their
colours only. As in the 'Houses and boxes' experiment
those children in the 'colour only' reference condition
were tested lor their ability to identify the three
colours necessary ,i'or the experiment. One of the twelve
children in this condition failed to identify the three
colours and was replaced by another child, of the same
age, who did possess the three colour names.
i) out- jeeta
24 nursery school children (12 boys, 12 girls) aged
between 3 years 1 month and 4 years 6 months,
ii) Material
as for the 'Houses and boxes' experiment (p. 61).
iii) Procedure
As for the 'Houses and boxes' experiment (p. 81)
except that:
a. The statement?used were:
The house is in this box or in this box (p v q). The
house is not in this box (~p)
and
The house is in the red box or in the white box (p v q
1
The house is not in the red box (~p).
b. Only one response per trial was allowed. If .his
response resulted in selection of the 'critical' box S
said: 'That's good, put the house up there next to the
other houses'. If the response was incorrect E said.
1. The word not was stressed-
2. Red, white and black; were used equally for all
subjects and statements.
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*?jo that's not the house is it?' Whether the response
was correct or not 5 then said: 'We'll gee if we can find
another house*. p then rearranged the cards in the anorop-
riate boxes, saidi 'listen carefully*, »nd then mad® the
statements for tve followin^ trial.
c. No attempt w°s ~ede to obtain justifications from the
chiliren.
d. ro-'.ition snd colour preferences were not sought at the
end of the tri'-Is.
iv) Design
The twenty-four subject? were divided into two
equal croups, one ,croup for the *pointing* condition and
one group for the 'colour only' condition. "Details of the
two croups are riven in Table IT.
Table 12
Composition, age dex-ails and experimental conditions








A Pointing 12 6 boys
6 girls
3,1-4.6 3.9^ 3.9*
3 Colour only 12 6 boys
6 girls
3.1-4.6 3 .10 3.91
The disjunctive syllogism in this three box situation
provides six conditions (i.e. spatial positions of the
boxes indicated in the statements). If we take box p
to be the left box, box q the centre box and box r the
right box, these six conditions ere *p v q,~p*, *p v q,
~.q' , *p v r, ^p', *p v r, ^r', 'o V r, ' and *q v r, ~r'.
Jr addition the 'p v q* statement in the disjunctive
syllogism can be presented in c left-right or right-left
direction (i.e. p v q, q v p). Thus we hove six ronditions
•"itri two ' directiono' of statement 'p v q' for each
condition. This rives 12 trials per 3 with each con '-ition/
'direction' combination occurring once.
For groups A and E (i.e. for 1? 3s as a group) e^ch
condition/*direction* combination occurred 12 times,
once in each series position (i.e. once as the first
trial, once as the second trial, etc.).
When coloured boxes were used, the six orders
resulting from the permute/ion of these colours were
used for boxes p, a and r. Ss were allocated equally to
these orders.
c. Results
Table 13 gives the number of correct and incorrect
responses, the number of subjects who are consistently
correct on all twelve trials end the number of subjects
who make at least one iricoueet response for the two
experimental conditions.
The probability of a correct response by chance is
one in three ad for both experimental conditions the
number of correct responses is well above chance level
(pC.OOl). The performance in the 'colour only' condition




Purler -f correct and incorrect responses end number of




No. of correct responses 112(77.33) 172(84 *7*) 234(31.5$ j1
No.of incorrect responses 32 22 54
Total no. of responses 144 144 296
No,of , Ss consistently
correct 7 8 15
Mo.of Ms with at least
one incorrect response 5 4 9
Total no. of Ss 12 12 24
Again, an in the 'Houses and boxes* experiment, the
younger half of the subject (i.e. the twelve subjects
aged 3 years 9 months and younger) produced significantly
more incorrect responses (pc.OOl) than the older half
of the subjects (i.e. the twelve subjects aged over 3
years 9 months). The younger half made 41 incorrect
responses compared with 13 from the older half. Ten of
the twelve older subjects were consistently correct
whereas only five of the younger twelve subjects were
consistently correct* Nevertheless, the number of correct
responses obtained from the younger twelve subjects is
still well above chance level (p<.OOl).
Two type of incorrect response were possible. Firstly
there was selection of the position negated by the *^-p'
1. Percentage of correct responses.
11/
statement and secondly there war- selection of the oosltion
not C!<. ntioned in the disjunctive syl log!em. The letter
ty pe : incr rrect response- wee most cowmen end accounted
- or 36 oi tve 54 incorrect responses. TM s difference is
01rni1ic - \n t (p <.0?).
d. Discussion
as in the 'Houses and boxes' experiment there is
clear evidence of pre-school children's ability to make
inferences. This ability is not consistent in the case
of younger children in this age range, but over the age
of 3 years 9 months there is a high level of consistency.
The most common incorrect response took the lorn of
selection of the box not referred to in the disjunctive
syllogism. It is difficult to explain this, but two
possibilities suggest themselves. Firstly one could
hypothesise some form of generalization of negation
from the Vp' box to the other box referred to in the
disjunctive syllogism a >.& secondly it may be that memory
limitations sometimes prevent retention of the first
part of the disjunctive syllogism (i.e. *p v q'y and
the subject ie responding on the basis of the second
part of the disjunctive syllogism (i.e. Up'}, This
would nean that selection of the correot box (according
to the disj nctive syllogism) and the non-mentioned box
should be equally probable.
The disjunctive syllogism is similar to a second
response following a 'correct' first response to state¬
ment 'p v q' in the •Houses and boxes' experiment (see
Introduction to t} in experiment, p. 109). However the
11r
percentage of correct response® In the disjunctive
eyll of Ism (Hi .?>"') Is lower than that 1n the 'Houses and
taxes' experiment (/)" .7f when the statement was repeated
before the second resoonse and H5 when the statement
was net repented). Thin Is not surprising, though, when
one considers that in the disjunctive syllogism all three
boxes contain cards when the subject makes hie response
whereas in the 'Housea and boxes' experiment one card
(the Vp' card) bos already been removed. In addition,
in the 'Houses and boxes' experiment the preeentege of
correct responses is based on second responses following
a correct first response. It does not take account of
incorrect first responses to statement *p v q'. There
were 6.6 per cent incorrect first responses. If one
takes the incorrect responses at the two stages in the
'Houses and boxes' experiment to be additive, then
performance on the disjunctive syllogism is not very
different from performance in the 'Houses and boxes'
e periment and, if anything, is slightly better than the
condition where the statement is not repeated In the
•Houses and boxes' experiment.
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I retpileation
A. Introduction to Implication
file evidence we have available on the way pre-school
children might be expected to handle implication, i.e.
statements in the form 'if p then q', is very limited
indeed. From the findings of le Bonniec (1970) it would
appear that sucn children do not possess the grasp of
necessity, impossibility and possibility which is essential
for an implication task (see p. 39)• Feel (1967) working
with five-year-old children found that implication was
treated as equivalence, although he did find that with
increasing age (up to 11 years) there was a earned tendency
for the/-p.Q contingency to be considered as ./correct
by subjects judging the acceptability or non-acceptability
of responses made by the experimenter (see p. 35).
A similar tendency to treat implication as equivalence
has been reported by Matalon (1962). With thirty subjects
aged between 9 years 3 months and 11 years 6 months he used
a red and a green light hidden behind doors and statements
of the form: 'If the red light is lit, then the green is
lit'. The proceiure involved revealing one of the lights
to the subject so that he coula see whether it was lit or
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not. The subject was then asked about the second concealed
light. Matalon found that 27 subjects responded correctly
to the modus ponens situation and 15 subjects responded
correctly to the modus tollens situation (i.e. they said
the green light would be lit when the red light was seen
to be lit (p.'.q) and the red light would not be lit when
the green light was seen not to be lit (—q.*.^p)). With
the two •intermediate' situations only 6 subjects when
the red light was seen not to be lit, and 5 subjects, when
the green light was seen to be lit, indicated the possibil¬
ity of the second concealed light being lit or not
(xxp.'.q v /vq, q.'.p v~p), i.e. indicated that they recog¬
nised the indeterminancy of the situation. The majority
of subjects, in this experiment, responded as though emp¬
loying material equivalence (if and only if p then q)."*"
The tendency to interpret implication as material equiva¬
lence was confirmed in subsequent questioning of the
children.
However, when the task was presented in a different
manner and the subjects were asked to judge whether diffe¬
rent combinations of the two lights were acceptable or
not, a somewhat different picture emerged. 28 out of 30
subjects judged the p.q contingency correctly, 27 subjects
judged the/*p.«.q contingency correctly, 23 subjects judged
the /vp.q contingency correctly, and ISsubjects the p./^q
contingency correctly (i.e. they judged p.q, ~p.aq, <~p.q
1. A distinction will be drawn between •material equivalence•
and 'matching* later in this chapter, p. 152
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p.-^f
contingencies acceptable and the contingency unaccep¬
table). This is much more in line with the results of Peel's
older subjects mentioned above.
In a further experiment conducted by Matalon with 45
subjects aged between 6 years 4 months and S years 7 months,
he utilized a 'more natural' situation. This consisted
of a model of a village. The model had five houses, a
post office, a church and a school, and leading from the
village we8 the only road along which, the children were
told, a man had to travel in order to reach the village
from his home. Alongside the road leading to the village
was a house. The children were told: 'If the man has been to
the post office, then he has passed by the house'. They
were then asked questions such as: 'The man has been to the
post office, did he pass by the house?' and 'The man has
passed by the house. Has he been to the post office?'
The results indicated quite clearly that the majority of
the children were utilizing material equivalence. A further
group of questions, though, suggested otherwise. The chil¬
dren were asked questions about the possibility of different
combinations of events occurring, e.g. 'Is it possible that
he (i.e. the man) has passed by the house and that he has
not been to the post office?' #lth such questions 43 of
the 45 subjects responded correctly to the q.p contingency,
40 subjects responded correctly to the >^q.p contingency,
31 subjects responded correctly to the q.^p contingency
and 18 subjects responded correctly to the ~q.^p contingency
(i.e. they agreed that q.p, q.^p, ~q.~p were possible and
denied that ^-q.p was possible).
One interesting feature of these experiments was the
type of explanation the children produced. In the 'red
ar.d green lights' experiment the children produced expla¬
nations based on the statement they were given, i.e. they
referred to the red and/or green lights being lit or not.
With the 'village' experiment though, explanations were
based on the properties of the village and were not rest-
rioted to the information contained within the statement.
Per example, when asked if the man had been to the post
office when he had not passed by the house, one subject
replied! 'No ... he cannot go by another road*. Another
subject when asked: 'fhe man has passed by the house. Has
he been to the poet office?' replied: 'He has been to the
school ... perhaps he has been to the school, perhaps to
the post office*. How far this type of explanation is a
function of the younger ages of the 'village' children or
how far it is a function of the nature of the 'village'
experiment one cannot say•
Studies of the way adults handle implication are much
more numerous than studies of children's handling of imp¬
lication. Wason and his colleagues have conducted a series
of experiments designed to investigate how implication is
understood by adults. Karly work (lason 1966} revealed
that when faced with a series of cards on one side of
which was a letter and the other side a number (the cards
were placed either side upwards) and asked to determine
whether the experimenter was lying when he said: 'If
a card has a vowel on one side then it has an even number
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on the other side', a group of students tended to respond
by selecting those cards displaying vowels and those cards
displaying even numbers. A correct response would have
been to select cards displaying vowels and cards displaying
odd numbers, since only in these two cases (i.e. the modus
ponens and the modus tollens) can one infer what should
be on the reverse of the cards. Wason hypothesises, first¬
ly, that his subjects have assumed three truth values for
the conditional: true, false and irrelevant, and that vowels
with even numbers verify, vowels with odd numbers falsify
and consonants with any number are irrelevant. Wason*s
second hypothesis is that: '...the need to establish the
"truth" of the statement predominates over the instruction'.
Thus fason's subjects incorrectly selected even numbers
(i.e. affirmed the consequent) since even numbers were
associated with vowels and were considered to verify the
conditional. In addition they failed to seleot odd numbers
(i.e. denied the contraposltive) since to do so 'the indi¬
vidual presumably makes a judgement of falsity by uttering
a covert negative to himself* and 'we seldom use a propo¬
sition or judgement that something is false in order to
make a deduction*. (Wason, 1968).
Wason (1968) attempted to elicit the contrapositive
inference by two kinds of 'therapy'. In one experiment
cards displaying, for example, D,D,B and 7 were shown to
the subject who was told: 'If there is a D on one side of
any card, there is a 3 on its other side*. The subjects
(University students) had to select which of the four
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cards would enable them to determine whether the statement
was true or false. They then had to say what values, if
any, on the reverse of the card® would make the statement
false. Following this they had the opportunity to revise
their initial selection of cards before assessing each
card (by looking at the front and reverse of it) as true
or false with respect to the statement. fason's hypothe¬
sis that this procedure would facilitate the selection of
/Jq (i.e. the card displaying 7) was not confirmed. Again
selection of cards displaying D and 3 (i.e. p and q) were
most common both in the initial and revised selection.
However, in the final assessment of each card Wason's
theory that p.q is considered true, p.rvq false and ^.p with
either q or ^q irrelevant was confirmed for p.q, p.^q and
^p./vq, but not for ~p.q which the majority of subjects
considered to be false.
The second type of 'therapy* and the second experiment
was designed to make the subjects aware that the p.^q con¬
tingency falsified the sentence, in the hope that the
awareness that ^q is crucial for falsification would lead
to its selection later. Again cards (this time with shapes
on one side and scribble on the other) were used. The
subjects were presented with a s&tement of the form: 'If
there is a square on one side of the card, then there is
a red scribble on the other side.' They were then presen¬
ted with four cards corresponding to contingencies p.q,
p.'aj, /vp.q, ^p.,vq and asked to select 'the one card which
makes the rule false' and then any cards which 'prove the
rule true'. Without exception all the subjects selected
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p./^q as the only falsifying contingency and p.q as the
only verifying contingency. Next eight cards corresponding
to contingencies p.q, p.^-q, /s-p.q, ^p.^q, q.p, Q.^P» ^q.p
and ^vQ.^p were placed in front of the subject face upwards
and the subject had to select those? cards which could show
whether the rule was true or false. Again cards showing
p and q were selected by the largest number of subjects,
followed by selection of cards showing p only. Very few
subjects selected cards showing . However, when asked
if any value on the reverse of ^q could make the rule
false, the majority of subjects said p on the reverse of
^ q wou1 d #'1 c i fy .
Implication can be expressed in forms other than
*if p then q'. Wason and Johnson-laird (1969) carried
out an experiment in which implication was expressed in
its disjunctive form (~-p v q) and found that 52.1 per
cent of their student subjects correctly selected p and
o.q as the two cards whose reverse sides would prove the
truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. However,
when the statement was in the form of a positive disjunc¬
tion (i.e. p v q) the success rate was even higher (75 per
cent) suggesting that negation contributes to some extent
towards the difficulty of implication. A further experi¬
ment (Johnson-Laird and Tegart, 1969) examined implication
expressed in four forms; 'if p, then q', 'there isn't p,
if there isn't q', • ither there isn't p, or there is q
(or both)' and 'there is never p without there being q'.
T e subjects task whs to classify sets of stimuli into
three categories! true, false and irrelevant with regard
123
to the statement. As in the previous experiment (Wason
and Johnson-Laird, 1969) the disjunctive form of implica¬
tion (either there isn't p, or there is q (or both))
produced a truth-functional analysis as the most frequent
response (i.e. p.q true, p./vq false, aP.q true and^p.^q
true). The three other statements produced responses in
line with Wason'a theory (i.e. p.q true, p.~q .false, /vD.q
and ^p./oq irrelevant).
Another group of experiments (Wason, 1964, 1969«:
Wason and Johnson-Laird, 197'u) indicate that sometimes
it is possible to elicit correct responses from subjects
who have previously reasoned fallaciously by facing the
subject with contradictions and inconsistencies in his
reasoning.
A group of experiments conducted by Legrenzi (1970)
provides some support for Wason'e theory, but one task
designed as a 'strictly binary situation' produced results
which contrasted with Wason'a theory. In this task the
experimenter rolled a ball-bearing down the inclined
plane of a small billiard table. The ball-bearing rolled
into one of two channels, one to the left and one to the
right. In addition a green or a red lamp could be lit.
T e subjects were presented with three types of statement:
'If the ball rolls to the left, then the green lamp is
lit', 'It is not possible for the ball to roll to the
left and for t.-e green lamp not to light', and 'It is
not possible for t e ball to roll to the left and for the
red lamp to light*, four contingencies corresponding to
the statement were presented (p.q, p.^q, ~p.q. /^p./vq) and
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the subjects made judgements as to whether the contin¬
gencies followed, did not follow or were irrelevant to
the statement. When the statement was in the form 'if...,
then...' the majority of subjects judged p.q andAp.Aq to
be true and a p.q and p.oq to be false, i.e. they appeared
to be handling implication ae material equivalence. The
two other statements were handled in a truth-functional
manner with p.q, ap.q and Ap.Aq all true and p.Ap false.
Another experiment by Taplin (1971) presented Implica¬
tion in the form of sentences such as: 'If food is cons¬
tantly supplied to them, then the very fiercest creatures
live peaceably together' and 'If Mrs. Kiton is a snob,
then Mrs. Bate© is a bore*. Five typeeof contingency
were examined p.q, Ap.*q,. q.p, Aq.ap and p,Aq. The
subjects (university students) were required to say whether
the consequent necessarily followed the antecedent, Twelve
examples of each contingency were used. Taplin found that
the most frequent response pattern was to affirm the
consequent necessarily follows the antecedent for p.q,
zvP.Aq, q.p and Aq#Ap and deny that this was so for p.Aq.
The studies of implication which have been described
raise two Important points. Firstly it is clear that the
nature of the task for example whether the subject is
required to 'select' or 'evaluate' and the wording of the
implication influence the type of result which is produced.
Of par'icular importance is whether the nature of the task
is or is not 'strictly binary'. A very relevant ©t dy
conducted by Thompson (cited in Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972)
indicated that children as young as five responded to a
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'strictly binary* situation according to material equiva¬
lence, but in a comparable non-binary situation this
pattern was broken and replaced by a variety of responses.
Secondly, the results of experiments with adults
throw some considerable doubt on Piaget's theory of
formal operations suggesting that 'formal operations may
be specific to the ingenious 'concrete" tasks devised by
Irihelder, but not processes which can be used to solve a
novel problem*. (Wason, 1969b).
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B. Experiment 4. Stars and Wee Aniamls
a. Introduction
In the preceding section, 'Introduction to implica¬
tion1 the way in which school-age children and adults
handle implication was discussed. There was very little
evidence to suggest in what manner pre-school children
might be expected to respond in an implication task.
This experiment is designed to attempt to look at pre¬
school children's handling of implication and to determine
what kind of response or responses, if any, children of
this age make.
Pour small boxes were used in the experiment. On
the lids of some of the boxes stars were positioned and
inside some of the boxes small rubber animals (referred
to as 'wee animals* because of the local dialect) were
placed. When the boxes were closed the subject could
see only the stars on the lids and not the contents of
the boxes (i.e. the wee animals). When the boxes were
open the subject could see the wee animals, but not the
stars on the lids. Statements of the form! 'If there is
a star on the box, then there is a wee animal in the
box*, were used in conjunction with the boxes in both
their open and closed states and the subject was required
to select those boxes on which, according to the statement,
there was ;>r might be a star (when the boxes were open)
and those boxes in which, according to the statement,
there was or might be a wee animal (when the boxes were
closed).
In effect, the subject was presented with implication
1?7
in the form 'if p then o*. When the boxes were closed
he had in front of him instances corresponding to p and
^p (i.e. the presence of absence of a star on each lid)
from which he had to select those cases in which he
thought q did or might follow (i.e. those boxes in which
there was or might be a wee animal). When the boxes were
open he was again presented with 'if p then q', but this
time he had in front of him instances of q and^q (i.e.
the presence or absence of a wee animal in each box)
and had to select those cases in which he thought p did
or might follow (i.e. those boxes which had or might have
a star on the lid).
In addition to presenting implication in its positive
form, statements In which either p or q or both were
negated, were included in the study. These afforded the
opportunity of observing how implication would be handled
1
in a 'more difficult' negative context.
The four statements used in the experiment, therefore,
were:
1. If there is a star on the box, then there is a wee
animal in the box (S=WA).2
2. If there is a star on the box, then there is no wee
animal in the box (S=WA).
1. See references to the difficulties of negation in
Chapter II. Disjunction, (pp. 77, 91)
2. *8' and 'WA' represent star and wee animal and are
used for specific statements. 'p * and 'q' are used
to eyvbolize the form of implication.
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3. If there is no star on the box, then there is a wee
animal in the box (IJoWA).
4. If there is no star on the box, then there is no wee
animal in the box ("S^WA).
The statements were used both with the boxes closed
and the boxes open, thus putting the subject in a situa¬
tion where he had to draw conclusions from p, , q and
According to formal logic all contingencies in the
task are true and valid. No false or invalid situations
arise, therefore, the subject is not being asxed to judge
the truth or falsity of tie statement, but merely to act
on the statement and distinguish between those instances
where necessity or possibility indicate the presence or
possible presence of a star (or wee animal) and those
cases where of necessity no star (or wee animal) can be
present.
The selections which would be expected on the basis
of a truth-iunctional analysis for each statement are
given in Figure 3«
figure 3
Selections based on a truth-functional analysis
Statement
Boxes closed Boxes open
Select Reject Select Reject
SiWA S, S - WA WA
SoWA S WA WA
"5 ^ WA 3, 3 - WA, WA -
WA 3 3 WA, WA -
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However, on the evidence discussed in the Introduction
to this experiment, that neither school-age children nor
adults conform to a truth-functional analysis of implica¬
tion, it is unlikely that responses of the type set out
in Figure 3 will be obtained from pre-school children.
What is of more interest in this experiment is whether
children of three to five years will make any kind of
response which suggests that their behaviour is being
guided by the information they gain from the implication
statement and if bo what form this behaviour takes.
b. Method
As in previous experiments in this study, the task
was referred to as a game in which the subjects were asked
to participate.
Since it is only through verbal explanation on the
part of the subject that one can obtain knowledge of the
subject's awareness, if any, of the necessity and
possibility of hia selections, it was decided once again
to attempt to elicit justifications of selections from
the subjects. On the grounds that the 'Why* questions
occur earlier in a child's development than 'How' questions
(Yamamoto, 196?) the children were asked; 'Why do you
think there is/might be a wee animal/star in/on that
box?' rather than 'How do you know....?' as in the earlier
'Houses and boxes' experiment.
Because of the evidence, described in the Introduction
to this experiment, that adults do not andle implication
in a truth-functional manner and because the manner in
which adults do handle implication varies from task to
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task it was decided to include an adult •mmple in this
experiment in order to gain a 'standard' against which
the children's responses could be compared. In addition
a control group of children, who performed the task;
without receiving the statement, were used as a second
'standard'. Any difference in response pattern between
the experimental children and the control children could
thus be attributed to the implication statement.
i) Subjects
Experimental subjects; children
*0 nursery school children (15 boys, 13 girls) aged
between 3 years 1 month and 4 year© 11 months. Mean age
4 years 1 month, median age 4 years 2| months.
Control subjects? children
10 nursery school children (5 boys, 5 girls) aged
between 3 years 2 months and 4 years 11 months. Mean age
4 years 2 months, median age 4 years 3 months.
Experimental subjects: adults
10 adults aged between 20 and 30 years (5 men, 5
women).
ii) Material
4 unpainted boxes, 2.\n x ?4W x 2". The lids of the
boxes were hinged and could either be closed or lifted
Into a vertical position.
2 red cardboard stars which could be attached to
the lids of the boxes and which were in the subject's
view when the lids were closed and out of his view when
the lids were raised to a vertical position.




Each 8 was tested Individually, seated at a low table.
E placed the four boxes, in line, on the table in front
of 3 and said? *1 have some boxes here. On some of the
boxes there are stars like these (E Indicated the stars
on the lids of the boxes) and in some of the boxes there
are wee animals like these* (E showed 8 the wee animals
inside the boxes).
E then continued? 'Sometimes the boxes will be
closed and you will be able to see the stars, but you
won't be able to see the wee animals, like this (E shows
8 the boxes closed) and sometimes the boxes will be open
and you will be able to see the wee animals, but you
won't be able to see the stars, like this* (E shows S
the boxes open).
E said? 'We are going to play a game with the boxes.
This time the boxes are open/closed and you can see the
wee animals/stars, but you can't see the stars/wee animals.
I'm going to tell you something and then I want you to
show me where there is/might be a star/wee animal.
Listen carefully'.^
One of the following four statements was then made
1. In the trials where, according to a truth-functional
analysis of the statement, a star/wee animal was
present of necessity 'is' was used. In the trials
where the presence of a star/wee animal was only a
possibility (i.e. in trials where no necessary
conclusion could be drawn) 'might be' was used.
by B:
1. If there is a star on the box, then there is a wee
animal in the box.
2. If there ia a star on the box, then there is no wee
animal in the box.
3. If there is no star on the box, then there is a wee
animal in the box.
4. If there is no star on the box, then there is no wee
animal in the box.1
If S made no response at this stage B said: 'Show
ft
me where there isA>ight be a star/wee animal'. As S
made his aelection/s E moved the chosen box/es out of
line away from 3.
When S stopped selecting boxes E asked: 'Bo you
think there is/might be' a star/wee animal on/in any
other box?' If 3 answered 'Yes' K asked: 'Where?' and
4
selection of boxes continued. If 3 answered: 'No' E
pointed to each of the unselected boxes and asked in
1. Where the word no was used it was stressed.
2. Using whichever expression (i.e. 'is' or 'might be')
was used by E before the statement was presented.
3. If a 'necessary* box still remained unchosen by 3
'is' was used. If only 'possible' boxes remained
unchosen 'might be* was used.
4. In nome eases 3 did not answer, 'Yes' but simply
pointed at another unselected box, sometimes with
an accompanying expression such as 'In there'.
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turn; 'Dr. you think: there is/right be e. star/wee animal
on/in this box?' In rsctice all 8s asked this question
responded 'Uo'.
The procedure also allowed for 'Don't Know' answers
to be noted, but in practice these never occurred.
When selection was complete and 8 had denied that
any retraining boxes could have a star on them or a wee
animal in them E said: 'Liaten carefully' and repeated
the statement before pointing to each selected box in
turn and asking: 'Why do you think there 1s/might*be a
etar/wee animal on/in that box?':
After questioning the subjects were told: '(-pen/
close the box/es you h-ve chosen and see whether the
stars/wee animals are there'.
The experiment continued with B rearranging the atare
and wee animals and placing the four boxes In front of 3
whilst saying: 'Now we're going to play the game again.
This time the boxes are closed/open and you can see the
stars/wee animals, but you can't see the wee animals/stare.
I'm going to tell you something and then I want you to
show me where there is/night be a wee animal/star, listen
'Is' was used when the selection was made in response
to a question or instruction containing the word 'is'
and 'eight be' was used when the s<lection was mode 1n
response to a question or instruction containing 'might
be' .
Hindsight suggests that it might have been profitable
to uestion children on the boxes they refected also,
but unfortunately such questioning was not carried out.
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carefully*. The experiment then continued as described
above.
Experimental subjects; adults
As in the 'Houses and boxes' experiment adult 8s
were told that no trickery was involved and were asked
.for their serious co-operation in return for an explana¬
tion of the purpose of the experiment at the end of the
trials. The adult version was modified only by omission
of the reference to 'playing a game'. In all other res¬
pects the procedure wa3 the same as for the children.
Control subjects: children
The procedure was the same as for the experimental
children except that no justifications were requested
and the statement used was: 'There is/might be^" a wee
animal/star in/on some of the boxes'.
iv) Design
The experiment was designed originally for 24 Ss
aged between 3 years 1 month and 4 years 7 months (i.e.
with age® corresponding to the ages of the Ss in the
earlier 'Houses and boxes' and 'Disjunctive syllogism*
experiments). However, during the course of testing it
became apparent that children at the upper end of this
age range (i.e. children over 4 years) were showing signs
of a different response pattern from the younger children
and, therefore, a further six older subjects were inclu¬
ded bringing the upper age to 4 years 11 months. The
1. 'la' was used on half the trials, 'might be' on the
other half of the trials.
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design pp it is described here is for 24 3s. The way in
which the six additional subjects were incorporated into
the study will be described later.
Bach of 24 Ss was assigned to one of 24 orders pro¬
duced by permutation of the four statements. For each
statement there were two conditions (i.e. boxes open,
boxes closed). This gave 8 statement/condition combina¬
tions and so each 3*s order was repeated twice to give
8 trials per 3 (i.e. one trial for each statement/condi¬
tion combination). The trials were given in two separate
sessions of 4 trials each. The 'boxes open' and 'boxes
closed' conditions were alternated in each 3's trials.
Half the Sa in each session commenced the aession with
the 'boxes open' condition and half with the 'boxes
closed' condition. Each 3 commenced the two sessions
with a different condition.
For the group of 24 3a as a whole each statement
occurred 48 times (6 times in each trial position) and
each statement/condition combination occurred 24 times
(3 times in each trial position).
Two boxes out of the four always had stars on them.
The 6 possible combinations of two boxes with stars on
them were distributed equally throughout the trials. Each
combination occurred 32 times (16 times in the 'boxes
closed' conditions, 16 times in the 'boxes open' condition).
Each S had each combination at least once and not more
tnan twice.
Having stars on two of the four boxes meant, according
to a truth-functional analysis, that t'e conclusion which
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could be drawn from two of the boxes was a necessary
one and the conclusion drawn from the other two boxes
was a possible one. From statements 'S^WA' and'S^fA' it
necessarily follows that two of the boxes contain wee
animals. From statements *3»<WXf and '"S^WA' it necessarily
follows that two of the boxes do not contain wee animals.
For all four statements there are two boxes which possibly
contain wee animals. Whenever, of necessity, wee animals
had to be in two boxes, wee animals were placed in these
boxes. Whenever, of necessity, wee animals had not to
be in two of bit © boxes, these boxes were left empty.
Whenever it was possible for wee animals to be in two
of the boxes, a wee animal was placed in one box and the
other box was left empty. This meant that for statements
*3oWA' and 'l-bWA' three wee animals were used and for
statements ' 3s WA* and '3^"7a' one wee animal was used.
The 6 3s, included in the study after the testing
had begun, were allocated to 6 of the 3eries cf 8 trials
used with the originally selected group of 24 Ss. They
were allocated in such a way that for the 6 subjects each
statement occurred at least once and no more than twice
in each trial position and 3 Ss commenced with a 'boxes
closed' condition a: d 3 3s with a 'boxes open' condition.
The 10 adult 3s were similar!; allocated to 10 series
of 8 trials used with the originally selected group.
These series were selected so that each statement occurred
at least twice and no more than three times in each trial
position and 3 Ss commenced with a 'boxes closed' condition
and 5 3s with a 'boxes open' condition.
The control children had only one session of 4 trials
The positions of stars and wee animals on and in the boxes
for all 10 control 3s, were the same as in one of the
sessions presented to one of the experimental children.
The positions used were selected to avoid the red stars
being on two adjacent end boxes (i.e. on boxes 1 and P
or on boxes 3 and 4) since two possible response patterns
were an 'end-to-end search strategy or selection of
starred boxes and stars in two adjacent end positions
would have prevented a distinction being made between
these two responses. In addition in two of the trials
the boxes contained three wee animals (once with the
boxes closed and once with the boxes open) and in two
of the trials the boxes contained one wee animal (once
with t e boxes closed and once with the boxes open).
Again end positions were avoided when there was one wee
anima1 and three adjacent end positions were avoided
when there were three wee animals (the positions for the
three wee animals were boxes 1, 2 and 4 and boxes 1, 3
and 4).^ In two trials the boxes were closed and in two
trials the boxes were open. For one trial with the boxes
closed and one trial with the boxes open, the statement
was: 'There is a wee animal/star in/on some of the boxes'.
For the other two trials (once with the boxes closed, once
with them open) the statement was: 'There might be a woe
animal/star in/on rome of the boxes'.
1. 1. is the left-most box and 4 the right-most box.
c. Results
Five types of response were identified. These are
described here, before their frequency for different
statements and conditions and their frequency in different
age groups is given.
A. hnd-to-end search. Here the subject selected either
the left-most box or the right-most box and continued
selecting adjacent boxes until all four boxes had been
selected. Occasionally he stopped after one or two
selections, but always, when asked whether there was/might
be a p.tar/wee animal on/in any other box, he continued
selecting adjacent boxes until the opposite end of the
array was reached.
B. Four box selection jrith. p and or q and ^q differen¬
tiated. Here the subject selected all four boxes, but
selected those with stars or wee animals first followed
by those with no stars or no wee animals, less frequently
those without stars or wee animals were selected first
followed by those with stars or wee animals. Again selec¬
tion sometimes stopped after boxes with stars or wee
animals (or boxes with no stars or no wee animals) had
been chosen, but selection always continued when the
experimenter asked whether there was/might be a star/wee
animal on/in any other box.
C. Matering of star to wee animal and no star to no wee
animal. Here the subject selected only those boxes which
had a star when the boxes were closed and those boxes
which had a wee animal when the boxes were open.
D. Equivalence. Here the subject produced material
equivalence responses, i.e. the subject indicated that
q followed p, out did not follow and that p followed
q, but did not follow ~q. Clearly for two statements,
('SdWA' and 'fcPwA'), this response is indistinguishable
from response C ('matching'). This will be referred to
later in the discussion of this experiment.
E. Tart negation. This response was peculiar to the
doubly negated statement 'UoIa* . The subject selected.
the boxes without stars or without wee animals and rejected
boxes with stars or with wee animals.
Ver,> few responses (16 out of 240) were not classi¬
fiable into one 01 the above response categories.
The frequencies of these five responses for each
statement/condition are given in Table 14.
Table 14
Frequencies of the five responses for each statement/condition
Hesponse
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I) 12 10 8 - 30
E - - 11 i - 8 19
Other
response
1 1 2 2 3 3 | 2 2 16
Total 30 30 30 ■ 30 30 30 30 30 240
1. Here the response could be either 'matching' (i.e.
response C) or equivalence (i.e. response D).
Two features of Table 14 are of interest. Firstly
the fact that some subjects produce 'equivalence' responses
to statements ' jJdTa' and '"0OWA' suggests that some, at
least, -f the responses which are classified as either
•matching* ■** or •equivalence' responses are probably 'equiva¬
lence' responses. It will be noted from Tt.ble 15 that
there is a marked difference in the frequency of 'equiva¬
lence' responses between the younger and older half of
the subjects. This difference is significant (p<.01).
It is, therefore, hypothesized that for statement 'boWA*
the younger subjects are probably producing 'matching'
responses and the older subjects are probably producing
•equivalence' responses. However, it is not unreasonable
to assume that statement 'SoWA* is the easiest statement
to handle and, therefore, there may be a larger number of
'equivalence' responses even from the younger subjects
for this statement than for other statements.
With statement 'SdhfA' a different state of affairs
exists. Comparatively few of the responses fall into
either the 'matching' or 'equivalence' categories. The
older subjects make type b responses where they select
the'no star* or 'no wee animal' boxes and reject the 'star*
or 'wee animal' boxes. It is mainly younger subjects
who produce the 'matcning'/'equivalence' responses and
it is, therefore, suggested that these responses are
'matching' responses whilst the older subjects, who pro¬
duce 'equivalence' responses for other statements, make
type K responses for statement 'SdWa'.
1. A fuller discussion of what constitutes a 'matching'
response is given in the discussion of this experiment.
The secern! feature of Table 14 is trie complete
absence of 'equivalence' responses for statement 'TbWA'f
when the boxes are opf), with a corresponding marked
increase in the number of 'matching' responses.when com¬
pared with other statcme.it/conditions. An explanation
for this phenomenon will be attempted in the discussion
of this experiment.
An analysis of the results of individual subjects
reveals that in only one case does a subject consistently
produce the same response for each statement. One subject
made 'end-to-end' responses (response A) for all statements.
However, there was some consistency between the over all
statements response patterns of some subjects. For
example six subjects all produced 'matching'/'equivalence'
responses for statement 'o^WA*, 'equivalence' responses
for statement 'SofX'end statement *1>oWA* (when the boxes
were closed), 'matching' responses for statement 'cfpWA'
(when the boxes were open) and 'part negation' responses
(i.e. response S) for statement 'abhA'. All these subjects
were aged 4 years 6 months and over. In addition eight
subjects always produced 'matching'/'equivalence' responses
for statement ' fp -'A' although their responses to other
statements varied.
Clearly one has to allow for inconsistency of response
in children of this age and particularly from the younger
half of the group (this w-8 also the case in the 'Houses
and boxes' experiment), but the evidence mentioned above
suggests that some of the inconsietency is a function of
differing degrees of difficulty of the statement.
Table 15 shows how the frequencies of the five res¬
ponses varied with age.
Table 15
Frequencies of the five responses according to age
Response Age Total
3.1 - 4.? 4.3 - 4.11
1 A 31 12 43














Total 120 120 240
There is a significant difference (p<.001) between
the response frequencies of the older and younger sub¬
jects in this study. This takes the form of a signifi¬
cant decrease with age (p<.001) of type A and type B
responses and a significant increase with age (pf.QOl)
of type D and type B responses. Type C responses (•mat¬
ching* responses) also decline slightly with age, but it
is suggested that this decline is more marked than it
appears since some of the responses which are either
1. There were fifteen subjects in each age range. The
mean ages of the two age ranges were 3«7 and 4.7. The
median, age were 3.7 and 4.6^-.
2. Here the responses could be either 'matching' (i.e.
response C) or 'equivalence' ( i.e. response D}.
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'matching* or 'equivalence' responses are probably 'match¬
ing' responses for younger children and 'equivalence* res¬
ponses for older children (see above).
Experimental subjects: adulta
With the exception of four responses the adult sub¬
jects appeared to be employing material equivalence.
Three of these exceptions came with statement 'IsoWa' where
two of the adult subjects produced type E responses (i.e.
they selected the boxes without stars/wee animals and
rejected the boxes with stars/wee animals). The other ex¬
ception is particularly interesting. It came with statement
'3>WA* when the boxes were closed. The subject first
selected both starred boxes, but when asked if there might
be a wee animal in any other box she hesitated for quite a
while before saying 'May be ... you haven't said there isn't
an animal there, have you?' Clearly this subject had gained
some kind of insight into the situation. It is interesting
to note that this subject was a primary school teacher and
was probably the most intellectually able of the adult
subjects. Unfortunately, though, the trial in which this
occurred was the last in her series of eight trials. How
far she would have employed this 'insight* with other
statements later on is not known.
One noticeable feature of the way adulta responded
was that, when there was a negative statement, they tended
to repeat the statement out aloud, often two or more times,
and then to verbalize the conclusion they drew. For exam¬
ple for statement 'IbWA' with the boxes closed one subject
144
said: 'If there'a not a star then there Is a wee animal
... if there's not a star ... just a minute ... if there's
not a star ... that means there's a star when the box is
empty'.
Control subjects: children
37 of the 40 responses made by the control children
involved selection of all four boxes. 32 of these res¬
ponses were *erd-to-end' search strategies (18 in a left
to right direction, 14 in a right to left direction), 2
of these responses were selection of boxes with stars or
wee animals followed by selection of boxes with no stars
or wee animals and three of these responses were apparent¬
ly random, nf the three responses where not all boxes
were selected, one was the selection of starred boxes
only, one was the selection of one of the two starred
boxes only and one was the selection of one box containing
no wee animal.
Justifications
Justifications of responses in this experiment were
much more easily obtained than in the previous 'Houses
and boxes experiment'. Again some of the youngest child¬
ren did not justify or justified: ''Cos it is', 'It's in
there'. However, the majority of children produced one
of three types of justification. Firstly justifications
such as ''Cos it's got a star on it', ''Cos there's a wee
animal', ''Cos there's a star' were quite widespread
throughout all age ranges and with all response types.
The second type of justification links the presence of
stars with the presence of wee animals, 'When the star's
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there, there's a wee animal there too*, 'When there's a
star there's a wee animal and when there's no star there's
no wee animal, 3ee'. This second kind of .justification
occurred in children from 3 years 8 months upwards. The
third type of justification occurs only with older subjects
who produce evidence of 'equivalence' responses. Here not
only are negatives, which are not just a matching of no
star to no wee animal, included in the justifications,
but expressions such ass 'It's got to be', 'It must be',
'It's supposed to be', all of which indicate some aware¬
ness of necessity, occurred quite frequently.^ For
example: 'It's got to be in that box 'cos there's a star
on it*, 'When there's no star, there's supposed to be a
wee animal in the box', 'It must be in there (pointing
to the unstarred box) if it's not in there (for statement
'SoWA* with boxes closed), 'The star's supposed to be
there 'cos it's got a wee animal and when there's a wee
animal there's supposed to be a star'(for statement 'SoWA*
boxes open).
This latter type of justification is very similar to,
if slightly less elegant than, any of the justifications
produced by adults. For example: 'If there's no star
then there should be a wee animal'. 'Well If there's no
wee animal when there's a star there must be a wee animal
when there is no star'. 'Prom what you said, the wee
animals should be in boxes with stars on top*.
In some of the responses stars or wee animals were
1. Reference to similar responses is made on p. 169
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not found on or in all tve boxes selected. The majority
of 3ubjeets did not remark on this, possibly because the
presence of a star or wee animal on or in some of the
selected boxes was sufficient for tho state of affairs
not to be queried. However three subjects (one child and
two adults) did comment on the absence of stars or wee
animals. The child was one of the older subjects who
produced 'equivalence' responses. He said: 'The wee
animal's not there' when responding to statement 'S^WA',
boxes closed, and he found a wee animal in only one of
the two unotarred boxes he had selected. The experimenter
asked him whether there should be a wee animal in the
empty box and he replied emphatically 'Yes*. One of the
adult subjects said: 'I only get one this time do I?'
when he found only one of the two boxes he selected in
response to 'IsdWA' , boxes closed, contained a wee animal
and the other adxilt made a point of indicating each time
a star or wee animal was not present in his selections,
apparently considering that this was part of the response
he was expected to make.
d. Discussion
Five different types of response have been found in
this experiment. One of these, the end-to-end search
strategy, found with both experimental and control subjects,
was also found with control subjects in the 'Houses and
boxes' experiment. Its presence in the experimental
responses here suggests that such responses were not
guided by the implication statement at all.
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The second type of response (i.e. the four box
selection, with p and^p or q and differentiated)
appears to be a response intermediate between the ' end-
to-end ' response and a 'matching' response. Clearly
some significance is attributed to the presence or ab¬
sence of stars and wee animals end the fact that this
response occurred only twice in forty control responses
indicates that the experimental statements play some part
in eliciting it. A similar finding has been noted by
Donaldson and Young (personal communication and reported
in Donaldson and Wales, 1969b) with children aged three
to five years. In their task two pictures of strings
of four beads were displayed before the subject. The
pictures were identical except that one picture had four
red beads and the other picture had three red. beads and
one green bead. A string of beads was suspended between
the two pictures with each bead covered in aluminium foil.
The subject's task was to select the bead which had to be
uncovered in order to say which of the two pictures was
a picture of the string of beads. Donaldson and Young
found their subjects, even after they had located the
'critical' bead and correctly identified the picture,
still said that it was necessary to uncover more beads in
order to know which picture was really the right one.
Donaldson and Young suggest a possible reason for this is
that the attractiveness of tie task (i.e. unwrapping the
beads) was such that the deoire to carry on with this
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activity took precedence over the production of an
economical solution.
The explanation suggested by Donaldson and Young
could account for the type B responses in this experi¬
ment. Other explanations, though, are also possible.
The differentiation made between p and or q and «■> q
could reflect degrees of *sureness1, the subject being
more sure of the correctness of his first group of
responses than of his second group of responses, but in
neither case responding with any certainty. Alternatively
the subject may have forgotten the statement by the time
he has finished selecting his first group of boxes and
so reverts to the strategy of opening all the boxes. In
some of these responses selection sometimes stopped after
one group "»f boxes had been chosen. When this happened
the experimenter asked whether there was/might be a star/
wee animal on/in any other box. The subject then continued
selecting boxes. Perhaps the intervention of this state¬
ment was taken by the subjects to be an indication that
further selections were required.
The type B responses can be grouped into those in
which stars or wee animals were selected first and those
in which boxes without stars or wee animals were selected
first. The latter were far "'ess frequent. It was thought
that selection of boxes without stars or wee animals first
might be related to the presence of negatives in the
1. It is also interesting to note that Donaldson and Young
found frequent •end-to-end' search strategies, this time
in the form of a consistent top-to-bottom search of the
string of beads, although the fcritical* bead was next
to the bottom >n the string.
statement, but this was not the case. These selections,
however, were more frequent when the boxes were open
than when they were closed. Why this is so is not clear.
According to a truth-functional analysis of implica¬
tion, selection of all four boxes is a •correct' response
for four of the statement/conditions ('SoWA', U>wa' boxes
closed and ''SoWA' and 'l^WA' boxes open). However, four
box selection (either 'end-to-end' or 'differentiation of
p and and q and^q) made by the experimental subjects
were not restricted to any specific statements and can,
therefore, be taken to be independent of truth-functional
analysis.
The 'mate! trig' responses in this experiment surest
a number of possible explanations. The subject may be
responding independently of the statement and simply-
selecting boxes which are distinguished by the presence
of a star or a wee animal. Alternatively, the subject,
again acting independently of the statement, may be
assuming a correspondence between the presence of one
attribute (i.e. star or wee animal) and the presence of
the other attribute and between the absence of one
attribute and the absence of the other attribute. However
the infreouency of •matching' responses in the control
group (only one such response was noted) raises problems
for these two explanations and indicates that the experi¬
ments"! statement is in some way instrumental in 'matching'
responses. A further explanation is, therefore, suggested
This is that the subjects who produce 'mate ing' responses
ignore t e negatives in the statements, possibly because
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•no star' or 'no wee animal' is not a physically present
attribute visible to the subject and possibly because
other difficulties of negatives in this task are so
great that the subject is not capable of handling them.
The statements are thus treated as positive statements
and are interpreted, by the subject, to mean that a
relationship exists between the presence of a star and
the presence of a wee animal. Many of the justifications
from subjects producing •matching' responses indicate an
awareness of such a relationship, for example: 'Because
there's a star and when there's a star there's a wee
animal in. the box and when there's no star there's no
wee animal in the box*. Hew far these subjects consider
the relationship to be based on necessity and how close
such a response is to art 'equivalence' response is
difficult to say. Certainly subjects who produced
•matching* responses did not ever utilize modal express-
ions such as 'must', 'has to be* in their justifications.
Olson (1966) conducted an experiment in which three,
five, seven and nimyear-old children had to determine
which of several patterns was 'correct* by pressing
bulbs which lit up when they corresponded with the 'correct*
pattern (see p. 105). He found that around age five hia
subjects produced whet he described as a 'successive
pattern matching strategy' in which they pressed bulbs
corresponding to each pattern in turn, regardless of
whether these bulbs were informative (i.e. whether they
were common to more than one pattern and tJierefore of p0
use in discriminating between patterns or whether they
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were peculiar to one pattern and therefore a means of
discriminating between patterns). Olson's task is
dlff rent from the one employed here since it involves
no verbal statement containing information on which the
subject can act. Instead the information the subject
used is contained within the visual display. However,
the 'successive pattern matching strategy' employed by
Olson's five-year-olds is similar to the 'matching* res¬
ponses noted here in that aspects of the task which are
made distinctive (the patterns in Olson's task and the
stars and wee animals in this experiment) are selected by
the subjects irrespective of their appropriateness in the
task the subject is asked to perform.
It should perhaps be noted here that the subjects
who employed the 'successive pattern matching strategy*
in Olson's experiment were slightly older than the subjects
in this experiment. Olson's younger subjects utilised a
strategy corresponding to the 'end-to-end' search found
in the experimental and, most markedly, in the control
groups in this experiment. Perhaps, if the control task
used here, had been presented to older subjects a type
of 'matching' response would have emerged based on either
selection of the most distinctive aspects of the display
or the assumption that the presence of one attribute
coincided with the presence of the other attribute and
the absence of one attribute coincided with the absence
of the other attribute.
It is possible that 'matching' responses found in
this experiment are more a function of the design of the
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experiment than a function of implication statements.
The statements may have served merely to alert the subject
to the need to make some kind of discrimination between
boxes with attributes and those without ( a discrimination
which, on the basis of Olson's findings, may have been
made without any statement by older subjects). The i^se
of the presence and absence of stars and wee animals to
represent p, ^p, q and -~q may then have been a sufficient
condition for the subjects to assume, independently of
the statement, that the presence of one a tribute indicated
the presence of the other attribute and the absence of
one attribute indicated the absence of the other attribute.
The experiments of Matalon (1962) and Peel (196?)
resorted evidence of the handling of implication as
though it were material equivalence by children of five
years upwards (see p. 116). However, in Peel's experi¬
ment and in one of Matalon's experiments 'equivalence'
responses were responses which required selection of
like attributes. For Peel these were red beads with
red counters and non-red beads with non-red counters
and for Matalon they were a light which was lit with
another light which was lit and a light which was not
lit with another light that was not lit. Matalon points
out that, from his findings, one cannot tell whether
children normally handle implication as equivalence or
whether the equivalence responses he obtained were
attributable to the task he used.
Clearly a distinction can be made between a simple
'matching'of like attributes and an tequivalence'response
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(if arf^ly if p then q) based on the drawing of a
conclusion from a verbally presented promias. jn practice
the behayiour resulting from these two procedures can be
indistii\guiehable. In this experiment the inclusion of
negative^ in some statements provided some measure of
distinction since 'equivalence' responses to statements
'f'oWX' ajjd *^>X:'A' required the subject to go against
a 'matching' response. However, negatives produce con¬
siderably difficulties in their own right and the extent
to which the responses in this experiment have been
influenced by these difficulties is unclear.
Beaponsea which are clearly based on equivalence
(i.e. responses in which negatives are taken into account)
occur majnly amongst the older children and adults, with
six of tpe older children and the adults such responses
are accompanied by justifications which include such
expressions as 'must be', 'has to he'. As far as one can
see these ®ix children appear to be producing adult-type
responses although the oldest child ie only four years
eleven months.
However, not all statements including negatives are
handled even by the older children (and In some cases not
by adults) according to material equivalence. The double
negative statement, '"soyT*, ia handled by the older
children and by two of the adult subjects in a way which
suggests that only one of the negatives is taken into
account. Rather than selecting boxes with stars and
1. In the experiment that follows an attempt has been
made to present a situation which does not include
negatives and is not amenable to the matching of
like attributes.
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rejecting those without stars when the boxes were closed
(or selecting boxes with wee animals and rejecting those
without wee animals when tne boxes were open), which is
an equivalence response, these subjects selected boxes
without stars and without wee animals and rejected boxes
with stars and with wee animals. In addition no child
ever handled the negative irx statement 'S3WA' when toe
boxes were open although all adults produce equivalence
responses for this statement/condition, presumably the
double negative statement and statement 'S>WA', boxes
open, are intrinsically more difficult to manipulate
than other statement/conditions in this study. The
cancelling effect in which two negatives give a positive
conclusion is probably quite alien to the experience of
most children and it is, therefore, likely that the
presence of two negatives in a statement merely serves
to emphasise toe negative quality of the statement and
leads to the selection of unstarred boxes or boxes with
no wee animals.
An analysis of the statement containing one negative
suggests that they are of unequal difficulty in terms of
the 'operations' required for an equivalence response.
For example when the boxes are closed statement 'b?WA'
simply requires t e subject to follow the statement and
select the unstarred boxes. When the boxes are closed
statement 'S^WA', on the other hand, requires the subject
tc draw the inference that the wee animal is in the
unsterred box, i.e. he has to direct his attention to
the boxes not mentioned in the statement, before he makes
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his selection. When the boxes are open, however, the
subject has to reverse the direction of the information
given to him in the statement (i.e. froTo pj>q he infers
Q-'-p) that he can select from boxes with and without
wee animals. For statement 'S?Wa' this gives him 'WZ'-S*
which is a conclusion on which he can act directly by
selecting boxes containing no wee animals. However,
with statement •"SpW-A* when the boxes are open the subject
is required not only to reverse the direction of the
information i.e. 'WA-'S' , but he is also required to make
a further inference in order to draw a second conclusion,
♦WI/.S', i.e. turn his attention to the boxes not mentioned
in the statement, on the basis of which he makes his
selection. Clearly these two operations need not occur
in this order since the reversal of information could be
the final operation preceding selection rather than the
first operation. Clearly also the analysis of equivalence
responses into separate operations is highly speculative,
but such an analysis does indicate that statement *^oWA',
boxes open, may be more complex than other statement/con¬
ditions and provides a possible explanation for the
absence of eq ivalence responses for this statement/con¬
dition. The ore-selection operations required for equiva¬
lence responses for the single negative statement/conditions
are given in Figure 4.
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figure 4
Pro-selection operations required for single-negative
sta tement/conJltlons
Operation
Boxes closed Boxes open
So wA a?WA ' IbWA
Turn attention to non-




information ~ . 4 4
We can perhaps now look at the high proportion of
•equivalence* responses with adults. Cert :.inly such
responses conflict markedly with Plaget's theory of
formal operations, on the basis of which one would expect
a truth-functional treatment of implication from adult
subjects. The results found here agree with those noted
by Legrenxi (1970) who found equivalence responses to
statements of the form 'if..., then...' in a. situation
which is similar to the present experiment in that it is
♦strictly binary', i.e. a situation 'in which the alterna¬
tives are both the only two possibilities which can occur,
and, in addition, mutually exclusive* (Legrenzi, 1970).
At first glance the findings of this experiment
appear to he at odds with those reported by Wason (see
p. 119). However, if we take into account the nature of
the tasks Wason*s subjects were asked to perform and the
task employed in this experiment we find that much of the
disparity can be resolved. In this experiment the subject
was presented with a conditional statement of the form
♦if p, then q* and faced with instances corresponding to
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p, ^p, q and ~q. He was then required to select those
instances where p or q possibly or necessarily followed
and to reject those instances where it was impossible for
p or q to follow. Clearly this task is very different
from Wason's 'selection'procedure where the subject was
required to select instances where the truth or falsity
of the conditional could be judged from whatever followed.
The present experiment is perhaps more akin to Wason's
'evaluation' procedure in which the subject is required
to judge contingencies such as p.q, /-p.q, q.p and/vq.p
as true, false or irrelevant with respect to the conditio¬
nal. In this task the subject is asked whether q can
follow p and/^p and whether p can follow q and ^.q, a
task which comes very close to evaluating contingencies
as in the Wason procedure, but in which there is a major
difference in that the subject does not have open to him
an 'irrelevant' category. The very nature of the task
precludes the subject from utilising such a category and
forces him into using a true/false division.
It can be said that subjects in Wason's experiments
and the subjects in this experiment are operating under
markedly different constraints and that these constraints
go a long way towards explaining why, for example, Waeon's
colleagues Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969) obtained judge¬
ments of irrelevancy for contingency A-p.q whilst in this
experiment the possibility of q following and the
possibility of p following ^.q was denied. However It
should be noted xhat in some circumstances Wason has
found contingency ^.p.q to be judged false and for subjects
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to say that p following /vq would falsify a conditional
(Wason, 1968).
Legrenzi (1970) puts forward an interesting hypothesis
which way be relevant" to the * equivalence • responses found
in this experiment. In referring to an unpublished study
by Mazzocco he points out that 'one condition which leads
to the converse of a rule being accepted is when it
simplifies a cognitive task*. Certainly to handle
implication as equivalence rather than to subject it to
a truth-functional analysis appears to be simplifying the
task and it may be that avoidance of difficulty has
contributed to the responses obtained in this experiment.
Finally, in this experiment, justifications were more
easily obtained from the subjects than in the earlier
'Houses and boxes' experiment. These justifications
were frequently not indicative of reasoning, but at least
some verbal explanations were attempted by the subjects.
There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly ques¬
tions preceded by 'Why* may be more easily handled by
children of this age than questions preceded by 'How',
and secondly this task or implication may be more amenable
X
to justiiication than the earlier task or disjunction.
1. Further discussion of points raised in this experi¬
ment, e.g. the 'inferential' nature of the children's
responses and a possible developmental secuence, will
be made in Chapter V. Discussion.
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Experiment 5. Ball, Brick and Cards
a. Introduction
In this experiment an attempt has been made to look
at implication using material which is not amenable to
the 'matching* of attributes as in the previous experi¬
ment, 'Stars and wee animals', where one could not deter¬
mine whether the 'matching' of stars and wee animals was
a function of attributes present arid attributes absent
or a function of the conditional statement.
The experiment is in two parts. In the first part,
on the basis of a conditional statement of the form 'if
p, t' en q', the subject Is required to select from in¬
stances corresponding to q and ^q whatever he thinks
should follow p and /^p. In the second part of the experi¬
ment, again on the basis of a conditional statement of
the form 'if p, then q', he is asked to judge the
acceptability or non-acceptability of contingencies p.q,
p.^q, -xp.q, ^p.^q. This second part of the experiment
was included in order to gain wider coverage of the area
than one would gain from the subjects' selections alone.
b. Method
A ball and brick were used to represent p and ~-p
and two cards, one red and one white, were used to rep¬
resent q and ^.q. In the trials in which the subjeot
draws a conclusion from p or (these will be referred
to as the ' S drawing conclusion' trials) either the brick
or the ball was placed in front of the subject, following
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which the experimenter presented him with a conditional
statement such as: 'If there is a brick, then there is
a white card'. For this statement a brick in front of
the subject would mean that he had to draw a conclusion
from p and a ball in front of the subject would mean that
he had to draw a conclusion from ^p. The subject was
then required to select from the red and white cards
(i.e. q and/--q) whichever card he thought was appropriate.
In the second group of trials (which will be referred to
as the 'S judging S's conclusion' trials) a similar
procedure was followed except that the experimenter
made the selection from the red and white cards and the
subject was required to judge whether the experimenter's
selection was 'all right' or whether it was 'wrong'. The
expressions 'all right' and 'wrong' were chosen as
expressions which were understood by the children in
pilot testing.
As in previous experiments ('Houses and boxes' and
'Disjunctive syllogism'), where the ability to identify
colours was a necessary, but task-extraneous, variable
of the experiment, the experiment was preceded by a
colour identification task. This also included identifica¬
tion of the ball and brick, since the ability to discrimi¬
nate between the two was also task extraneous, but essen¬
tial to the experiment. Immediately preceding the experi¬
ment the experimenter placed the ball, the brick and the
red and white cards on the table in front of the children
whilst saying: 'I've got a ball, a brick and some cards
here'. The experimenter then pointed to each object in
turn and asked: 'What is this?' If a child said; 'A
card' when a card was pointed out, the experimenter
asked; 'What colour Is it?' After the subject had
identified each object the experimenter asked him to:
•Show me the ball'(the brick, the white card, the red
card) going through each object in turn. If a child
failed to respond or responded incorrectly at any stage
in this identification procedure, it was proposed not
to use hira as a subject, but to substitute another subject
of a similar age in his place. In practice this was not
necessary since all subjects selected performed this
pre-experimental test correctly.
In additon to the children, a group of adults also




24 nursery school children (12 boys, 12 girls) aged
between 3 years 2 months and 4 years 11 months. Mean
age 4 years 1| months, median age 4 years 2 months.
Adults
8 adults aged between 20 and 30 years (4 men, 4 women)
ii) Material
A ball, diameter l|M} a brick, sides 1"; a red card
and a white card, 3M x 2jM.
iii) Procedure
'S drawing conclusion* trials
Each S was tested individually, seated at a low table
facing E. E said to 3: 'I've got a ball, a brick, a
red card and a white card. (E ahowed the four objects
to S). We are going to play a game with them and in
this game I'll put the ball or the brick there (E
indicated a position on the table in front of S) and
you have to put a card there (E Indicated a second posi¬
tion adjacent to the first position and handed the
cards to 3). E continued: "This time I'm going to put
the ball/brick there (E positioned ball/brick in front
of S). how listen carefully to what I say*. 1 then
presented the conditional statement: 'If there is a
ball/brick, then there is a red/white card'. If S did
not place either the red or white card next to the ball/
brick K asked: 'What are you going to put there?' After
3 had selected a card E asked: 'Why is the red/white
card supposed" to be there?' After this E *aid: 'Now
we'll play the game again'. E handed the cards to S
and the procedure was repeated from the point where B
says: 'This time I'm going to put the ball/brick there'.
'3 judging E's conclusion' trials
After showing 3 the four objects E said: 'We are
going to play a game with them (i.e. the four objects)
and in this game I'll put the ball or the brick there
(E indicated a position on the table in front of S) and
then I'm going to put a card there (E indicated a second
position adjacent to the first position), but sometimes
1. The word 'supposed' was used since it had occurred
quite frequently in justifications obtained in the
'Stars and wee animals' experiment.
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I'll put a. card there that's wrong and sometimes it will
be all right. This time I'm going to put the ball/brick
there (E positioned the ball/brick in front of S). Now
listen carefully to what I say'. 33 than presented the
conditional statement and said: 'I'm going to put the
red/hite card there '(E positioned the red or white card
next to the ball/brick). E then asked: 'Is the card all
right or is it wrong?' When S had responded E asked;
'Why io it all right/wrong?* After this E said: 'How
we'll play the game again' and the procedure was repeated
from the point where B says: 'This time I'm going to put
the ball/brick there'.
Ad ul '• subjjecta
Adult Ss were told that no trickery was involved and
were asked for their serious co-operation in return for
an explanation of the purpose of the experiment at the
end of the trials. In addition no reference to 'playing
a game' was made with adult 8s.
iv) Design
In the *S drawing conclusion' trials the ball/brick1
represented either p or^p. This gave two conditions.
In ad ition the statement could involve four combinations
of ball/brick and red card/white card (i.e. Ball? red card,
ballowhite card, bricksred card, brickowhite card). There¬
fore each S was presented with all four statement varia¬
tions for each condition. This gave eight trials per 8.
The two conditions were alternated for each S, with half
the Ss commencing with the ball/brick referring to p and
half with the ball/brick indicating ^vp.
1. This is the ball/brick placed in front of the subject.
I
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For the 24 Se each condition occurred 96 times, 12
times in each trial position. For the 24 Ss each state¬
ment variation occurred 43 times, 6 times in each trial
position and each condition/statement variation combina¬
tion occurred 24 times, 3 times in each trial position.
In the '3 judging E'o conclusion* trials there were
four conditions representing contingencies p.q, p.^q?
^p.q and^p.^q. Again there were also four statement
variations used with each condition giving 16 trials per
3. Each S was assigned to one of the 24 orders resulting
from permutation of the four conditions.
For the 24 Ss each condition occurred 96 times, 6
times in each trial position. For the 24 Ss each state¬
ment variation occurred 96 times, 6 times in each trial
position and each condition/statement variation combina¬
tion occurred 24 times, at least once and no more than
twice In each trial position.
The '3 drawing conclusion* trials were conducted in
one session, the *3 judging E's conclusion' trials were
conducted in two sessions. Half the subjects commenced
with the *3 drawing conclusion' trials and half commenced
with the 'S judging E's conclusion* trials.
The 8 adult subjects were assigned to the experi¬
mental orders of eight of the children so that in the
'3 drawing conclusion' trials each condition/statement
variation combination occurred eight times, once in each
trial position and in the '3 judging E*a conclusion' trials
each condition/stotement variation combination occurred
eight times, once in each two successive trial positions.
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As with the children half the adult 8s commenced with the
'S drawing conclusion' trials and half commenced with
the '8 judging E's conclusion' trials.
e. Results
'S drawing conclusion' trials
For each condition (i.e. ball/brick represents p or
✓v.p'*) there were four responses per subject. Since only
two types of response occurred i.e. the subjects selected
either a card representing q or one representingq, it
was decided to analyse the data on the basis of individual
subject's responses to each .^condition rather than to
determine the frequency of these two responses for the
subjects as a whole. An over all analysis of the frequency
of the two responses would, in fact, be misleading in
this experiment, since it would conceal one noticeable
response strategy where the subject consistently selected
a card of one colour regardless of whether it represented
q or ^q. However, within the four responses per condition
that each subject makes, there is some, though not con¬
siderable, inconsistency and, therefore, a subject he©
been allocated to a particular response category if
seventy-five per cent (i.e. three of his four responses)
fall within that category. The responses for the subjects
are given in Table 16.
1. p refers to the object mentioned in the statement and
to the object not mentioned in the statement.
Similarly q refers to the card mentioned in the




Responses in '3 drawing conclusion* trials
Responses
No. of Ss producing responses
Given p Given /^p
Select q 20 (20)1 15 (13)
Select 0 4 (3)
Select one colour
consistently 3 3
Other responses 1 2
Total 24 24
Selection of q ratlier than A_q to follow p and
selection of q rather than A-q to follow /vp were sig¬
nificantly above chance level (p<.001 and p<.02 res¬
pectively) .
It should perhaps be noted that all four^q res¬
ponses to A-p were obtained from subjects aged 4 years
7 months and over and the consistent selections of
one colour were all obtained from three subjects aged
3 years 6 months and younger.
Adult subjects
—<m 'i»i*i ii——mi 11 ii ■—»
Adult subjects consistently made q responses to p
and ^ q responses to A-p.
'd judging hi*s conclusion' trials
There were four responses for each condition and
1. The number in brackets shows the number of subjects
whose responses are consistently within this
category i.e. subjects who make this response on
all four occasions.
2. Here the subject has selected q on two occasions and
'vq on two occasions.
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again there were only two response types i.e. the subject
either said the experimenter's conclusion was 'all right'
or it was 'wrong'. As with the 'S drawing conclusion*
trials an over all frequency analysis of these two
response types would conceal one response in which the
subject consistently said the experimenter's conclusion
was * all right* (or 'wrong') regardless of whether q or
q had been selected. Therefore, an analysis based on each
subject*s responses to each condition has been made again.
Subjects have been allocated to a particular response
category when at least seventy-five per cent of their
responses fall within this category. The responses are
given in Table 17.
Table 17
Responses in 'S .judging E'e conclusions' trials
Responses
Mo. of Ss producing responses
P.q p.^.q -p-q /vp.
Judge 'all right' 22 (19)1 1 (o) 12 (9) 8 (2)
Judge 'wrong* 0 21 (19) 5 (4) 11 (8)
Consistently judge
'all right'/'wrong' 2 2 2 2
Other responses 0 0 5 3
Total 24 24 24 24
1. The number in brackets shows the number of subjects
whose responses are consistently within this category
i.e. subjects who make thi«* response on all four
occasions.
2. Here the subject has judged 'all right' on two occasions
and 'wrong* on two occasions.
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Judgements of p.q 'all right* and p.A_q 'wrong'
were significantly above chance level (p<^.001). There
was no significant tendency to judge ^p.q or^p./^q either
'all right' or 'wrong'.
All five subjects who judged contingency /-p.q
'wrong* were aged over 4 years 2 months and four of
these subjects were, in fact, the subjects who produced
/-q responses to /-p in the '3 drawing conclusion' trials.
Judgements of the -vp.—c contingency also appear to be
related to age with six of the eight 'all right' judge¬
ments coming from subjects aged 4 years 1 month and over,
although 'wrong' judgements were fairly evenly distributed
between the younger and older halves of the subjects.
Consistent judgements of 'all right* (or 'wrong') regard¬
less of the contingency were obtained from two subjects
of 3 years 4 months and younger.
Adult subjects
Adult subjects consistently judged p.q to be 'all
right', ^p.q to be 'wrong', p.^q. to be 'wrong' and with
the exception of one subject, on one occasion only, adult
subjects judged ^p.^q to be 'all right'. This one
occasion on which an adult judged A.p./\j| to be wrong is
explainable on the grounds of the subject mishearing the
conditional (if there is a brick, then there is a white
card* since in his justification he said: "There should
be a white card when it's a ball' and when the experi¬
menter asked him why this should be so, he replied:
•Because you get the red card with the brick'.
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Justlflcatlone
For both conditions a number of the younger subjects
produced justifications such as 'Cos It is', 'Because I
want to*. A number of subjects simply reaffirmed their
own or the experimenter*s response. For example when
asked: 'Why is the red/white card supposed to be there*?'
they replied: 'Because it's a red card' or when asked:
*tihy is it'all ri rht/'wrong' they replied 'Because It's
wrong' or 'Because it's a red card' (when the experimenter
had selected a red card). Some subjects consistently
referred to the ball or brick (whichever was present) in
all their trials. This occurred even when the ball or
brick represented p or A-p and they responded with q and
even when the r-p.q contingency was presented to them and
judged to be 'all right*. For example when the conditional
wae 'If there is a brick, then there is a red card' and a
ball was placed in front of the subject he responded with
a red card and justified his .response by saying 'Because
there's a ball'. This ■■uggests that the subject has
cither never noted the rick referred to in the conditio¬
nal, or that he has forgo1.ten about the brick by the time
he makes his justification, nr that he considers it
irrelevant when ^ eking his response.
As in the previous 'Stars and wee animals' experiment
older children (most markedly the four subjects who
produced ^-q responses to r-p and who judgeAj>.q * wrong • and
'all right'' and adults tend to produce justifications
including modal expressions. For example from the children:
'The white's all right because if there's a brick then it
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must be white. If there's a ball then it must be red',
'If it has a brick, it's got to be red. The white one's
wrong*, 'Cos it's supposed to be red, isn't it', 'Because
it has to be a white one. There's supposed to be a white
one when you put the ball there and a red one when you
put the brick there I The following were obtained from
adults. 'It shouldn't be red if the ball's there. It
should be the white card'. 'Well, if the red card goes
with the brick, I've picked the white card because you've
put the ball there, not the brick'.
d. Discussion
The very young children in the 'Stars and v/ee animals'
experiment produced a systematic, but conditional-unrelated,
response pattern in the form of an end-to-end search
strategy. In this experiment another systematic, but
conditional-unrelated response pattern is also produced
by the youngest children. This takes the form of selec¬
tion of the same coloured card, irrespective of the con-
tional in the 'S drawing conclusion* trials and consistent
Judgements (either all 'all right* or all 'wrong*}, irres¬
pective of the conditional, in the *S judging E's con¬
clusion* trials. Here perhaps we have evidence that the
youngest subjects take little, if any, notice of verbal
information conveyed in a conditional statement, but
that their responses are highly systematic, the exact
nature of the response depending on the nature of the
task and the constraints it imposes. It should he noted
that although not acting in accordance with the conditional,
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these subjects are nevertheless acting; in accordance with
the general nature of the task. They do make responses
of the type the task requires.
Prom Tables 16 and 17 it can be seen that, like
subjects in the 'Stars and wee animals' experiment, some
subjects indicate the acceptability of q following p but,
unlike the subjects in the 'Stars and wee animals' experi¬
ment, they also indicate that q can follow ^p. Perhaps
here we have evidence that the rejection of/vp.q in the
•Stars and wee animals' experiment (i.e. the 'matching'
responses) was a function of the material used and
particularly the use of attributes present and absent to
represent p, q, ~p and/^q. In this experiment the subject
appears to be 'matching* his response or the experimenter's
response to the card referred to in the conditional state¬
ment. Little notice appears to be taken of the ante¬
cedent in the conditional. 'Matching' of response to
the card referred to in the conditional could also account
for the twelve subjects who judge ^.q to be 'all right'
and the eleven subjects who judge /vp./^q to be 'wrong'.
Seven subjects always selected or accepted q and always
rejected or did not accept to go with both p and^p.
Five subjects, all above the mean age of the group
judge ~p.q to be wrong and ^p.«q to be 'all right' and
of these five subjects, four also produce responses
to op in the '8 drawing conclusion* trials. These four
subjects give justifications including modal expressions
and here we have evidence that at the upper end of the
age range 'equivalence' responses are operating. However
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for contingency three other subjects also make
an 'all right' judgement. Two of these subjects are
below the mean age of the group. An examination of the
over all response patterns of these three subjects reveals
that all three gave q in response to both p and and
all three judged p.q and ^p.q 'all right' and p.^q 'wrong'.
Clearly this evidence does not fit any of the three res¬
ponse types put forward so far i.e. it cannot be explained
as 1) a systematic, but conditional-unrelated response
pattern, 2) a 'matching' response pattern, 3) an 'equiva¬
lence' response pattern. In fact the response patterns
of these three subjects conform to a truth-functional
analysis of implication. Their justifications, however,
do not contain modale and tend to reaffirm their own or
the experimenter's conclusions or to refer to the ball or
brick: placed in front of them. In view of the non-truth-
functional treatment of implication by adult subjects in
this experiment, it would appear highly unlikely that
these three children (the youngest only 3 years 7 months)
are basing their responses on truth-functional logic,
but exactly why this particular response pattern has
1 2
emerged defies explanation at the moment.
1. See reference to 'growth errors' in Chapter V.
Discussion.
2. Further discussion relevant to this experiment will
be found in the discussion of the following experiment
and in Chapter V. Discussion.
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D. Experiment 6. Boat and Train
a • Introduction
It hoe been known for a long time that the ability
to reason deductively varies according to the nature of
the experimental task. Lefford (1946) has demonstrated
that the incidence of fallacious reasoning is greater with
emotionally toned items than non-emotionally toned items
and Wilkins (19?8) studying syllogistic reasoning found
that valid conclusions occurred more frequently when the
subject was familiar with the material than ¥/hen the
material was symbolic or unfamiliar to the subject. Janis
and Prick (1943) found that a subject was more likely to
reject a. valid argument if he disagreed with the con¬
clusion than when he agreed with the conclusion and more
likely to accept an invalid argument when he agreed with
the conclusion than, when he disagreed with the conclusion.
Smedalund (i960) points out that if someone prefers
person A to person B and person 3 to person C then it is
assumed by adults that he will also prefer person A to
person C. He describes this as an 'example of those
peculiar constructs which are somehow inbetween synthetic
and analytic, i.e. which have an empirical content, but
are felt to be logically necessary'. To examine whether
children between five and seven years are capable of
making inferences with this type of material he carried
out an experiment in which the subject was shown three
pictures of a child. On each side of the child was an
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object. On the first picture the child was pointing at
object A and not at object B. On the second picture the
child was pointing at object B and not at object 0. On
the third picture objects A and C were on either side of
the child who pointed at neither object. The subject was
told that the child in the pictures was telling the®
which object he would like to have. After the subject
had been shown the first to cards he was asked to select
(between objects A and C) the object which the child in
the picture preferred. The results indicated an almost
complete absence of transitivity with the subjects making
selections based on their own preferences or on other
irrelevant features of the situation.
In this study so far two experiments on implication
have been conducted. In the first experiment, 'Stars and
wee animals', the material used appeared to influence the
response patterns of many of the subjects in that they
tended to 'match' stars with wee animals and no stars
with no wee animals irrespective of the conditional
statement. In the second experiment, 'Ball, brick and
cards' no obvious relationship existed between the
material and the majority of subjects appeared to be
using the conditional statement as a guide upon which
they based their responses. In the next experiment,
therefore, it is proposed to replicate the outline of
the 'Ball, brick and cards* experiment, but to use
material which the child considers to be related, e.g.
a train and a railway line,and to use material which
the child considers not to be related, e.g. a boat and
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a railway line. It is hoped that this procedure will
five some indication of how resistant to the child's
everyday experience are the response patterns of the
♦Ball, brick and cards* experiment.
In the next experiment p and /^p are represented by
a railway line and some water in a blue saucer-shaped
container and q and ^~q by a boat and train. Here one would
predict that a. child, on the basis of his everyday
experience of these items, would associate the boat with
the water and the train with the railway line.
b. Method
In order to ascertain whether the material used was
related for pre-achool children a pre-teet was carried
out with six children who were not experimental subjects,
but who were of the same age range as the experimental
subjects. Bach subject was shown the toy train, the toy
boat, the railway line and the blue saucer-shaped container
filled with water and described by the experimenter as a
train, a boat, a railway line end some water. The subject
was asked: 'What goes with the water?* and when he had
responded: 'What goes with the railway line?' All subjects
linked the boat with the water and the train with the
railway line. The subjects were also asked whether the
boat could go with the railway line and whether the train
could go with the water. All six subjects responded 'ho*
to these questions,
i) Subjects
24 nursery school children (12 boys, 12 girls) aged
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between 3 years 1 month and 4 years 11 months. Mean
age 4 years If months, median age 4 years If months.
ii) Material
A toy train, a toy boat, a section of railway line
from a toy railway set and a blue 3aucer-shaped container
(diameter 5fn) filled with water.
iii) Procedure
'3 drawing conclusion' trials
Each 3 was tested individually seated at a low
table. E said to Si 'I've got a train, a boat, a rail¬
way line and some water'. E placed the items in front
of S and said: 'Show me the train' (boat, railway line,
water). After S had pointed to each item E asked: 'What's
this?' and pointed to each item in turn. When S had
named each item E said: 'We are going to play a game and
in this game 1*11. put the water or the railway line there
(E indicated a position on the table in front of 8) and
you have to put the train or the boat there'(E indicated
a second position adjacent to the first position and
handed the train and boat to S). How listen carefully to
what I say. If there is a railway line/water, then there
is a boat/train'. If 3 did not piece either the boat
or the train next to the railway line/water E asked:
'What are you going to put there?' After S had selected
either the boat or train E asked: 'Why is the boat/train
supposed to be there?' After this E said: 'Now we'll play
the game again*. E handed the boat and train to 3 and
the procedure was repeated from the point where 1 says:
'This lime I'm going to put the railwayline/water there*.
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*3 judging B's conclusion' trials
After the initial identification of objects as in
the "3 drawing conclusion' trials E said: 'We are going
to play a game and in this game I'll put the water or
the railway line there (E indicated a position on the
table in front of S) and then I'm going to put the
train or the boat there (E indicated a second position
adjacent to the first position), but sometimes I'll put
the wrong one there and sometimes it will be all right.
This time I'm going to put the water/railway line there
{E positioned the water/railway line in front of S). Now
listen carefully to what I say'. E then presented the
conditional statement and said: 'I'm going to put the
boat/train there'(E positioned the boat/train next to
the water/railway line). E then asked: 'Is the boat/
train all right or is it wrong?' When S had responded
E asked: 'Why is it all right/wrong?' After this E
said: 'how we'll play the game again' and the procedure
was repeated from the point where E says: "This time I'm
going to put the water/railway line there'.
iv) Design
In the '3 drawing conclusion' trials the water/rail¬
way line represented p or^p. This gave two conditions
i.e. either an item representing p or one representing/^p
was placed before S. In addition the statement could
involve four combinations of water/railway line and
train/boat (i.e. Wateroboat, waterstrain, railway line^
boat, railway limotrain). Therefore each S was presented
with all i'our statement variations for each condition.
This gave eight trials per S. The two conditions were
alternated for each S, with half the 3s commencing with
the water/railway line referring to p and half with the
water/railway line indicating .
For the twenty-four Ss each condition occurred 96
times, 12 times in each trial position. For the twenty-
four Ss each statement variation occurred 43 times, 6
times in each trial position and each condition/state¬
ment variation combination occurred 24 times, 3 times in
each trial position.
In the 'S judging E's conclusion' trials there were
four conditions representing contingencies p.q, p.^vct,
~p.q and/vp.—q. Again there were also four statement
variations used with each condition giving 16 trials per
S. Each S vas assigned to one of the 24 orders resulting
from permutation of the four conditions.
For the twenty-four Ss each condition occurred 96
times, 6 times in each trial position. For the twenty-
four Ss each statement variation occurred 96 times, 6
times in each trial position and each condition/statement
variation combination occurred 24 times, at least once
and no more than twice in each trial position.
The 'S drawing conclusion' trials were conducted
in one session, the '3 judging E*e conclusion' trials
were conducted in two session??. Half the subjects com¬
menced with the 'S drawing conclusion* trials and half
commenced with the *8 judging E's conclusion' trials.
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c. Results
*3 drawing conclusion* trials
As in the earlier 'Ball, brick and cards' experiment
for each condition (i.e. water/railway line represents
p or^p) there were four responses per subject. Two of
these responses occurred where p and q were related (i*e.
water and boat, railway line and train) and two responses
occurred where p and q were not related (i.e. water and
train, railway line and boat). The data have been analysed
on the basis of each subject's responses to each condition
as in the 'Ball, brick and cards' experiment, but this
time a further breakdown of results separates those res¬
ponses made when p and q were related from responses
made when p and q were not related. For each subject
this drives two sets of two responses within each con¬
dition and a subject has been allocated to a particular
response category if both his responses fall within that
category. The responses for the subjects are given In
Table 18.
Selection of q rather than to follow p and selec¬
tion of q rather than^q to follow/^p were significantly
above chance level (p<.G01) when p and q were related and
when they were not related.
The three subjects who matched related items regard¬
less of the condition were all aged 3 years 8 months and
younger.
'S judging E's conclusion' trials
Again an analysis of the results has been made on
the basis of each subject's responses to each condition.
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For each condition there were four responses per subject
and these have been divided .further into the two responses
which occurred when p and q were related and the two
which occurred when p and q were not related. A subject
has been allocated to a particular response category
when both his responses fall within that category. The
responses are given in Table 19.
Table 18
Kesponsea in *5 drawing conclusion' trials
No. of Ss producing responses
Response Given p Given
R NR R NR
Select q 21 r 20 nr 20 nr 20 r
Select ^q 0 nr 1 r 0 r 0 nr
Consistently match
related items 1 3 3 3 3
o
Other responses 0 0 1 1
Total 24 24 24 24
Rep and q are related
NR « p and q are not related
r « What is given and the selection are
related.
nr * What is given and the selection are
not related.
1. Here three subjects consistently matched the boat
to the water and the train to the railway line in
all conditions.




Responses in 'S judging 5*6 conclusion' trials
Response
Ho. of Ss producing responses
p«q P »/vQ -P-q p • -q
R r NRnr Rnr NR r Rnr]HR r R r NRnr
Judge 'all right' 8 8 0 2 8 8 3
.
3
Judge 'wrong* 0 0 7 5 0 0 4 5
Consistently judge
'all right'/'wrong' 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Consistently matck
related items 1 10 10 10 10 10 10
10 10
2
Other responses 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Total 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
R s p and q are related
NR « p and q are not related
r * the contingency given is related,
nr *= the contingency given is not related.
In this test exactly two-thirds of the subjects
produced either consistent Judgements of 'all right'/
'wrong' or consistent Judgements in which related items
were 'all right* and not related items 'wrong*. This
latter response came from children as old as 4 years
11 months. The former Judgement came only from children
aged 4 years and younger. These two response types
accounted for all children up to and including age 4
years 2 months.
1. Here ten subjects consistently judged related items
'all right' and not related items 'wrong* in all conditions.
The items so judged were the ones on the table in front of
the subject and not those referred to in the conditional.
2. The contingency was judged 'all right' once and 'wrong'
once.
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Of the eight remaining subjects all eight judged
p.q and <-p.q 'all right' regardless of whether p and q
were related and seven of the eight judged p./Mj 'wrong'
when the items were not related. With other contingencies
the situation was lees clear.
Justifications
As in earlier experiments a number of younger
children responded 'Cos* and other subjects simply
justified by referring to one of the items placed on the
table by the experimenter, e.g. 'Because there's a
railway line', 'fhey did not respond in this way to
items they themselves had selected which suggests that
this justification is not just a naming of one item
they can see.
A large number of justifications in the '8 judging
B's conclusion' trials referred to the relationship
between the items. Only two subjects gave this type
of justification in the '3 drawing conclusion' trials.
Sypical examples were 'Because boats always go on water'
(p was a railway line, q a boat, ^p was given and the
subject responded with q), 'Because trains do go on
railways' (p was a railway line, q a boat, a railway
line and a train were give i and the subject said this
was 'all right'), 'Because trains don't go on water'
(p was a railway line, q a train, some water and a train
were give and the subject said this was 'wrong').
With olddr subjects who gave q in response to p
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and ^p and judged p.q and *~p.q 'all right' regardless of
the relationship between the items there were a few
justifications similar to the justifications given by
older subjects in the 'Stars and wee animals' and 'Ball,
brick and cards' experiments. Examples were? 'Because
it should go there' (p was a railway line, q a train,
/^p was given and the subject responded with q)f 'It's got
to because it has. It's supposed to be there' (p was
some water, q a railway line, p was given and the subject
responded with q). However such justifications were less
frequent than in the earlier experiments and were markedly
less sophisticated.
d. Discussion
In this experiment, as in previous experiments, we
have evidence of younger children producing systematic,
but con • itlonal-unrelated responses. Here it applied only
to the *S judging E's conclusion' trials where six sub¬
jects made consistent judgements of 'all right' or 'wrong'
irrespective of the conditional. In addition, though,
we have another form of consistent response which is
conditional-unrelated, which applies throughout the age
range, and which can be attributed to the nature of the
material used in the experiment. In the *S drawing con¬
clusion' trials three subjects consistently selected Items
which were related in their experience rather than in the
conditional. In the 'S judging E's conclusion' trials
this response was very frequent with ten subjects consis¬
tently making their judgements on the basis of the
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relationship between the material in front of them rather
than on the basis of the conditional.
It is not surprising to find that the nature of
the material has influenced some responses, but why it
should be more pronounced in one set of trials needs
some explanation. One could perhaps argue that to make
a judgement of someone else's response is intrinsically
more difficult than to make the response oneself. This
may or may not be the case, but in the previous 'Ball,
brick and cards' experiment there was no such movement
from conditional-related (i.e. responses where some
account was taken of the conditional) to conditional-
unrelated responses between the 'S drawing conclusion'
trials and the 'S judging E's conclusion' trials. In
that experiment there was no indication of differing
degrees of difficulty in the two sets of trials. Perhaps
in this experiment the addition of another variable has
made the task more complex and, whereas in the 'Ball,
brick and cards' experiment the two conditions could both
be coped with, even though it was more difficult to judge
the experimenter's response than to make a response, in
this experiment the additional variable has pushed the
complexity of the task in the '8 judging E's conclusion*
trials to a point where many children cannot cope with
the conditional and so they utilize another strategy.
Another explanation could be that in the *8 drawing con¬
clusion' trials the subject only sees one of the items
in front of him until he has made his response. In the
'S judging E's conclusion' trials, however, the subject
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sees two items, either related or not related, in front
of him before he makes his judgement. Perhaps actually
seeing the items in proximity is sufficient for their
relationship or lac'* of relationship, in his experience,
to become dominant over the conditional.
As in the 'Ball, brick and card' experiment there
was b tendency to select q in response to p and ~ p end
to judge p.q and ^-p.q 'all right* and p.^q and ~p.^-q
'wrong'. Four subjects consistently responded in this
manner. These subjects were aged 4 years 4 months and
over.
Unlike earlier experiments no subject consistently
produced 'equivalence' responses although one subject,
aged 4 years 11 months, produced a response pattern found
1
in the 'Ball, brick and cards' experiment where q was
given in response to p and /vp and p.q, <vp.q and ^p./^q
were judged 'all right' and p.~q was judged 'wrong',
i.e. a truth-functional analysis of implication.
The main difference between the results of this
experiment and the earlier 'Ball, brick and cards' experi¬
ment seems to be in the direction of what appears to be
a lower level of performance. In both experiments there
are conditional-unrelated responses, but in this experi¬
ment such responses are more pronounced and take two
p
forms i.e. systematic judgements of 'all right'/'wrong'"
and matching of related items.
1. This response pattern is also described on p. 172.
2. In the 'S drawing conclusion' trials no systematic
strategy comparable with consistently selecting one
colour was employed.
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What appears to be a matching of the consequent in
the conditional and ignoring the antecedent is also
found in both experiments. It is very marked in the
'S draws conclusion* trials. However, consistent use of
this strategy is restricted to older subjects whereas in
the 'Ball, brick and cards' experiment it was replaced,
in older subjects, by an 'equivalence' response pattern.
A further point relates to justifications. In this
experiment they were noticeably more difficult to obtain,
they were shorter and rarely did the child attempt to
relate the conditional statement to the material in front
of him in any detailed way."5" It should also be noted
h* re that justifications containing such expressions as
'it should*, 'it's got to', which are similar to justi¬
fications obtained from subjects who produced 'equivalence*
responses In earlier experiments, were obtained on one
oi' two occasions from older children, in this experiment,
in situations, for example, where they gave q in response
to A.p or judged ^p.q 'all right'. Such justifications
were very infrequent, they covered only a limited range
of expression® (no child, for example, used the word 'must')
and did not form part of fairly detailed justifications as
in earlier experiments, but the feet that they did occur
means that one cannot equate them with'equivalence' res¬
ponses as earlier results had suggested.
from the 'Ball, brick and cards' experiment and the
1. Justifications of the type given on p. 169 were not
obtained.
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'Boat and train* experiment it is suggested that the
following developmental sequence may be operating!
1. Conditional-unrelated responses
a) The first stage produces responses in which the sub¬
ject treats the task in a systematic way, but this bears
no relation to the conditional. He is nevertheless acting
within the constraints of the task and producing the type
of response required.
In the 'Ball, brie* and cards' experiment this takes the
form of systematically responding with a card of one
colour or systematically responding 'all right'/'wrong'.
In the 'Boat and Train' experiment this would toke the
form of systematically selecting one item (i.e. either
the boat or the train) or systematically responding
'all right'/'wrong'.
b) The second stage can only be demonstrated in the
'Boat and train' experiment. Here another variable
enters the task and the subject responds on the basis
of this variable. It i3 argued that this is a slightly
more advanced stage than stage a) because i) this response
came from subjects throughout the age .range whereas res¬
ponse a) was restricted to the very youngest subjects
and ii) it requires the subject to make a different
response on each trial i.e. he has to assess the task
on each trial (in the 'Boat and train' experiment he had
to assess the relationship between items) whereas in
stage a), after the first response, he simply repeats
1. This response did not occur.
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whatever he has done before.
In the 'Boat and train' experiment this takes the form of
selecting a boat whenever there Is water, a train whenever
there is a railway line and judging related items 'all
right' and unrelated items? 'wrong'.
?. Part-conditional responses
a) the first stage Involves responding to only part of
the conditional. In these experiments it was the conse¬
quent. The antecedent appears ignored.
In both experiments this took the form of selecting which¬
ever item was represented by q in the conditional irres¬
pective of whether p or was placed in front of the
subject. It also took the form of judging 'all right'
any pair of items in which the item represented by q
appeared and judging 'wrong' any pair of items in which
the item represented by q did not appear irrespective of
whether p or ~P was also In front of the subject.
b) This stage is more tenuously suggested, but it may
be that the few subjects who produced what appeared to
be truth—functional treatments of implication are at a
stage where they are able to produce 'equivalence' res¬
ponses for some conditions, but are still in stage a)
for other conditions. Alternatively they do note the
antecedent as well as the consequent in all conditions,
but the consequent is dominant. In this case their 'logic*
takes the form of selecting whatever the consequent
represents or judging 'all right' a contingency where
whatever "he consequent represents appears. However, if
whatever the consequent represents does not appear an
]
'equivalence' type process operates.
It is suggested that this stage may fit in here
because it came from younger subjects than the 'equivalence'
responses in the 'Ball, brick and card' experiment and
Came from the oldest subject in the 'Boat and train'
experiment where no 'equivalence' response patterns were
found.
3. Equivalence responses
This stage was only found in the 'Ball, brick and
cards' experiment and only with older subjects. It
involved giving q in response to p, a. q in response to^p
and judging p.q and /^p.A-q 'all right' and p.^-q and /vp.q
'wrong*. These are the responses given by adults.
1. Further discussion of a general developmental sentience
end discussion of points raised in this chapter will




A. Introduction to Verbal Inferenoea
It is the usual practice when conducting experiments
with young children to have a task in which concrete
material is present either for the children to look at or
for them to manipulate. Donaldson and Wales (1969b) refer
to this as 'concrete support'. It has been argued that
this 'support* is needed because young children are in¬
capable of reasoning at a purely verbal level.
Inhelder and Piaget (1958), in discussing children
older than the ones in this study, sayi 'It is often
sufficient to translate a ooncrete operation into simple
propositions and deny the subject the use of manipulstable
objects for working out the operation in question for the
problem to become insoluble before the formal level*. In
describing the acquisition of conservation Piaget (1962)
also says: 'The ability to pass from one point to another
and be able to come back to the point of departure, to
manipulate the reversible operations, appears around
seven to eight years of age. It is limited when compared
with the operations of the superior level only in the
sense that they are concrete. That is to say, the child
can manipulate the operations only when he manipulates the
object concretely'.
The use of concrete material in experiments with
young children has certain obvious advantages. It provides
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a focus for the child's attention and affords assessment
of responses on the basis of actions upon the material
thus avoiding the difficulties of eliciting and inter¬
preting verbal responses but the situation is far from
clear. Different types of concrete material can produce
different results in tasks which are otherwise identical.
This has been shown in the 'Ball, brick end cards' experi¬
ment and the 'Boat and train' experiment in this study.
It has also been found that 'concrete support' can some¬
times appear to hinder performance. Wohlwill (cited in
Donaldson and Wales, 1969) found that children aged be¬
tween five and seven were more successful with a class
inclusion task when the task was completely verbal than
Mien pictures were used.
As far as pre-school children are concerned it is
important to know, not only what differing effects
different types of material produce but also, whether
there are any situations in which they can operate at a
purely verbal level.
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B. 'Experiment 7» Apple and ''range
a. Introduction
One of the main features of the concrete operational
stage of development ia the acquisition of two forms of
reversibility, i.e. reciprocity and inversion. Placet
(196?) describes reciprocity thus: 'Reciprocity arises
in connexion with relations. If A equals B, by recioro-
city B equals A. If A is smaller than B, by reciprocity
B is larger than A.' It ia this second examole of reci¬
procity, given by Piaget, which has been taken as the
basis of an experiment in which no concrete material is
used and the children are required to respond verbally
to verbally given information.
b. Method
In this task the subject is told that the experi¬
menter has an apple and an orange and that the apple ia
bigger or wee-er than the orange or that the orange is
bigger or wee-er than the apple. He is theq through two
types of questions, required to indicate what he con¬
siders is the complementary relationship of these two
objects, i.e. to indicate an awareness of the logically
equivalent combination of the two objects.
The statements used and the questions asked were:
1• I have an apple and an orange. The apple is bigger
than the orange. Is the orange bigger or wee-er
than the apple?
2. I have art apple and an orange. The apple ia birger
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than the orange. Is the orange wee-er or bigger
than the apple?
3. T hove an apple and an orange. The apple is wee-er
than, the orange. Is the orange bigger or wee-er
than the apple'7
4. I have an apple and an orange. The apple is wee-er
than the orange. Is the orange wee-er or bigger
than the apple?
5. I have an apple and an orange. The apple io bigger
than the orange. Which is wee-er?
6. I have an apple and an orange. The apple is wee-er
than t*e orange. Which is bigger?^-
i) .'Objects
24 nursery school children (12 boys, 12 girls) aged
between 3 years 2 months and 4 years 11 months. Mean
age 4 years 1 month, median age 4 years | month.
ii) Procedure
Bach S was tested individually seated at a low
table facing E. £ said to S: 'Listen carefully. I've
got an apple and an orange. The apple is bigger than
the orange. Is the orange bigger or wee-er than the
apple?' When 3 had responded E asked: 'Why do you think
the orange is wee-er/blgger than the apple?' Where the
question was in the form: 'Which is bigger/wee-er?' E
asked: 'Why do you think the orange/apple is bigger/
wee-er?' After 3 had replied E moved on to the next
1. The apple and the orange appeared equally as first
and second mentioned items.
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trial commencing with: 'This time I've got another apple
» 1 2and orange .
iii) Design.
for each of the 24 3s there were 6 trials, each
trial covering one of the conditions given on page 193.
In each S'e six trials there were three trials in which
the apple was larger than she orange and three in which
it was smaller than the orange. 24 orders wore produced
"by permutation of the first four conditions i.e. the
conditions in which the question was of the form: 'Is
the orange bigger or wee-er than the apple?' Each S was
assigned to one of these orders which covered trials 2 to
5. The first and last trials for each S were conditions
5 and 6 i.e. the conditions In which the question was of
the form: 'Which is bigger/wee-er?' These two conditions
occurred equally as first and last trials.
c. Results
Out of the twenty-four subjects seventeen gave
correct responses to eacb of the aix conditions. Throe
subjects made one error (one in Condition 4 and two in
Condition 1), three subjects made two errors and one
1. This is a typical trial. Other conditions (i.e. state¬
ments and questions) from the list riven above were
also used to commence a series of trials.
2. A number of possible ways of introducing this task: to
the subject, such as saying it was a pretend game, were
considered in a pilot study, but it was found that com¬
mencing the task immediately in the manner described
in the Procedure seemed acceptable to the subjects.
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subject employed a strategy in which he gave the first-
mentioned item in the statement when he was required to
name an item and gave the relationship mentioned in the
statement (i.e. either bigger or wee-er) whenever he was
required to respond bigger/wee-er. Apart from this one
subject there was no noticeable error patter. Ho child
aged 4 years 0 months and over made an error.
1
Justifications
Apart from the usual 'Cos* and 'Because it is'
responses there were some justifications which referred
to qualities of apples and oranges. For examples 'Because
it (the orange) has skin, but bigger skin', 'Because it
(the orange) won't take a long time to peel'. A frequent
justification was a reaffirmation of the subject's res¬
ponse. For example having replied 'bigger' the subject
justified with 'Because it's bigger* or having replied
•apple' the subject said: 'Because it's an apple*. A
number of justifications correctly included one relational
expression and one or both objects. For example having
been told the orange was bigger than the apple and asked:
'Which is wee-er?' the subject responded 'The apple,
because the apple is wee-er than the orange'. Another
subject having responded 'bigger' (the orange was bigger
than the apple) justified with 'Because it is. The apple
is wee-er'.
Two subjects (one aged 4 years 2 months and one aged
4 years 11 months) included both items and both relational
expressions in their justifications. From the younger
subject came: 'the orange is wee-er and the apple is
bigger*. Prom the older subject came: •The apple i®
bigger fchan the orange and the orange is bigger than the
apple'.
d. Disoussion
The results of this experiment suggest two things.
Firstly that in some circumstances pre-school children
ean operate very efficiently at a purely verbal level and
secondly they can make inferences (as defined in the
Introduction to this study, p. 10) at this level. More¬
over it is also suggested that they have demonstrated
one of the reversible operations denied them by Piaget
until the concrete-operational level i.e. reciprocity.
It may be argued that these children are not really
reasoning at the level required to handle reversible
operations, that they are operating at a lower level and
producing responses which superficially resemble those
of reciprocity, but what this lower level is and what
form the strategy or 'logic* involved takes is difficult
to say.1 One explanation could be that the subjects
place an 'absolute* interpretation upon the information
they are given. For example if told 'The apple is bigger
than the orange' they interpret this as 'The apple is
the big one. The orange is the wee one'. When asked:
•Is the orange bigger or wee-er than the apple?' or
'Which is wee-er?' they interpret the question as 'Is
the orange big or wee?' or 'Which is the wee one?* and
1. 'Gx*owth' errors will be discussed in Chapter V.
Discussion.
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respond accordingly without any awareness of the rela¬
tional aspect of the situation. This may have happened
with some subjects, but it is difficult to extend such
an explanation to subjects who justified their responses
in such ways as: 'The apple is wee-er than the orange' or
'The apple is bigger than the orange and the orange is
wee-er than the apple'.
It should be noted, though, that Clark (1969) argues
that linguistic processes are fundamental to deductive
reasoning of this type and that with adults the 'deep
structure* underlying statements such as 'A is better
than B' takes the form 'A is good, B is good'. Added to
this is the 'deep structure' interpretation which attributes
more 'goodness' to A than 'goodness* to B. It would
appear reasonable to assume that children also have this
type of 'deep structure', i.e. 'the apple is big, the
orange Is big*, rather than 'the apple is big, the orange
is wee' for 'the apple is bigger than the orange' and,
therefore, to argue that children in this study have
indeed demonstrated deductive reasoning of the type
produced by adults.
Two further points in Clark's theory are relevant
to this study. Firstly 'certain "positive" adjectives,
like long, are stored in memory in a less complex and
more accessible form than their opposites, like short'
and secondly 'listeners cat only retrieve from memory,
information which is congruent at a deep level to the
information they are searching for*. If the information
is not 'congruent' then time-consuming adjustments of
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information have to be made. Clark has shown that it
takes longer to draw conclusions from statements such
as 'B is worse then A' than from statements such as
'A is better than B'. It also takes longer to answer
the question 'Who is worst?' than the question 'Who is
best?' for statement 'A is better than B' (i.e. it takes
less time in a 'congruent' situation). In the present
study half the trials used the 'positive' adjective
'bigger', but half used the more time consuming (and
more complex) opposite form 'wee-er'. In addition the
response required of the subject was not 'congruent' with
the premiss (i.e. at a deep level the information stored
and that sought were not 'congruent').
1. Further discussion relevant to this experiment will




One of the interesting features of the results of
this study has been the almost complete absence of random
responses. There has been no random responding in the
sense of operating outside the constraints of the task.1
All subjects adhered to the confines of a formal experi-
/■
mental situation i.e. they responded to a situation
2
which they themselves had not initiated and moreover all
subjects responded appropriately within the limits of
the task, the nature of which was conveyed to the child
by verbally presented information. Where, for example,
the nature of the task required the subject to select a
box or to make a verbal judgement he made a response
appropriate to this requirement. One can, therefore,
claim that all subjects adhered to some of the verbally
presented information in the task, although not all
subjects adhered to the information contained within the
premiss associated with the task. Random responses within
the constraints of the task did ocour (or at least res¬
ponses which the experimenter could not classify occurred),
but these were rare. The over all impression is one of
fairly strict adherence to one particular strategy from
each subject.
1. The constraints of the task being those verbal and
nonverbal requirements which the task imposes upon
the subject.
2. Reference is made to formal and spontaneous situations
in Chapter I. Introduction, p. 15.
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If one considers the strategies which subjects have
employed throughout this study a three-stage developmental
sequence, which I propose to describe below, is suggested.
It is possible that this sequence has a fairly wide
applicability to situations where the child has to handle
a verbal premiss relating to physically present material
and possibly also to situations where the task is com¬
pletely verbal i.e. no physical material is present,
although with only one such experiment in this study it
is impossible to support such a hypothesis.
Stage 1. Premiss-unrelated response
Ihis response, obtained from the youngest children
in the study, is completely independent of the information
contained within the premiss, yet it is highly consistent
and systematic and falls within the constraints of the
task. At the lowest level this takes the form of repeti¬
tion of the same response irrespective of changes in the
material displayed before the child and Irrespective of
differing premisses. It can also take the form of a
repeated systematic 'search strategy' if such a response
is appropriate to the nature of the task. For example
in the 'Ball, brick and cards' and 'Boat and train' experi¬
ments this response was exemplified in repeated selection
of the same coloured card or repeated judgements of 'all
right' (or 'wrong'). In the *Star3 and wee animals*
experiment it took the form of a systematic 'end-to-end'
search strategy. This 'end-to-end* search strategy was
also found in the control conditions in the 'Houses and
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boxes' experiment where no premiss was given and the
children were simply told that the house was In one of
the boxes. This result from eontrol subjects supports
the argument that such responses are premiss-unrelated.
Two aspects of these systematic responses are of
interest. Firstly in the one condition where adults
might hare responded systematically i.e. the control
condition of the 'Houses and boxes' experiment, they did
not do so, and apart from a tendency not to select the
•reward' box of the previous trial no systematic
2
strategy was noted. If this tendency to order and sys¬
tematic responding applied only to children it leads one
to speculate on the possibility of some inborn systematic
system. On the other hand both adults and children may
be searching for the rule which governs the situation
and whereas the children will settle for a simple repeti¬
tive rule,i.e. open each box in turn or give the same
response, adults expect to find some other rule applying
and their responses, apparently random, are partly
hypothesis testing (one hypothesis in the 'Houses and
boxes' experiment being that a 'reward' box on one trial
would not be the 'reward' box on the following trial).
1. This is referred to on page 99-
2. It should also be noted that other strategies such as
preference for the left-most box, frequent adjacent
responses and preference for the red box were noted
in children in the 'Houses and boxes' experiment and
that these, although secondary to the premiss in
experimental trials, could become dominant in other
situations.
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Allied to this, as far as the children are concerned, is
the idea, put forward by Legrenai in a different context
(referred to on page 158), of reducing the difficulty
of the task and the ways in which children responded may
well represent an attempt to simplify the task(thia should
not be taken to mean that they are capable of a higher
level of responding).
The second interesting feature of systematic res¬
ponses relates only to the 'end-to-end' seach strategies
and that these were mainly in the direction of left to
right. In addition in the 'Houses and boxes' experiment
there was a marked preference for selecting the left-most
box with experimental subjects. Had this been with older
subjects one could have easily related it to reading
habits, but its presence in children, the majority of
whom cannot yet read, is surprising and again leads one
to speculate upon some 'natural' predisposition to res¬
pond in this way.
A Becond form of premiss-unrelated response also
occurs and it is probably later appearing than the response
mentioned so far in this stage. In this response qualities
of the material used are taken into account. Relationships
between the material or perceptually dominant features of
the material are used in the response strategies. Not
all the experiments carried out in this study lend them¬
selves t.o a distinction between this and the earlier
response, but in the 'Boat and train' experiment it. can
be clearly seen in responses where the subject has linked
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a boat with water and a train with a railway line irres¬
pective of the premiss. In the 'Stars and wee animals'
experiment the 'four box selections' where the subject
selected first the boxes with stars or wee animals and
then the boxes without stars or without wee animals'*" and
possibly some of the selections of boxes with stars/wee
animals only (i»e, in which the subject did not select
boxes with no star or no wee animal) may have reflected
this response strategy although the relative infrequency
of this type of response in the control group suggests
that it is not sufficient to explain all such experimental
group responses. It was however the possibility of this
having happened and the possibility of subjects having
assumed that the presence of one distinctive attribute of
the material was linked with another distinctive attribute
(i.e. stars bein^: linked with wee animals) that indicated
the need for a task of a different nature in the 'Ball,
brick and cardsf experiment.
It is proposed that this stage of premiss-unrelated
behaviour, which falls within the constraints of the task,
can also be found when no material is physically present.
In this case it takes the form of either repeating some
part of the premiss or repeating some part of the question.
For example the subject might respond by repeatedly giving
whatever is first mentioned in the premiss (or whatever
1. And the 'four box selections' where no star/wee animal
preceded star/wee animal.
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is last mentioned) or he might similarly do this with the
question he is asked. In making some reference to the
premiss in this way it does not mean that his behaviour
is guided by the premiss, i.e. there is no understanding
or interpretation on his part, but simply a repetition,
although this again is guided by the constraints of the
task, it is task appropriate, and therefore cannot be
considered a simple mechanical repetition. However, there
is evidence from only one child in this study to support
this proposal. In the 'Apple and orange' experiment
thie subject always gave the first item referred to in
the premiss when he was required to give an item, and
referred to the relationship in the premiss when he was
required to respond 'bigger* or 'wee-er'. One might also
expect to find repetitive answers akin to the 'all right'
/'wrong' or repeated reference to the same mentioned item
although such responses, in the purely verbal experiment
in this study, did not occur. However any hypothesis
about Stage 1 responses in purely verbal situations can
only be highly speculative. It is interesting to note
that the repetition of part of the premiss or question
(i.e. first-mentioned or last-mentioned) did not occur
in experiments other than the purely verbal one. It may
I
be as Donaldson and Lloyd (1971) suggest that in a state¬
ment/physical material situation it is the physical mater¬
ial which is dominant over the statement.*
1. This is discussed below
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Stage 2. Part premiss-related response
In this stage the subject is guided by the infor¬
mation within the premiss, but he does not utilize all
the information available within it. Donaldson and Lloyd
(1971) suggest that what happens when a child is required
to relate statements to physically present objects (or
pictures of objects) is that the child is governed by the
perceptual properties of the physical array (these pro¬
perties influenoe the nature of the child's looking, the
things he attends to, the way in which he structures or
interprets what he sees) and by his interpretation of the
statement. They propose that: 'typically, the child's in¬
terpretation is less constrained than that of the adult
the syntactic structure of the utterance. He derives
from the language a general notion of the theme: of the
elements involved and the kinds of relation that are
referred toj but linguistic 00nsiderations alone leave
open to him certain options which the adult analysis
would disallow*. They then go on to suggest that: 'in
the absence of a decisive structuring of the language, it
is then the structuring of the physical array that deter-
1 2 •*
mines the outcome*.
1. On the basis of this proposal it may be necessary to
suggest that children giving Stage 1 responses do not
completely ignore the premiss, but that they fail to put
an interpretation upon it or put an interpretation upon
it whioh gives way to the properties of the physical
(Continued on p.207).
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(Footnote continued from p. 206).
array. It should be noted, though, that there are other
aspects of the task apart from the statement and physical
array which can be instrumental in directing a response,
for example, that the response should be verbal or that
it should be a judgement of someone else's behaviour.
2. It should be noted that the Donaldson and Lloyd propo¬
sal is referring to situations where the child is answer¬
ing questions or making judgements about the statement and
physical array. This is not always the case in this study
since in most of the experiments the child is required to
act upon the physical material in order to bring it into
line with the premiss.
3. This account of how children relate linguistic utter¬
ances to their referents is made with reference to one of
a series of experiments conducted at the Edinburgh Cogni¬
tion Project. In this experiment nursery school children
aged between 3 years 7 months and 5 years 0 months were
required to judge whether statements containing quanti¬
fiers and emitted by a 'talking panda' were true or false
in relation to a physical array displayed before them.
In some of the conditions, from a few of the youngest
subjects, came sequences of 'true' judgements consistent
with Stage 1 as proposed in this study, although these
were not successive responses since trials for other con¬
ditions, to which different responses were given, were
interspersed witlfnany one condition.
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Certainly the idea that children's interpretations
of verbal statements are less governed by syntactic struc¬
tures than adults' interpretations is very relevant in
this study. It can explain the errors with premisses
containing negatives. For example in the 'Houses and
boxes' experiment and the 'Disjunctive syllogism' experi¬
ment a statement such as: 'The house is not in the red box'
could have been interpreted as: The house is in the red
box'. Similarly in the 'Stars and wee animals' experiment
premisses including 'no star' or 'no wee animal' could have
been Interpreted as if the negatives were not there.
Where a double negative occurred (for example: 'If there
is no star then there is no wee animal') some subjects re¬
sponded as though a single negative had occurred, e.g.
they selected the unstarred box as the one which should
contain the wee animal. Presumably here the interpreta¬
tion extended to include one negative or an awareness of
negation but not to the adult encoding of a double negative.
Turning to the physical array side of the situation,
and the way it can dominate the statement, one suspects
that this may have happened for some subjects in the 'Stars
and wee animals' experiment. The presence of stars or wee
animals on or in some boxes may have dominated some res¬
ponses so that starred boxes or boxes containing wee ani¬
mals were selected. This may have occurred when the sub¬
ject's interpretation of the premiss contained an aware¬
ness of a negative. In the 'Houses and boxes' experiment
there was little evidence of the physical array dominating
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the premise although it may have played a secondary role
in eliciting certain colour and position, preferences
which were noted, but which did not extend the child's
response beyond the limits of the premiss.1
With the 'B 1.1, brick and cards' experiment and the
'Boat and train' experiment a frequent response was the
selection of q Irrespective of whether p or *-p was given
and the judgements p.q, ap.q 'all right' and p.^q, /v,p.e-q
•wrong'. Here the subject consistently makes his response
on the basis of the latter half of the premiss. Why this
should be so is difficult to cay. In this situation there
are no obvious features of the physical array which might
be governing the response. If one speculates perhaps it
is the presence of 'If' before the first half of the
premiss which weakens its impact when compared with the
second half of the premiss so that: 'If there is a ball
then there is a red card' is interpreted by the child as:
• There is a red card*. Or perhaps it is simply a question
of the last-mentioned being better retained. A possible
alternative explanation is that the nature of the task
is dominating the premiss in the way that the physical
material might dominate the premise. The subject knows
that he has to make a selection or judge the experimenter's
selection and therefore this part of the task takes on the
1. Here reference is only being made to the influence of
physical material when there has also been some indica¬
tion of the premise also having influenced the
response.
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dominant role. In interpreting the premiss he does so
in relation to the selection which concerns q (i.e. the
red card, the white card; the boat,the train) and p (i.e.
the ball, the brick; some water, a railway line) is either
not noted or interpreted in a way which classes it as
irrelevant or secondary.
In a purely verbal task one can hypothesize that
this stage will also be found and will be exemplified
by a limited interpretation of the premiss and possibly
by the dominance of some aspects of the nature of the
task.
Stage 3. Premiss-related response (adult response)
In this stage children produce responses where the
information contained within the premiss is used in the
way in which adults would use it. This raises the ques¬
tion of whether pre-school children in this study have
demonstrated their ability to make inferences as defined
in the Introduction to this study (p. 10). The writer
argues that in some conditions some of the children have
indeed demonstrated this ability. In two of the experi¬
ments on disjunction ('Houses and boxes' and 'Disjunctive
syllogism') there is evidence that pre-school children
can draw a conclusion which follows necessarily from,
but is not explicitly contained within, information given
to them. Similarly in the seventh experiment ('Apple
and orange') this ability is demonstrated and this time
at a purely verbal level. In two of the experiments on
implication ('Stars and wee animals', 'Ball, brick and
211
cards*) some of the older subjects handled implication
as though it were material equivalence and so did adult
subjects performing the same tasks. If one accepts only
a truth-functional analysis of implication as indicative
of inferential behaviour then neither children nor adults
make^ inferences in response to implication tasks. However,
if one accepts the adult responses as the 'standard*
against ?#hich the children's responses are measured then
perhaps one can claim further evidence of inferential
behaviour.
The responses from the older children and adults in
the implication tasks raise the whole problem of how one
assesses reasoning. There is now a growing body of
evidence 1 that adults frequently do not reason according
to formal logic and that it is becoming more and more
unrealistic to judge an individual's reasoning ability
against a 'standard* of formal logic. But what do we
put in its place? Is there a form of 'psychological'
reasoning which is completely independent of formal logie
and which may or may not be governed by rules or laws of
its own? Or is it as Henle (1971) suggests a matter of
determining how the subject interprets the information he
is given because thereafter 'evidence for fallacies is
essentially lacking'? Henle's argument is that we
reason perfectly validly according to formal logic if
we take Into account all the information (which may be
1. Reference to this is made in Chapter I. Introduction,
(p. 54) and Chapter III. Implication (p. 119)*
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greater or less than that In the premisses given) used in
drawing a conclusion. On this basis handling implication
as equivalence is valid if the subject understands 'if p
then q* to mean 'if and only if p then q*. Clearly there
are questions which cannot yet be answered and in this
study it is perhaps better just to say that some pre¬
school children produced responses which appear identical
to adult responses.1
One point which should be considered here is the
question of 'growth' errors. A number of experimentalists
have noted that 'correct' responses obtained from young
children are at a later age replaced by 'incorrect' res¬
ponses. Ervln (1964) found that children who had used
correct forms of irregular past tenses later used incorrect
forms. For example 'did' and 'came* became 'does' and
•corned'. Lunzer (1965) carried out a task in which he
studied children's understanding of areas and perimeters.
He observed that children around the age of eight to ten
would judge a rectangle measuring 5n x 45" to be equal in
area to one measuring 25" x 25". Younger children, given
the same task, correctly judged the areas to be unequal.
Bruner (1966) found that, when asked to predict the level
of liquid when it was poured from one glass to another of
the same diameter, but different height, sixty per cent
of four-year-olds were correct, but only twenty to thirty
1. If one takes Henle's argument further then perhaps
children who produced Stage 2 responses (and even
Stage 1 responses) can be said to have reasoned
validly.
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per cent of five to seven-year-olds were correct. Other
such example^ exist, but these are typical of the kinds
of results found. The proposed explanations for this
phenomenon suggest that older children are applying
different rules and considering a wider range of available
information (some of which can be irrelevant to the task)
than the younger children. Whether one can then go on
to argue that the correct responses of younger children
and adults are of a different order, that they are funda¬
mentally different, is not clear. Certainly observations,
that developmentally children who respond correctly then
proceed to respond incorrectly, are inadequate for any
such conclusion to be drawn, since it is just as possible
that the young children and adults are operating identi¬
cally and it is the older children who are •regressing'.
Whatever the explanation for this kind of finding, one
has to a1 low for the possibility of children who have
produced results, apparently the same as those of adults,
failing to produce these responses at a later age.
The three stages outlined above reflect a movement
towards the constraints of linguistic utterances from
which can be drawn inferences. One can say that the
linguistic ability, i.e. the ability to interpret the
utterance, must be present for the inference to occur,
but it is less clear whether the inference follows from
the linguistic interpretation as part of the interpreta¬
tion or whether it is a separate step which does not
always occur.
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In some tasks more children appeared to be operating
at Stage 3 than in other tasks. For example in the 'Apple
and orange' experiment seventeen subjects attained this
level whereas in the 'Boat and train' experiment no
child did. Does one then infer that it is the nature of
the task, the material used and the linguistic complexity
of the premiss which is concealing the inferential ability
of the children in the 'Boat and train' experiment or is
there something fundamentally different in the type of
inference required in the two tasks? This question is,
of course, impossible to answer at present, but whatever
the answer we know that the same question can be put in
relation to adult reasoning where different types of
task also elicit different types of response.
In this study an attempt has been made to simplify
the task, to reduce the confounding variables (discxassed
in the Introduction, p. 3). Clearly many such variables
have still impinged upon the experiments. It is impossible
to conduct an experiment in a psychological and physical
vacuum, but some evidence of inferential behaviour has
been obtained from some children. It may be that if one
could iron out more confounding variables more evidence of
inferential behaviour would be obtained and as Mehler and
Bever (ig68) say: 'Although we may draw conclusions about
abilities from the child's successful performance, we
cannot infer the child's underlying incompetence from
his failure to perform'.
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